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ABSTRACT 
IMPACT OF STATE FRAGILITY ON CAPITAL FLOWS AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN NIGERIA 
Temitope Joseph LANIRAN 
Keywords: State Fragility, Capital flows, Economic Growth, Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag 
This thesis aims to investigate the impact of state fragility on capital inflows and 
economic growth in Nigeria over the period 1980-2015. In line with existing studies, it 
adopts an augmented neoclassical growth model where capital is divided into 
domestic and foreign capital inflows (FDI, ODA and Remittances). Using an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to co-integration, 
significant long-run relationship was confirmed between state fragility, capital flows 
and economic growth. The results reveal domestic capital to be very significant and 
contribute positively to economic growth. Similarly it was observed that remittances 
remain a very crucial form of capital flow to Nigeria and that the presence of state 
fragility makes it more significant. For ODA a positive contribution to economic 
growth was observed, however, the presence of state fragility renders it insignificant. 
In the case of FDI, the study found a negative relationship between FDI and 
economic growth albeit insignificant. However, the presence of state fragility makes it 
significant but still negative. A negative relationship was also observed between 
state fragility and economic growth. These findings, implies that while the issue of 
state fragility needs to be addressed and concerted efforts put into building state 
resilience, not just for the direct impact of state fragility on the economy, but also its 
impact on the economy through other channels such as capital flows. 
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CHAPTER 1: IMPACT OF STATE FRAGILITY ON CAPITAL INFLOWS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. It discusses the motivation and 
states the problem identified.  It outlines the objectives and research questions to be 
addressed by this thesis, as well as the methods to be utilised in achieving the 
objectives. It also highlights the contribution of the study as well as the structure of 
presentation for the rest of the thesis.  
1.1 Introduction 
Fragile states pose a dilemma for the development community, at research, policy 
and practice levels (Carment et al., 2009). These countries present not only some of 
the most serious and urgent development needs in the world but the most difficult 
environments for conventional economic theories and assumptions (Chandy, 2011).  
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(2013) report on fragile states, there are about forty-seven countries that are 
classified as fragile, which is quite high considering the need for countries to begin 
the transition from development to sustainability. This reveals the importance of the 
issue of fragility for global growth and development in this age of globalisation. About 
a decade ago, most of the fragile countries were low-income economies, but recent 
development has seen about half of them (21 out of 47) become middle-income 
economies, albeit lower middle income (OECD, 2013). 
 Perhaps, more than any time in this century, there is a consensus that policies 
aimed at economic growth, such as balanced budget, general macroeconomic and 
political stability are of much importance (Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001; Blanchard, 
Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010).  Organisations such as the World Bank and the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) have continued to prescribe market-oriented 
policies to the developing world.  It is expected that the sub-Saharan region, in 
particular, will sustain and increase its growth trajectory with increased levels of 
market involvement and democratisation in the region.  It is important to note that, as 
crucial as market-driven growth is to the region for its efficiency benefits, there is a 
need for strong institutions and governance to regulate market excesses as well as 
conducive social and economic environment, the absence of which characterises the 
fragile states.  
The state fragility concept is an elusive one (Ferreira, 2017). It has been defined in 
several manners by various international organizations. For example, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) defines fragile states as those 
where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to its people (DFID, 
2005). The condition of fragility has been associated with various combinations of 
dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and 
weak governance, persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high 
propensity to conflict and civil war (Carment et.al, 2008). The relevance of fragility is 
particularly pronounced in areas of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
where fragility appears to be widespread. Bertocchi and Guerzoni, (2012) among 
other studies explained state fragility along the lines of continued socio-economic 
and political instabilities. In essence they implied state fragility to be the presence of 
a combination of social, economic and political instabilities in a country, although in 
no given proportions. Other pivotal studies that have defined state fragility along 
these dimensions of instabilities include (Fund for Peace, 2015 and OECD, 2016).  
This socioeconomic and political environment raises questions relating to the growth 
experience of fragile countries in the region, the drivers of the growth, and the role of 
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capital flows in enhancing growth in these countries. These issues are important 
given that about three-quarters of African countries largely those of the sub-Saharan 
region are fragile (OECD, 2013). Despite this status, some of these countries are 
experiencing growth, which challenges theoretical expectations of a negative state 
fragility impact on growth. For instance, economies like Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
and Rwanda have been among the fastest-growing economies of the past decade. 
This rapid growth has led to the graduation of a number of sub-Saharan Africa 
economies to middle-income economy status with Nigeria being a leader in the 
group (OECD, 2013)1.  
Despite being at the core of the discourse on fragile states, literature on the link 
between state fragility and economic growth is only just emerging, and mostly within 
the context of cross-country analysis (Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2012 and Ferreira, 
2018). Although existing growth theories do not necessarily account for the role of 
state fragility, these recent studies have relied on augmenting simple neoclassical 
models with measures of state fragility to capture its impact on economic growth. 
Some studies along the same spectrum have focused on proxies of various 
dimensions of state fragility, from which inferences can be drawn such as the 
relationship between political instability and economic growth (Aisen and Veiga, 
2010). Other studies have investigated economic implications through indirect 
channels such as how state fragility affects the contribution and interaction of capital 
flows in driving economic growth (Mallaye and Yogo, 2011).  Bertocchi and Guerzoni 
(2011) highlighted that empirical studies can focus on the direct impact of fragility on 
economic growth and development, and indirect impact through capital flows. 
According to Ikpe (2007), looking at only state fragility is insufficient to explain 
                                                          
1
 although the middle-income class is now further divided into upper and lower 
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economic growth. Its indirect implication can be very useful for efficient policy 
making.  
 In general, the literature on state fragility and economic growth can be broadly 
divided into two: direct and indirect. As earlier mentioned, while these two channels 
(direct and indirect) have been established in the few available literature on state 
fragility and economic growth, they have largely only been tested within the cross 
country context. Very little attention has been placed on time series context2.  
Theoretically, fragility would have at the minimum, a marginal negative impact on 
economic growth.  An emerging consensus, however, within the available empirical 
literature is such that suggests no clear-cut robust negative impact of state fragility 
on economic growth.  It alters or reduces the potentials of theoretical growth drivers. 
 This study investigates the impact of state fragility on capital flows and economic 
growth using time series data for Nigeria from 1980 to 2015. It does this by first 
investigating the trend and dynamics of state fragility in Nigeria over the period of 
study. It then introduces measures of state fragility into a simple neoclassical model, 
where capital is subdivided into domestic and foreign capital inflows. These capital 
inflows include; foreign direct investment, official development assistance and 
remittances. The measure of state fragility was introduced at both aggregate and 
selected disaggregated dimensions of state fragility to understand their impact on 
economic growth. These dimensions are economic dimension, social dimension and 
military and political dimension. For econometric estimation, the study made use of 
the auto regressive distributive lag estimation technique.   
                                                          
2
 The importance of time series context will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
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1.2 Motivation for the Study 
According to AERC (2015), recent growth in the sub-Saharan African region has not 
been accompanied by structural transformation or reduction in unemployment levels. 
World Bank (2015) noted that although the region has a lot of growth potentials, it 
has been unable to optimise these potentials due to instabilities of various forms. For 
example the World Bank (2015) report highlighted that prospects in South Africa 
have declined due to difficulties in overcoming an electricity problem. In Angola, the 
challenge has been the sharp drop in the price of crude oil, while Nigeria has 
combined both an electricity supply challenge and the sharp drop in oil prices.  On 
the domestic front, risks associated with political and security instabilities, social 
instabilities such as ethnic conflicts, youth bulge and fiscal vulnerabilities dominate. It 
however, becomes crucial to understand what drives growth in an economy faced 
with these myriad of challenges.  
Kaplan (2015) opined that the prevalence of fragility in most African economies 
explains the suboptimal growth experienced in the region. Interestingly, quite a lot of 
the existing models on economic growth in the literature tend to ignore fragility and 
its manifestations in fast-growing African economies. He stressed that some of the 
largest and longest standing subnational armed conflicts, other large-scale violence, 
and other manifestations of fragility have been exhibited by hitherto relatively stable 
middle income, fast-growing economies or economies with huge growth potentials. 
This deflects the attention of external observers from the internal strains of fragility 
within such economies. The World Bank (2015), for example, listed countries such 
as Jordan, Kenya, Guinea, Nepal, Ukraine, Lebanon and Nigeria among others that 
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often fall into this category. Kaplan (2015) went further to explain the term “fragile but 
controlled contexts” citing cases of pre-2011 Syria, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan.   
Perhaps economic growth has a way in which it veils fragility and gives a wrong 
external perception on economies. This led to calls by organisations such as the 
OECD for the exclusion of income levels as an input in fragility measurements, nor 
should it be used for classification in dealing with fragility. Perhaps the reverse is the 
case, where capital inflows and growth can be hindered by fragility. According to the 
OECD (2013), recent periods have seen the fragile state economies experiencing 
fast growth and significant levels of capital inflows (FDI, ODA, and remittances). 
Nigeria remains a major recipient of total FDI and remittances going to fragile states, 
although proportionally less for ODA (see appendix; 1.1 to 1.3) and, until recent 
economic slowdown, continued to experience significant economic growth levels.  
The Choice of Nigeria as a fragile state of interest in this study is however premised 
on its economic performance in recent times despite its fragile state status. As earlier 
mentioned, while previous periods witnessed the concept of state fragility largely as 
an exclusive reserve of low-income countries, recent periods have seen some of 
them grow out of that classification (OECD, 2013). This growth has led to the 
graduation of about seven sub-Saharan Africa economies, hitherto classified as low-
income, to middle-income status, albeit lower-middle income as earlier noted. 
However, the choice of Nigeria is premised on its growth and capital inflow attracting 
ability despite its state fragility status, making it a significant capital flow recipient 
fragile state in sub-Saharan Africa. Although in per capita terms the magnitudes of 
these abilities diminish. 
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 As earlier mentioned the OECD (2013), highlights Nigeria as a leading and 
significant fragile state economy in the sub-Saharan African region with interesting 
dynamics, which will be discussed in subsequent chapter.  
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1.3 Problem Statement 
African policymakers are increasingly becoming aware and appreciative of high-
quality research in informing economic policies and decisions to drive their growth. 
Although there is much literature on growth in SSA at both regional and nation-state 
levels, (Ndulu et al. 2008; AERC, 2015), scanty knowledge exists on these issues 
within the framework of fragility, which has become perhaps one of the most 
germane issue for nation-states in the region. About 80 percent of the fragile states 
around the globe are from the sub-Saharan African region (OECD, 2013).  These 
Fragile states are characterised by deep structural and economic constraints (Maier, 
2010).  
The prevailing conditions in fragile states (weak human and physical capital 
accumulation, unstable macroeconomic environment, poor health and educational 
outcomes, unstable political environment, poor infrastructure) is not conducive for 
capital inflow, a key driver of growth. Due to their fragility, these economies often 
cannot mobilise domestic capital, raising questions about the growth experience of 
fragile states.  It, therefore, becomes crucial to understand the role of state fragility in 
economic growth and capital inflow levels. Given the multiple sources of fragility and 
the reinforcing interactions among them, fragile countries find it very difficult to build 
resilience, and many seem to be caught in a “fragility trap”3. This makes the 
transition out of fragility neither simple nor rapid. For instance, it is estimated that of 
26 sub-Saharan African countries identified as fragile, only 12 could be expected to 
become more resilient by 2039 (Cilliers and Sisk 2013). 
                                                          
3
 A closely interlinked circle of underdevelopment, political instability or conflict, and ineffective state 
capacity. (see Andrimihaja et.al (2011) Avoiding the fragility trap in Africa. World Bank policy research 
working paper no. 5884 (http: //elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10. 1596/1813-9450-
5884). 
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According to Bertocchi and Guerzoni, (2012), the state fragility concept has in recent 
times reached the centre stage of the economic development debate, in particular on 
the growth prospects of SSA. The concept of state fragility has been associated with 
various combinations of the social dysfunctionalities and qualitative factors 
(Carment, et al. 2009).  The relevance of state fragility for SSA countries is 
underlined by the fact that they are overrepresented among fragile states, as shown 
by the European Report on Development (2009), which is entirely devoted to the 
problem of fragility in Africa. Similarly, the Global Report 2009 (Marshall and Cole, 
2009), noted the continuing disorder affecting the region. The report stressed that 
the condition of fragility may jeopardize not just economic growth, but also capital 
inflows, which are crucial growth drivers.  
Contemporary economic analysis is yet to fully comprehend the various forms of 
interaction and feedback between fragility and the economy. Most attention on 
fragility over the years has appeared to be coming from the humanitarian point of 
view. It is, however, impossible to deny that fragility defines both the social and 
economic atmosphere within a country. According to Maier (2010), the dimensions of 
state fragility broadly cover aspects of security, economic and social development as 
well as political representations and governance. He explained that the term 
“fragility” hides a spectrum of heterogeneous country experiences ranging from 
countries in a situation of early recovery to countries with chronic levels of 
underdevelopment or protracted conflict.   
The key insight of economic growth theory is that high rates of accumulation of 
capital as well as other determinants have growth implications4. The critical question 
                                                          
4
 Rao and Cooray (2009) present a comprehensive overview of growth determinants literature 
particularly for policies in developing countries.  
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then is how state fragility affects capital flows and economic growth. This study 
proposes to expand knowledge by conducting a country-specific study, as each 
fragile state is unique in its fragility (Fund for Peace, 2015). Faust et.al (2015) argued 
that there is a fragile consensus on state fragility and its implications for growth and 
development. They stressed that the reason for the fragile consensus is the fragile 
nature of the state fragility concept itself; where drivers of state fragility differ from 
country to country.  They concluded that for policy effectiveness in fragile states, 
policy makers have to ensure appropriate bespoke interventions that take into 
consideration domestic fragility drivers. Moreover, development experts have 
questioned the use of a one size fits all approach in discussing issues in developing 
countries. Maier (2010) cautioned that the heterogeneity observed in development 
performance among fragile states is so vast that it is not very useful to treat fragile 
states as a group. Alesina et.al (2003) noted that a cross country statistical exercise 
is a crude way to summarize complex socio-political and economic challenges of 
countries. They posited a promising direction for future research, to supplement 
large-sample studies, would be for economist to do more case studies of economic 
and development issues of countries. This study, therefore, proposes to investigate 
the impact of state fragility on economic growth and capital inflow and their 
interactions in Nigeria. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This study seeks to understand the impact of state fragility for capital inflow and 
economic growth in Nigeria. In achieving the above general objective, the following 
specific objectives/questions have been identified:  
11 
 
1.5 Research Questions  
- What is the trend of fragility in Nigeria over the period of study? 
-  What is the impact of state fragility on capital flows and economic growth of 
Nigeria?  
1.6 Data and Research Methodology 
In covering the terms of reference in this research, econometric estimation technique 
will be employed.  
1.6.1 Data 
The study employs secondary data in investigating the macroeconomic measures of 
fragility, economic growth and capital inflows in the selected fragile state, for the 
periods 1980 to 2015. The sample size was very much dependent on data 
availability as published by the World Bank Data Bank at the time of conducting the 
research. Secondary data involves desk data collection (Saunders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill, 2009). Published data on macroeconomic variables can be obtained from 
the relevant institutions such as the National Bureau of Statistics, Budget Offices 
(BO), National Ministries and Central Banks, World Bank, and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The reliability and validity of these data are determined by the authority 
of the source of that data (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). In the case of this 
study, the thesis has relied heavily on the World Development Indicators from the 
World Bank databank to source for data used in the econometric analysis. To ensure 
that data obtained for the research are valid, the study ensured that all data was 
carefully examined, cross-checked and screened. 
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1.6.2 Methodology 
In order to investigate more accurately the implications of state fragility on capital 
flows and economic growth, it is necessary to have a framework to decide on the 
variables of the study. The traditional models of growth mainly focus on two key 
factors as drivers of growth: technology and capital accumulation, but they do not 
consider the role of other qualitative factors such as state fragility. Therefore, the 
potential roles of such factors are largely ignored in the growth literature. In 
addressing this, studies that have identified the role of these qualitative factors have 
utilized augmented neoclassical models in addressing this challenge. Mankiw et.al 
(1992) opined that the inclusion of some relevant qualitative and control factors in a 
neoclassical model improves the model and avails the model the ability to assess the 
impact of such qualitative factors on economic growth. Other studies that have 
argued along this line using cross sectional datasets include; Jalilian et.al, 2007 and 
Messaoud and Teheni, 2014. Studies that have augmented neoclassical models with 
qualitative factors using time series datasets on the basis of country specificity are 
also emerging. These studies include Klobodu and Adams, 2016; Nwosa and 
Akinbobola, 2016; Jawaid and Saleem, 2017.  
In view of the above, this study adopts an augmented neoclassical model that 
includes a qualitative factor, in this case state fragility to investigate the implication of 
state fragility on capital inflows and economic growth within a time series framework.  
Econometric analysis was used to examine the impact of state fragility on capital 
inflows and growth in Nigeria. Data was log transformed to stabilize the variance of 
the series. To carry out the estimations in this thesis, eviews 9 was used. 
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1.7 Contribution and Policy Relevance of the Study 
This thesis aims to contribute to the capital flow and growth literature within the 
context of fragile state economies using the case of Nigeria. Specifically; 
-  This thesis introduces state fragility into an existing growth model and thereby 
understands the implications of state fragility for economic growth. 
- This thesis contributes to the literature within the economic growth framework using 
a time series approach to provide explanations to the impact of state fragility on the 
economy of Nigeria. State fragility has proven to be a multifaceted issue that by 
concentrating on a specific area, this study can reach a more meaningful conclusion 
and more useful policy implications. By restricting the attention to Nigeria, the study 
can factor into its fragility measure specific economic, social, and political 
characteristics of Nigeria.  
-  This thesis also provides a framework to inform future studies on fragile state 
economies. 
The economic environment in fragile economies including Nigeria is not favourable 
for capital inflows which may be a key growth driver. The international policy 
community has identified the uniqueness of these economies and has continued to 
call for developing economic models that suit these economies and their 
peculiarities. While a lot of studies might have been done in this area, very little 
knowledge exists on this subject in the context of fragility.  
This study proposes to situate fragility into existing theoretical growth models and 
discussions to evaluate its impact on Nigeria. It also adopts a country-specific 
context which may give a better insight into the country’s fragility as against the one 
size fits all ranking system approach commonly used.  This study, becomes apposite 
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at a time when Nigeria is trying to boost its foreign capital inflows as a measure to 
fast track its economic growth.   
1.8 Thesis Structure and Organisation  
The study is organised into six chapters with each chapter comprising appropriate 
sections. The first Chapter provides an introduction to the thesis, highlighting the 
statement of problem and motivation for the study, its objectives and research 
questions as well as the contributions and policy implications of the study. The rest 
of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two seeks to provide an overview of 
Nigeria along its socio-political and economic structures, being the main context of 
this study.  It aims to provide a contextual background to situate the analysis in the 
following chapters of this study.  
Chapter three addresses the first objective of this thesis. It aims to conceptualise 
state fragility in the context of Nigeria within the framework of existing literature. It 
focuses on indexing Nigeria’s state fragility to provide a measure of state fragility to 
be used in investigating whether state fragility really matters for capital flow and 
economic growth in Nigeria. In doing this, it examined seminal works on state 
fragility. It identified the various forms of the dimension of state fragility and ongoing 
arguments on the state fragility concept. It highlights the consensus on the 
multidimensional approach to being adopted in dealing with fragility. It went further to 
index state fragility for Nigeria using an equal weight approach and a multivariate 
approach (principal component analysis). 
Chapter four undertakes a review of the relevant literature including theoretical and 
empirical reviews concerning the theories of economic growth their evolution and the 
importance of capital to economic growth. Empirical research that has been done on 
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both cross-country and country econometric analysis is systematically reviewed and 
provides a framework for this study. 
The fifth chapter focuses on the second but core objective of this thesis which is to 
investigate the impact of state fragility on capital flows and economic growth in 
Nigeria. It adopts a simple neoclassical growth model, which was estimated with the 
use of the Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) estimation technique.  The 
chapter utilised a stepwise approach to investigate this relationship, and the results 
were presented. The chapter ends by discussing the results found and provides a 
conclusion on the impact of state fragility for capital flows and economic growth in 
Nigeria. The chapter found a positive relationship between remittances, ODA and 
economic growth, although in the case of ODA, it was not very significant.  However 
in the case of FDI a negative relationship was observed with economic growth. The 
chapter found a negative relationship between state fragility and the economic 
growth. Also and more interestingly is that the chapter found that the introduction of 
state fragility altered the contribution of capital flows to economic growth 
unfavourably. The chapter concludes that state fragility has direct negative impact on 
economic growth, however and more importantly, it has indirect impact on economic 
growth through altering contributions of theoretical growth drivers such as capital 
flows adversely. 
The thesis concludes in chapter six, with a summary of major findings, policy 
implications of results and recommendations, issues for further research and the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA  
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of Nigeria along its socio-political and 
economic structures, being the main context of this study.  It aims to provide a 
contextual background to situate the analysis in the following chapters of this study. 
2.1 Introduction 
An increasing number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are showing signs of 
economic progress, reflecting the implementation of better economic policies and 
structural reforms. These countries are giving greater priority to public spending on 
human capital development and other basic social services. In addition, there is a 
growing movement toward more open and participatory forms of government that 
encourage cooperation between the state and civil society. 
Nonetheless, the economic, social and political situation in the region remains fragile 
and vulnerable to domestic and external shocks, and the region has a long way to go 
to make up for the ground lost over the past decades (Hopkins, 2014). Despite some 
upturn in economic growth rates, poverty is still widespread and in many parts of the 
continent extremely acute. Investment remains subdued, limiting efforts to diversify 
economic structures and boost growth. Furthermore, a number of countries have 
only recently emerged from civil wars that have severely set back their development 
efforts while, sadly, new armed conflicts have erupted in other parts of the continent. 
These conflicts and other adverse factors, notably poor weather and topographic 
conditions and deterioration in the terms of trade, have led to some loss in economic 
momentum in the region in more recent years. These issues have however shaped 
the context of these countries and have implications for their economies. Elbadawi 
and Sambanis (2000) highlighted that the SSA is a heterogeneous region made up 
of countries with different peculiar issues. 
17 
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide an overview of Nigeria within the 
scope of the socio-political and economic issues that shape the country. The chapter 
provides a contextual background to situate the analysis in the following chapters of 
this study.  This chapter presents an overall view of the history of the Nigeria. In 
addition, it collectively lays out a broad framework for thinking about different issues 
in regard to socio-political and economic context of Nigeria. Hopkins, (2014) stressed 
that in explaining the economic performance or otherwise of West African countries, 
it is impossible to ignore the historical perspectives that have shaped the evolution of 
countries of the region. Loosely speaking, the history of Nigeria can be divided into 
three main periods, i.e. the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. 
Nevertheless, this chapter will focus mainly on post-colonial era history of Nigeria in 
situating the context of the study.  The general aim here is therefore to provide 
background information on crucial factors on social, to political and macroeconomic 
issues that make up the contextual situation of Nigeria.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2.2 
starts with a brief history and geography of Nigeria. Section 2.3 discusses the social 
structure of Nigeria, and this is followed by Section 2.4, which analyses the Political 
and Security Structure of Nigeria. The subsequent section 2.5 presents an overview 
of the Nigerian economy covering issues of the macroeconomic environment and 
capital flow to the country. Section 2.6 discusses Nigeria as a fragile state. Finally, 
Section 2.7 provides a summary and some concluding remarks. 
2.2 Brief History and Geography of Nigeria 
Prior to 1914, the British colonial masters ran two protectorates namely Northern and 
Southern protectorates. On the 1st of January 1914, following the recommendations 
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of Sir Frederick Lugard, the two protectorates were amalgamated to form the Colony 
and Protectorate of Nigeria under a single governor-general resident in the city of 
Lagos in the Southern Protectorate.  
Nigeria was granted independence on the 1st of October 1960 from the colonial 
masters. A new constitution established a federal system with an elected prime 
minister and a ceremonial head of state. Following a UN-supervised referendum, the 
northern part of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons joined the Northern region in 
June 1961, while in October the Southern Cameroons united with Cameroun to form 
the Federal Republic of Cameroon. On October 1, 1963, Nigeria became a republic. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first president of the country, although as prime minister 
Alhaji Tafawa Balewa was still more powerful. Also, although Nigeria had in 1963 
adopted a republican constitution, but it elected to stay a member of 
the Commonwealth. 
Nigeria is located on the western coast of Africa. It has a land mass of about 
923,768.0 square kilometres with an estimated population of over 180,677,058 
million people in 2014. The countries land mass stretch from the Gulf of Guinea on 
the Atlantic coast in the south to as far as the Sahara Desert in the north. Nigeria is 
boarded by the Niger and Chad Republics to the north, the Cameroon Republic to 
the east, and the Benin Republic to the west (CBN, 2014; NPC and ICT 
International, 2014). Nigeria has a diverse geography, with climates ranging from 
arid to humid. Nigeria is bordered to the north by Niger, to the east by Chad and 
Cameroon, to the south by the Gulf of Guinea of the Atlantic Ocean, and to the west 
by Benin. 
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2.3 Overview of the Social Structure of Nigeria 
Nigeria is a federation with different ethnic nationalities, and currently structured into 
36 states, a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), 774 local government areas and six (6) 
geo-political zones. These geo-political zones were based on cultural affiliation, 
language and contiguity of the states and local government areas. The zones are 
South-South, South-West, South-East, North-Central, North-East and North-West 
(Adeyemi, 2013). 
2.3.1 Population of Nigeria  
Nigeria, currently ranks seventh in the world, and is the most populous nation in 
Africa. In 2015, the population was estimated above 180 million people5.  Although 
when census was last conducted in 2012 by the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), the total population of citizens in Nigeria was 166.2 million people (NBS, 
2014). Figure 2.1 below presents the trend of population in Nigeria in millions from 
1980 to 2015. 
Figure 2.1: Population of Nigeria from 1980 to 2015 (millions) 
 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2017)  
                                                          
5
 World Population Prospects (2017) - United Nations population estimates and projections. 
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The population in Nigeria has continued to grow over the years. As at 1960, when 
the country was declared independent from the United Kingdom, the country 
recorded an estimated 45.2 million people; currently it is estimated to have exceeded 
180 million over the past 50 years of existence. The entire population of Nigeria 
accounts for about 2.35% of the world’s population. This means that about 1 out of 
every 43 people are Nigerians. The country has continued to grow at an average 
rate above 2.5 % over the years and is estimated to have doubled its current 
population by 2050 (United Nations, 2017). Figure 2.2 below presents the growth 
trend of population in Nigeria from 1980 to 2015. 
Figure 2.2: Population Growth Rate of Nigeria from 1980 to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2017) 
More than half of Nigeria’s population is youthful. Figure 2.3 below presents the 
youth bulge as a percentage of total population in Nigeria. From the chart the fraction 
of the youth in the country as maintained an upward trend and as such the country 
can be said to be a youthful country with huge labour potentials, but when faced with 
unemployment levels, this potential labour become potent perpetrators of crime and 
violence.  
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Figure 2.3: Youth Bulge as percentage of Population in Nigeria from 1980 to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
The general expectation is that rising ratio of youth population relative to other age 
groups would stimulate economic growth and development, otherwise known as 
demographic dividend. The youth bulge has the potential to propel economic growth 
and human development; however, this is not automatic (Olaniyan, Soyibo and 
Lawanson, 2012). For example, the high rate of risky behaviour associated with the 
youth population has led many to conclude that the youth bulge could be a problem 
rather than an asset to the society (Urdal, 2006). Other studies have argued that the 
structure of the composition along gender can give insight as to whether a youth 
bulge will linked to high rate of crime or not (Omoju and Abraham, 2014). Figure 2.4 
below present’s gender composition of Nigeria. 
Figure 2.4: Gender Composition of Population in Nigeria from 1980 to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2017) 
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 The split between the males and the females in Nigeria are quite even. Men take the 
edge in numbers, but not by much. There are, according to estimates, about 1.04 
males to every 1 female in the country. 
2.3.2 Nigerian Quality of Life 
The life expectancy in Nigeria is, unfortunately, the lowest in all of West Africa. 
According to the latest World Health Organisation, WHO (2018), life expectancy in 
Nigeria, is 55 Years approximately. The report revealed Nigeria has a life expectancy 
ranking of 178 out of 192 ranked countries across the world. This very low number 
can be attributed to the fact that the country has a lot of health issues. The report 
stressed further that, In terms of access to clean drinking water, 68.5 percent have 
improved means of access while 31.50 percent still struggle to get clean water. 
Similarly, when examining the access to sanitation facilities, only 29 percent of the 
entire population of Nigeria have improved sanitation access as compared to the 71 
percent that are still struggling. The average number of years spent in school in 
Nigeria is approximately 9 years, with national literacy rate of only 49.6 percent by 
2015 according to (World Bank, 2016). 
Figure 2.5: Secondary School Enrolment % of total in Nigeria from 1980 to 
2015  
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2016) 
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2.3.3 Ethnic and Religious composition of Nigeria 
Nigeria as a nation is an aggregation of several nationalities.  In real terms, it is a 
pluralistic and multi-faceted society, both in terms of religion and composition6. The 
official language of Nigeria is English, but the country does feature multiple 
languages. The most common non-English languages include the language of 
Hausa, the language of Yoruba, and the language of Igbo. Those three languages 
are the most widespread, apart from the language of English. The overall religious 
aspect of Nigeria is generally split between Christianity and Islam. Most Nigerian 
Muslims are Sunni and are located in the northern parts of the country while the 
Christian population is located mainly in the middle and the southern areas of the 
country. There are more than 250 officially identified major ethno-lingual groups 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2015).  However, it has over 450 different ethnic 
groupings including sub ethnic groupings (Adeogun, 2006).  
Despite the multiplicity of ethnic groups there are three major ethnic groups namely 
Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. Other significantly large groups include; Ijaw, 
Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv among others. The Hausa and Fulani are the predominant ethnic 
groups in the northern region of Nigeria. Though the groups originated in different 
parts of West Africa, religion, intermarriage and adoption of the Hausa language by 
the Fulani have unified the groups over time (Gordon, 2003). In contemporary 
Nigerian society, they are often referred to collectively as Hausa-Fulani. The Hausa-
Fulani is the largest of the major ethnic groups. They have been politically dominant 
since Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 1960. Islam is a key component of their 
ethnic identity and continues to inform their role in modern Nigerian society and 
                                                          
6 Tekena N.Tamuno, Seperatist Agitations in Nigeria Since 1914, in Gregory Maddox and 
Timothy K.Welliver (Eds), Colonialism And Nationalism In Africa (A Four-Volume Anthology 
of Scholarly Articles, vol.3,Garland Publishers,New York,1993,pp196-197 
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politics. Their culture is deeply patriarchal and patrilineal. In recent years, Hausa-
Fulani were instrumental in adopting and upholding Sharia, a system of Islamic law, 
in 11 of the country’s northern states (Ado-Kurawa, 2016). 
The main ethnic group in south-eastern Nigeria is the Igbo. It represents some of the 
staunchest opponents of the Sharia law. In many northern Hausa-Fulani-dominated 
states, minority populations of Igbo claim to have been unfairly targeted by laws that 
do not pertain to their faith (Ojukwu, 2009).   Unlike neighbouring Hausa and Yoruba 
cultures, Igbo society was traditionally decentralized and non-hierarchical (Dodo-
Williams and Milano, 2018). This made its members easier converts for European 
missionaries and today most Igbo are Christian. Under British colonial rule, many 
Igbo served in government and military roles and were later key players in Nigerian 
independence. But over the last few decades the group has become less politically 
dominant. 
Discovery of large oil reserves near Igboland in the early 1960s and proposed 
redistricting led many in the group to fear that they would be cut out of revenues from 
the country’s natural resources. In 1967, an Igbo secessionist movement in Biafra 
state led to a 30-month war with the Nigerian government, in which hundreds of 
thousands of Igbo starved to death. After the war, the Igbo were reintegrated into the 
Nigerian society, but in a more marginalized role. Despite lingering ethnic tension, 
they now play an important part in south-eastern Nigeria’s oil trade. Although they 
have often struggled to coalesce around a single candidate for the presidency, 
however, recent periods has seen a resurge of secessionist ideologies in the region 
and is heavily used for political gains.  The sincerity and potential actualisation of this 
self-actualisation remains heavily debatable in public opinion.  
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In the case of the Yoruba’s, they are one of Nigeria’s most urban ethnic groups. 
Historically, their culture centred on densely populated city-states each controlled by 
a King known locally as “oba”. Yoruba form the majority in Lagos, the second most 
populous city in Africa.  In modern day Nigeria, Yoruba speakers do not always 
identify with their larger ethnic group, but rather the many smaller Yoruba-speaking 
communities (Forde, 2017). This pluralism extends to Yoruba views of religion. As 
Islam and Christianity spread to Yorubaland over the past few centuries, the group 
embraced both faiths alongside its many traditional and animist beliefs. This blend 
and acceptance of religion survives in modern times and has mitigated some 
religious conflict in places where Yoruba form the majority. Like the Igbo, Yoruba 
held important roles in the British colonial government, participating significantly in 
both political and economic life. Since independence, the group has been 
overshadowed by the more numerous and dominant Hausa-Fulani. However, in 
1999 a Christian Yoruba named Olusegun Obasanjo became Nigeria’s president and 
was re-elected for a second term in 2003. 
In recent years, the Ijaw have agitated for more political franchise in Nigeria (Watts, 
2016). Although they are the fifth largest ethnic group in the country, their traditional 
lands in the Niger River Delta are some of the country’s most oil rich. Oil exploration 
has had devastating consequences on Ijaw territory and subjected the group to 
numerous ecological hazards (Ikporukpo, 2004). Mismanagement of oil revenues 
has kept much of the wealth from returning to the local communities and causes a lot 
of tension. Despite these ongoing tensions, 2007 saw an Ijaw take a major political 
office for the first time. Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw, became a vice presidential 
candidate for Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’adua, and became president after the demise 
of Yar’adua in 2010 and subsequently won the 2011 presidential elections.  
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The Nigerian government has worked out tentative power and resource sharing 
arrangements to help ensure that its many ethnic groups have some say in how the 
country’s natural resource wealth is spent. But major questions about ethnicity and 
how to balance the many competing interests still impede societal cohesion. Cities 
remain largely segregated along ethno-religious lines, and confrontation between 
ethnic groups is common. Often, ethnic clashes in one part of the country can set off 
a chain of reprisal riots and attacks in other parts of the country. All major ethnic 
groups have formed militias to protect their own interests and perpetrate violence on 
other groups. While illegal, these vigilante groups continue to act with impunity for 
lack of stringent law enforcement. 
2.4 Overview of the Political and Security Structure of Nigeria 
There are numerous manifestations of ethnic identity politics in Nigeria, either 
caused by the structural imbalance of the federation or competition for scarce 
resources including quest for political power (Salawu and Hassan, 2011).  
As a result, fierce political competition becomes the focal point for resource 
allocation; meanwhile, deadly means are used to achieve this objective.  Since 
independence the country has often oscillated between Military and democratically 
elected civil regimes. Prior to the latest return to civilian democratic regime in 1999, 
which produced Chief Olusegun Obasanjo a southern Christian as president, many 
have complained and called for the termination of Hausa-Fulani oligarchy that are 
believed to have controlled political power since independence in 1960.  
In 1966, the first military coup was not intended to produce Aguiyi Ironsi as the head 
of state. The coup was led by group of junior military officers, their aim was strict 
political re-orientation of Nigeria, the coup was foiled and the military was left with no 
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other option than to appoint the most senior officer as the head of state, by default 
Aguiyi Ironsi became the leader. In 1976, Obasanjo became the head of government 
after General Murtala Mohammed was assassinated in a Dimka led military Coup, 
again by default. Some have also argued that the second coming of Obasanjo in 
1999 was seen as a compromise candidate and safe choice for the northern 
oligarchy after complications of the Chief Moshood Abiola famous June 12 ethnic 
riots (Kew, 2010). In the nations over fifty years of independence, persons from the 
south have only ruled for seventeen years while the rest have been for persons from 
the North.  
Table 2.1 Breakdown of Ethnic Composition of Past Nigeria Leaders since 
Independence 
Head of Government Duration Source of Power7 Region/state/ethnicity 
Tafawa Balewa 1960-1966 Democracy-election North/Hausa-Fulani 
Aguiyi-Ironsi 1966 (Jan-May) Military-default South/Igbo 
Yakubu Gowon 1966-1975 Military North/minority 
Murtala Mohammed 1975-1976 Military North/Hausa-Fulani 
Olusegun Obasanjo 1976-1979 Military-default South/Yoruba 
Shehu Shagari 1979-1983 Democracy-election North/Hausa-Fulani 
Muhammad Buhari 1983-1985 Military North/Hausa-Fulani 
Ibrahim Babangida 1985-1993 Military North/Hausa-Fulani 
Ernest Shonekan Aug 27-Nov 1993 Appointment South/Yoruba 
Sanni Abacha 1993-1998 Military North/Hausa-Fulani 
Abdul-Salami 
Abubakar 
1998-1999 Military North/Hausa-Fulani 
Olusegun Obasanjo 1999-2007 Democracy-Election South/Yoruba 
Umar Yardua 2007-2010 Democracy-Election North/Hausa-Fulani 
Goodluck Jonathan 2010-2015 Democracy-Election South/Ijaw 
Muhammad Buhari 2015- Democracy-Election North/Hausa-Fulani 
Source: Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, Results at a Glance, Wednesday 25th April, 2007 
                                                          
7
 Tunde Babawale Op cit pp21 
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As depicted in the table above, apart from the six months of default rule of Aguiyi 
Ironsi, no Igbo has ruled Nigeria, this could be one of the reasons why the Igbo are 
still calling for secession from the federation. The Igbo fought against the federation 
during the first republic and today through Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and more recently, the Indigenous People of 
Biafra (IPOB) are calling for the actualization of Biafra. Another important feature of 
the table above is that apart from Yakubu Gowon (Military/North) and Goodluck 
Jonathan (Democratic/South) no minority ethnic group as led Nigeria.  
The reign of Gowon, a Christian minority from northern Nigeria was seen as a matter 
of convenience for the north, he was given the privilege by the Hausa-Fulani 
oligarchy on the simple calculation that, since Gowon was a northern Christian, it will 
be logical and politically viable to argue that the civil war in Nigeria was not between 
predominantly Christian Igbo and predominantly Muslim north. The Igbo was 
presumed by the north, would argue that the civil war is between predominantly 
Islamic north and Christian Igbo (South) which would draw sympathy for Biafra and 
would ultimately change the course of the war. This was a smart political move by 
the north to use Gowon to argue, otherwise in other to deny the Igbo the sympathy of 
the Western nations. Similarly, the unexpected death of Musa Yaradua 
(North/Hausa-Fulani) led to the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan (Minority, 
South/Ijaw) as acting and subsequently president of Nigeria in 2011 elections. 
Historically, ethnicity has played a major role in Nigerian political process.   
In recent times, Nigeria has ascended the ranks as one of the most active terror 
destinations in the world; in terms of frequency and sophistication of attacks.  
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Figure 2.6: Total terrorism incidents in Nigeria by years, 1980-2015
 
Source: Adapted from Global Terrorism Database (2015) 
As depicted in Figure 2.6 above, the total number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria 
between 2000 and 2015 rose astronomically. The trend appears to be increasing in 
recent times in spite of increased government security spending as depicted in 
Figure 2.7 below.  For example, in 2014, the president had requested the approval of 
the House of Assembly to borrow and spend an additional $US1 billion on counter-
terrorism efforts in addition to the 2014 budgetary allocation and the request was 
approved by the National Assembly.  
Figure 2.7 Security Spending as percentage of government expenditure in 
Nigeria from 1980 to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual statistical report 2015. 
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Terrorism related activities are not altogether new in Nigeria. Since the post-
independence era, the chequered history of the country can be characterized by 
several episodes of internally motivated crisis (Chuku et.al, 2017). Specifically, these 
terrorism-related crimes have been escalated by the multi-faceted political and 
religious demands of different competing groups, and for reasons of ethnic 
fractionalization. Some of the most contentious issues include: the demands for 
appropriation of oil rents, reforms in fiscal federalism and political restructuring, 
which has primarily contributed to the emergence of militia and terrorist groups in the 
southern and northern regions respectively. Although in recent times, what is 
generally recognized as terrorism in Nigeria are the activities of the Boko Haram 
sect. A group whose activities is localized to the North-Eastern region and 
neighbouring countries, targeting innocent civilians, religious and public places, 
government officials, and security forces. It is only one of many formal and informal 
groups engaged in what qualifies as terrorist activities. Tonwe and Eke, (2013) 
presented an anatomy of their operations.  
The relevance and strength of the group has risen quickly from being a regional 
phenomenon to attaining global status. This is confirmed by the recent trends that 
show links between Boko Haram and ISIL, an organization to which they had earlier 
pledged their allegiance. This increasing relevance and spread also imply stronger 
and more significant influence on the political and economic fundamentals of the 
Nigerian economy, begging for answers to questions concerning the underlying 
factors behind the origin and growth of terrorism in Nigeria, the consequences of 
government counter-terrorism activities, and the strategies for economic insulation. 
 It is generally believed that the nature of terrorism in Nigeria is mostly elite-
motivated, originating from the fallout of political competition for resources. 
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Advocates of this theory argue that it is very difficult for perpetrators of terrorism, 
who are often poor and uneducated rural dwellers, to mobilize resources to launch 
large-scale and sustained campaigns against civilians and the military forces for 
several years (Chuku, et.al, 2017). On the one hand, while, this argument appears 
reasonable, especially if one considers the demographic distribution and 
concentration of insurgency in the history of Nigeria. For example, in the early 
2000’s, when the president and ruling party were mostly from the South-West region, 
the insurgency was more concentrated in the South-South region, with 
manifestations in the form of militancy, vandalism, and kidnappings. On the other 
hand, however, between 2007 and 2015, when the president emerged from the 
South-South region, militancy dramatically reduced in the South-South region and 
became concentrated in the Northern regions, in the form of bombings on civilians 
and military formations, kidnapping of pupils, and killing of so-called “infidels.”  
The mechanisms underlying the activities of these terrorist groups suggest a 
strategic tactic. They often try to exploit the government’s counter-terrorism dilemma 
by using violence to provoke governments into harsh and indiscriminate counter-
terrorism responses that often affect the entire society, including the innocent 
population. Two examples are common: (i) when mobile telecommunication services 
are disabled in the affected regions and different degrees of curfews are imposed; 
and (ii) when an emergency rule is imposed, which suspends democratic institutions 
and allows the armed forces to perform so-called cleansing and restoration 
operations unhindered. 
The problem, however, is that these measures are often abused, as there are many 
cases of human rights abuses and extra-judicial killing by the armed forces in the 
affected areas (see Amnesty International, 2016). These counter-terrorism actions 
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are often considered to be provocative to residents and turns them against the 
government, which eventually leads to the radicalization of some of the citizens, 
making it easier for terrorist groups to recruit new members by claiming to represent 
and protect the interest of these vulnerable groups who, according to the recruiting 
terrorist groups, are being repressed by the state. 
 In a bid to use a combination of sanctions and incentives (commonly referred to as 
the carrot-and-stick approach), the government has been implementing several 
incentive based programmes. For example, the Amnesty programme, which was 
designed to pardon repentant militants and rehabilitate them through vocational and 
professional training programmes and also offer them monthly stipends during the 
process of integration back into the society. Moreover, additional budget outlays 
have been granted the armed forces to better equip them to fight terrorism in the 
country. Because recent investigative evidence has revealed large-scale financial 
corruption in government efforts toward counter-terrorism in Nigeria and they have 
had repercussions to the fight against terrorism as the credibility of government effort 
toward the fight against terrorism is often perceived to be insincere. 
2.5 Overview of the Nigerian Economy  
As earlier mentioned, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, located on the 
western coast of Africa on a land mass of about 923,768.0 square kilometres with an 
estimated population of over 180,677,058 million people in 2014. In terms of size of 
economy, the Nigerian economy is the largest economy in SSA, particularly post a 
2014 rebasing of the economy thereby accounting for about 17 percent of the 
economy size of the region; although, on per capita basis, the country only remains 
among the top 20 (World Bank, 2015). This can however not be devolved from the 
share population size of the country.  
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Before the discovery of oil in the country, the economy was predominantly agrarian 
with agriculture accounting for about 64.1% and 47.6% of the GDP in 1960 and 
1970, respectively (CBN, 2010). After the discovery of oil in the early 1970’s, the 
share of agriculture declined over time with oil taking over, accounting for about 
33.6% by 1981. The period between 1990 and 2002 saw the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP ranging between 37.9% and 42.1%. This figure has hovered 
around 41.0% since 2003 (CBN, 2010). The 2013 rebasing of the GDP brought a 
different dimension to the shares of the various sectors in the GDP. With the 
rebasing, the agriculture and oil sectors which were dominant in their share in the 
GDP over the years were overtaken by the services sector, whose share in the GDP 
ranged between 34.0% and 38.0% between 2010 and 2015 (CBN, 2014; 2015). The 
recent dominance of the services sector reflected the positive developments in the 
telecommunications, motion pictures and music (Nollywood and entertainment) sub-
sectors. Figure 2.8 below presents the trend of Gdp per Capita in the country over 
the period of study. 
Figure 2.8 Gdp per Capita in Nigeria 1980 to 2015  
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2016) 
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On average, aggregate income experienced a downward trend for much of the 
1980s; however from the latter part of the 80s, it experienced an upward trend and 
maintained this through the early part of the 90s. A rather undulating trend with 
upward tendencies followed to the mid-2000s followed a sharp upward trend.   
Figure 2.8 captures the situation of economic growth in the country for the period of 
study. The country experienced a steady decrease in national income ranging 
between the years of 1980 to 1984. Pinto (1987) claims that this could have been a 
back drop of the global oil glut experienced in the 70s. Nigeria’s growth experienced 
a sharp rise in 1985 and then further declines through 1987. The economy’s growth 
from 1988 maintained a steady seeming sharp upward trend until 1993. Akpan and 
Atan (2011) claimed that the initial fall could be explained by the new introduction of 
the Structural Adjustment programme which they claimed was initially resisted by 
Nigerians and later on by 1988 started to materialize into economic growth. This was 
maintained through 1993 which was the period when the Structural Adjustment 
Programme in Nigeria came to an end. However it witnessed a lot of undulation from 
1994 through 2004. From 2005, the economy has however followed a sharp upward 
trend nature. The year 2004 witnessed the launching of the economic agenda 
tagged National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). The 
four goals of NEEDS are poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation 
and value re-orientation. The hope of the programme was to diversify the economy, 
boost non-energy exports, increase industrial capacity utilization, and improve 
agricultural productivity. A lot of these goals were basically to be funded by oil 
revenue as it has continued to contribute about half of government revenue.  
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Figure 2.9 Oil revenue as a percentage of Government Revenue in Nigeria 1980 
to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual statistical report 2015. 
According to EIA (2014), Nigeria was the top liquid fuels producer in the Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) region, followed by Angola. In 2012, Nigeria and Angola jointly 
produced up to 75.0% of the total liquid fuels in SSA. Still in 2012, Nigeria was 
ranked the 4th largest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exporter in the world, accounting 
for 8.0% of total LNG exports worldwide and also exported about 950 billion cubic 
feet (bcf) of LNG in 2012 (EIA, 2014). The country is endowed with 182 trillion cubic 
feet of proved natural gas reserves, which accounts for 82.0% of the total proven 
natural gas reserves in SSA. This makes the country the 9th largest holder of proved 
natural gas reserves in the world (EIA, 2014).  
Fluctuations in crude oil price and other major developments in the global oil market, 
noticeably affect the Nigerian economy because of her heavy dependence on oil 
revenue. According to projections by the IMF, Nigeria earned $52.0 billion in 2015 
from oil and natural gas exports. This amount was $35.0 billion less than what was 
received in 2014, due to the fall in oil prices (IMF, 2015). As part of lessons learned 
from developments in the global world market (fluctuations in crude oil price), the 
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Nigerian government put in place two fiscal buffers (the Excess Crude Account and 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund) to cushion any form of negative effect from oil price 
developments. These buffers (accounts) are to hold in trust any excesses (savings) 
generated from increase in oil price above the budget benchmark price used to 
estimate budgeted revenues. For example as a result of fall in oil price between 
2012 and 2014, government expenditure dropped as presented in figure 2.10.  
Figure 2.10 Government Expenditure and Money Supply as percentage of GDP 
in Nigeria 1980 to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
Nigeria has been currently adjudged to be the largest oil producer in Africa, with the 
second largest proved oil reserves in Africa, next to that of Libya and the world's 
fourth-largest exporter of LNG in 2015 (WEC, 2013; EIA, 2016). Nigeria has been a 
member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 
1971. The country’s major oil wells are located in the southern part of the country, in 
the Niger delta to be precise and in the Gulf of Guinea, Bight of Benin, and the Bight 
of Bonny (offshore). The greater part of Nigeria’s crude oil export is mainly to North 
America and Western Europe, and the bulk of its refined crude oil product 
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requirements are imported. Most of the country’s exploration activities are centred in 
the deep and ultra-deep offshores and partly in north-eastern part of the country, 
particularly the Chad basin (WEC, 2013).  
2.5.1 Overview of capital in Nigeria 
The need for external capital flows to developing countries to supplement domestic 
savings for investment and growth cannot be over-emphasised. For most countries, 
the gap between domestic savings and domestic investment is wide; thus to achieve 
sustainable economic growth, countries require other sources of capital outside the 
domestic economy. The need for external finance is even greater in developing 
African countries such as Nigeria, where there are generally high levels of poverty 
and low domestic capacity to save. The realisation of this need for external capital 
flows has led many African countries, including Nigeria to liberalise their financial 
systems. In response to this liberalisation, foreign capital flows to Africa have been 
on the increase in recent years. History shows that foreign capital has grown 
significantly in sub-Saharan Africa with Nigeria accounting for a greater portion of 
this. In Nigeria, FDI increased from US$544.33 million in 1981 to US$7.10 billion in 
2012 accounting for almost 20% of the total FDI in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 
(World Bank, WDI 2016). Like many sub-Saharan African countries, Nigeria has 
adopted policies aimed at attracting foreign capital which have allowed for greater 
capital inflows into the economy. This inflow of capital is ideally expected to promote 
economic growth. Moreover, the effect of capital flows on economic growth also 
depends both on the type of foreign capital and the type of economy (Aizenman et 
al. 2013). 
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Figure 2.11 Capital flows as percentage of GDP in Nigeria 1980 to 2015 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
The figure above depicts how capital flows have witnessed a quite significant level of 
dynamism over the years. In Nigeria, while ODA has maintained a rather steady and 
low level except for the outliers between 2004 and 2008, FDI and remittances have 
experienced more volatility. The upsurge witnessed from 2004 to 2006 is linked to 
debt relief granted Nigeria by the Paris Club of creditors to the tune of over USD 5 
billion in 2005 and further increases for 2006 which was classified as ODA (OECD, 
2007). Nigeria is a resource-based country and is one of the largest recipients of FDI 
in sub-Saharan Africa. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (2006), Nigeria received 11% of 
Africa’s total inflow of FDI in 2006 and 70% of West Africa’s total inflow of FDI in the 
same year. However, petroleum sector accounted for 80% of the total inflow of FDI, 
which makes the sector the largest recipient of FDI into Nigeria. It also revealed that 
Nigeria dominated the increase of FDI inflows into West Africa from $3.2 billion in 
2004 to $4.5billion in 2005, a 40% increase which represented 15% of Africa’s total 
FDI value at the time. Nigeria was one of the sub-Saharan African countries that 
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introduced policy measures to promote investment through tightening its regulatory 
framework by adding local content requirements (UNCTAD, 2010). Specifically in 
Nigeria, FDI has been a major target for the past few decades to foster an increase 
in economic growth. As a result, efforts have been made through different policies to 
attract FDI. One of the policy measures adopted was the establishment of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986, which provided the basis for 
deregulation of the Nigerian economy (CBN, 2001). Nigeria implemented the SAP 
with a view to restore the economy and make the country better able to service its 
debt. Prior to the introduction of SAP, Nigeria had an overprotective investment 
policy (i.e. the Nigeria Indigenisation decree of 1972), which affected growth of 
foreign capital flows into the economy (Obiechina and Ukeje, 2013).  
The abolition of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion decree of 1989 essentially 
prevented the economy from maximising its potential when compared to the East 
Asian countries who were already operating ‘open-door’ policies in terms of FDI 
since the 1960s (Adelegan, 2000). Other factors such as a destabilising debt burden 
as well as socio-economic and political developments mitigated the inflow of FDI in 
the 1980s. The regulatory and institutional framework required prior to foreign 
companies being approved and incorporated contributed to a large extent to 
discourage FDI into Nigeria before 1998 when the Industrial Development 
Coordinating Committee (IDCC) was set up. FDI reduced in 1994 due to the adverse 
political climate and macro-economic problems evidenced by rising inflation, and 
interest and exchange rate volatility in the country at that time. The investment in the 
global system of mobile communications (GSM) has increased the inflow of FDI into 
the Nigerian telecommunication industry. According to Central Bank of Nigeria 
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(CBN), 2001, deregulation of the Nigerian telecommunication sub-sector in 2001 
resulted in a remarkable improvement in the sector.  
There have been increases in capital flows, especially FDI, into Nigeria since the 
early 1990s until recently when we observe a reduction in its value. This reduction 
may be due to the present insecurity in the country with the ongoing bombing attacks 
and kidnapping by Boko-Haram, a radical Islamist group predominantly operating in 
the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The presence of such insurgent groups might affect 
investors’ decision to make investments in the form of FDI and remittances in the 
country. All the capital flows as a percentage of GDP can be seen to be declining, 
except for gross capital formation since initial drop in the 80s and 90s.  
Remittances did, however, start to rise significantly in Nigeria in 2004 from US$2.27 
billion, and stood at US$20.6 billion as at 2012. The increase is mainly attributable to 
the Nigerian diaspora being encouraged by the economic growth observed to invest 
in the country after the change from military to democratic rule. Nevertheless, in 
recent years remittances, as a percentage of GDP, have also reduced which might 
be linked to the prevailing insecurity in the country and to some extent the recession 
in the advanced economies. During this same period, Nigeria witnessed a drastic 
reduction in receipt of foreign aid, down from US$11.4 billion in 2006 to US$1.9 
billion in 2012 (World Bank, 2014). The reduction in foreign aid might be explained 
by the world viewing Nigeria as emerging into a middle-class economy, thus no 
longer justifying receiving such foreign aid. Although we observe a decline in most 
foreign capital flows into Nigeria as a percentage of GDP in recent years, we see an 
increase in their actual values since 2000 as illustrated in figure above. 
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2.6 Nigeria as a Fragile State 
The connotation of fragility as opined by Brock et al (2012) posits that “the 
terminology of failed, weak states or fragile states is not only descriptive, but also 
has a normative connotation: states are not functioning as they should”. Thus, fragile 
state is a state on the brink; it does not have what it takes to effectively perform the 
function of statehood. It is an ineffective state in a precarious condition, though not 
yet a failed state. Hence, fragile states are often characterized by ongoing violence 
and insecurity, a legacy of conflict, weak governance and inability to deliver public 
goods (Mcloughlin, 2012, p.8). 
The logical reason is that fragile states fight war on several fronts and because of the 
flexibility of their socio-political enclaves and the already heated polity and the fact 
that the state does not have effective control over its territory, the instruments of 
violence freely comes in and go out at will creating an combustible fuel for violence. 
Fragile states like Nigeria are always at war but in their own case, they are always at 
war with themselves. They are held together by force of arm and usually have a very 
strong centre, the reason is that they cannot afford to have a weak centre or else, 
the already precarious mansion would fall like a pack of card as typified by Nigeria. 
The “Escaping the fragility trap”, report published in April 2018 by the joint LSE and 
Oxford University Commission on State Fragility identified crucial symptoms of a 
fragile state, which include insecurity, legitimacy amongst others.  
With the spread and impunity of Boko Haram, the marauding Fulani herdsmen and 
other militant groups, there is no doubt that Nigeria faces multiple threats from 
organised non-state violence. According to the report “Lack of security lies at the 
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heart of fragility”. It continues: “Fragile states are ill-equipped to respond effectively 
to security threats. Citizens are therefore exposed to personal risks from violence”. 
Nigerian security forces are not only unable to face down organised private violence 
in the country, they themselves have become predatory on the people, as frequent 
reports of human rights abuses by the military have shown (Torbjörnsson and 
Jonsson, 2017). This is a strong indicator of state fragility. 
Although the country currently operates a democratically elected civil rule, however, 
legitimacy is not just about winning elections, it’s also about the social contract 
(Mueller, 2004). If a government doesn’t meet the needs of the people, it would lack 
legitimacy in their eyes. Nigeria is a country where successive governments have 
failed to tackle unemployment, poverty, inequality and insecurity, while public officers 
abuse the state for personal gain. This undermines state legitimacy. 
State fragility is also manifested in the failure of the state to deliver basic services to 
citizens (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010). Nigeria lacks the ability to get things done, to 
provide basic things that are taken for granted in many other states! Nigeria probably 
has one of the worst public sectors in Africa, with poor quality of policy delivery and 
public investment management. Also, as a mono-economy that depends on oil for 96 
per cent of its export and more than 75 per cent of government revenue, Nigeria is 
certainly prone to shocks, with little resilience an indicator of fragility (Ikpe, 2007). 
Finally, Nigeria is socially and politically divided, deeply polarised along ethnic and 
religious lines, acutely lacking unity and cohesion. While, Nigeria is not a war-torn 
failed state like Libya, Syria or Afghanistan, and it’s not as fragile as some small, 
vulnerable states, however, Nigeria is not working as an effective state; it has all the 
recognised characteristics of fragility: lack of basic security, inadequate government 
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capacity, a hostile environment for private sector growth, a divided society etc. 
Joseph (2018) stressed that Nigeria is Africa’s largest democracy and largest 
market. The country contributes the most troops for peacekeeping missions in Africa 
and has become a key broker for peace agreements in West Africa. As a major 
producer of crude oil and the most populous African country, it has often been 
‘elected’ to represent Africa at major international discussions.  The country is multi-
ethnic and multi religious with two dominant monotheistic religions Islam and 
Christianity. Northern Nigeria is dominated by Muslims and southern Nigeria is 
dominated by Christians.  The mixed Muslim/Christian middle belt of the country has 
been a hotbed for ethno-religious conflict. Clashes over Sharia, tribal differences and 
land disputes, high restive youth population and oil wealth and its management 
among other issues continue to fuel the fragility of Nigeria as a nation state. Ikpe, 
(2007) highlighted that the most fragile countries are also overwhelmingly primary 
goods producers, particularly mineral resource producers such as Nigeria. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, with a multi ethno-lingual society and a high youth population, there 
are strong tendencies for social crisis. Unlike most other fragile economies in the 
region, Nigeria has not recorded any major territorial threat to its existence since the 
largely self-funded civil war and reconstruction (Heerten, and Moses, 2014). It, 
however, has a paradoxical weakness which saw the United States of America 
National Defence committee in 2005 warn about the country's disintegration as a 
possibility by 2020 (Stewart and Brown, 2009). As the nation continues to generate 
more revenue based mainly on the sales of oil gotten from the Niger Delta region of 
the country, agitation for a larger chunk of the revenue continues to gain momentum 
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leading to the involvement of a mostly unemployed army of youths engaged in 
vandalisation of oil pipelines and other forms of chaotic activities which in turn 
impede economic activities and discourage investment in the region. In response to 
such events, the government increases its military presence in the region which 
often leads to more conflict and as a result security costs for the country increase. 
Also issues bothering on terrorism and religious extremism coupled with high 
unemployed youth, that creates an source of recruit for terrorist activities have 
continued to make the country more fragile. 
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CHAPTER 3: INDEXING STATE’S FRAGILITY: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 
This chapter focuses on understanding and conceptualizing the term state fragility. It 
does this by presenting a conceptual clarification of state fragility, existing indices, 
their rationale, and the aggregation techniques used. It presents a fragility index for 
Nigeria using existing methods as suggested by the literature as well as an 
alternative multivariate approach (principal component analysis). The existing 
fragility indices are first discussed with potential limitations before proceding to an 
alternative approach. The indicies are utilised in empirically testing the impact of 
state fragility on capital flows and economic growth in subsequent chapters.    
3.1 Introduction  
The term “state fragility” has evolved over the years, and has continued to gain more 
relevance in development discourse in recent periods. According to Ziaja (2012), 
most of the states depicted as “fragile” were previously discussed and analysed 
within the context of “state failure”8. Despite the continued debate over the aptness 
of the term, the concept remains of significant attention to the international 
community. With varying explanations and no universal definition, common 
symptoms such as weak internal cohesion and weak governance structures 
characterise these states.(See Appendix 3.1 for a comprehensive overview of 
selected definitions of state fragility). 
                                                          
8
 “Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. In most 
failed states, government troop’s battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Official authorities in a failed 
state sometimes face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, differing degrees of communal 
discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state. The absolute 
intensity of violence does not define a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence (as in 
Angola, Burundi, and Sudan), the direction of such violence against the existing government or regime, and the 
vigorous character of the political or geographical de mands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or 
justify that violence that identifies the failed state. Failure for a nation-state looms when violence cascades 
into all-out internal War, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary 
life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their 
surroundings”(Rotberg, 2002).  
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Common to the various existing state fragility definitions, a fragile state can be 
referred to as a low to middle-income economy with limited capacity in carrying out 
core state responsibilities and failing to provide essential services to citizens for 
sustainable survival (Chauvet and Collier, 2004; DFID, 2010; OECD, 2012, 2014). In 
essence, these states pose a serious challenge to global development. In response 
to this, emerging development literature attempts to provide explanations of the 
developmental and economic implications of fragility for these states (Carment, 
Samy and Prest, 2008; Baliamoune-Lutz,2009; Deléchat, 2018). 
Emerging development literature investigates the developmental impact of fragility 
through either its direct implications for income and growth or its indirect inference 
for some forms of capital flows to the various states.  
On the one hand, studies that have focused on the direct implications of state 
fragility have failed to reach a robust conscensus on its implication for growth. Using 
a growth regression framework for SSA, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) found that 
the use of a conventional fragility definition becomes an insignificant covariate after 
accounting for standard regressors.  According to Baliamoune-Lutz (2009), the 
manner in which fragility influences per capita income is such that it interacts with a 
series of other factors. Asongu and  Kodila-Tedika (2013) concluded that fragile 
countries respond differently to the economic, institutional and demographic 
characteristics of state fragility. Most recently, Ferreira (2018) evaluated the 
implications of state fragility on economic growth. The study suggests that there is a 
significant negative effect of state ineffectiveness on economic growth, whereas they 
fail to find any significant impact of political violence.  
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On the other hand studies such as Mallaye and Yogo (2011) have focused more on 
indirect relationships such as capital flow interaction in the presence of state fragility. 
While Mallaye and Yogo (2011), and Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) have focused 
on SSA, Ferreira (2018) focused on a world sample. It is worthy to note that Ferreira 
(2018) remains one of the first studies to directly investigate the impact of state 
fragility on economic growth.  
State fragility is one of the most recent concepts to influence the debate about 
growth in Africa. The condition of fragility has been associated with combinations of 
multiple dysfunctions, including a country's inability to provide vital services, unstable 
and weak governance, lack of territorial control, and a high propensity to conflict, 
rather than to specific economic, institutional, or historical characteristics (Bertocchi 
and Guerzoni, 2012). While it may be difficult to singularly isolate the influence of 
each of these factors, the use of a composite measure may facilitate understanding 
of the effects of state fragility on other phenomena such as economic growth. For 
example, Sekhar (2010) tried to analyse the role of social, political and economic 
factors in a fragile state using the failed state index of 2007.  The results support the 
hypothesis that there is a great degree of simultaneity in the vulnerability in these 
three domains and together they determine a country’s fragility/stability. It is seen 
that social vulnerability impacts political and economic vulnerability signifi cantly, 
whereas political vulnerability has a defi nite effect on social vulnerability but not on 
economic vulnerability. Economic vulnerability had a limited effect on the 
vulnerability in the other two spheres – in the sense that a single dimension alone 
(either income level or income inequality but not both) appears to impact vulnerability 
in the social and political domains. The insignifi cant effect of political vulnerability on 
economic vulnerability is surprising. One plausible explanation is that political 
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vulnerability may lead to economic vulnerability with a lag, while this study is based 
on data at a single point in time. 
Africa has played a central role in the analysis of fragility, since it is in this continent 
that fragility is particularly widespread. The European Report on Development 
(2009) is entirely devoted to the problem of fragility in Africa. The potential negative 
impact of fragility and the consequent relevance of fragility for policy are also 
confirmed by the increasing attention of other international organizations.  
An approach to the analysis of fragility, pioneered by international organizations such 
as the World Bank and the OECD, linked it to the level of development in affected 
countries (Ziaja, 2012). Within this policy-oriented debate, standard measures of 
economic success, such as income and growth, were evaluated together with 
indicators of the quality of government intervention in the realms of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The perception that economic progress and sound policies can 
guarantee a nation’s strength has been contested (Collier and O’Connell, 2007; 
Carment, et.al, 2009 and European Report on Development, 2009).  
It has been acknowledged that, especially in SSA, the beneficial influence of 
economic factors is by no means mechanical, since relatively rich African countries 
are often plagued by corruption and activities that have generated instability and 
dysfunctions, and thus lead to fragility (Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2012). For example, 
the availability of natural resources can play a counterproductive role, since it can 
lead to the well-known resource curse9, especially when associated with a high level 
of societal inequality and/or demographic pressure (Ross, 2003).  In such situations, 
even commitment to economic reform can bring about turbulence and instability. 
                                                          
9
 Maier, R., (2010: p.11) Growth and Equity in Fragile States. Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands 
Institute for International Relations-Clingendael 
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Thus, the lesson to be learnt from the approach that has stressed economic 
explanations of fragility is that the beneficial effect of positive economic outcomes is 
not necessarily warranted, which calls for careful analysis of the channels at work, 
such as capital flows. 
 In the light of these issues, this thesis adopts a working definition of state fragility, 
built on a conceptual framework from the Fund for Peace (2015) and Bertocchi and 
Guerzoni (2012) that establishes fragility as a multidimensional phenomenon of a 
state’s lack of cohesion and instability which manifests along social, economic and 
political dimensions particularly in developing countries.      
Analysis bringing fragility into context for fragile state economies requires a 
meticulously customised and pragmatic approach and not the generalistic approach 
that has been engaged by the international community.  Kaplan (2014) posits that 
focus should rather be on underlying institutional and sociopolitical dynamics, effects 
and structures, as they give greater insights into the actual state of fragility in a 
country and have resultant economic implications. He opined further that the 
international community should cease from its one size fits all assumption on fragility 
issues, arguing that fragile states experience myriad difficulties, which can not be all 
be addressed concurrently. 
This chapter, therefore, aims to contribute to the emerging discussion on the 
analysis of fragility, and its applicable quantification. The chapter proceeds as 
follows: Section 2 provides a general background on fragile states, definitions, 
characteristics and classifications. Section 3 provides an overview of existing indices 
their objective, measurement technique and critique. Section 4 discusses country-
specific issues thereby providing a broad contextual understanding of Nigeria's 
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fragility dimensions and indicators. Section 5 identifies relevant variables and defines 
them. Section 6 presents the results of existing fragility measures and the proposed 
alternative approach. Section 7 provides a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Background and Conceptual Framework of Fragility   
3.2.1 Background 
“Fragile states” are made up of an interestingly diverse group of nations, which are 
vulnerable to internal tensions and are often associated with weak economic 
performance. Fragility is often associated with poverty, with an increasing fraction of 
the world’s poor living in the fragile states (OECD, 2013). This makes them more 
dependent on external interventions than non-fragile developing countries and more 
vulnerable to capital flow fluctuations. Furthermore, many fragile states are conflict-
affected or conflict-vulnerable, positioning them as potential risks to regional and 
global stability.  
Interestingly, quite a lot of the existing models on fragility, an emerging area of 
academic and research interest, tend to ignore middle-income countries’ fragility and 
its manifestations. However, some of the largest and long-standing subnational 
occurrences of armed conflict and large-scale violence and other manifestations of 
fragility have been exhibited by hitherto perceived relatively stable middle income 
countries with fast-growing economies or economies with substantial growth 
potential (World Bank, 2015). For instance, the World Bank (2015) included African 
countries such as Kenya, Republic of Guinea, and Nigeria that often slip through this 
net.  
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According to Ikpe (2007), the literature on fragile states has overwhelmingly 
focussed on low-income states. However, in isolating initial conditions and the 
development and security outcomes, a truer picture as to the extent of state fragility 
emerges. The majority of fragile states are indeed low-income, but some, including 
Nigeria, are becoming middle-income states. The majority of these very fragile 
middle-income countries are in Africa, and the rest are in the Middle East.   
Kaplan (2015) went further to explain what he termed as “fragile but controlled 
contexts”, citing the cases of pre-2011 Syria, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. Perhaps 
growth gives an erroneous external perception of the stability of economies. This led 
to calls by organisations such as the OECD for the exclusion of income levels as 
inputs in fragility measurements and classifications. They argued that capital inflow 
and growth may not necessarily determine state fragility. Perhaps, the reverse is the 
case, where capital inflows and growth can be hindered by fragility. An example is 
the commonly cited one of Nigeria. According to Omeje (2005), state fragility 
dimensions such as armed conflict and oil pipeline vandalisation in the Niger Delta 
region reduces capital flows and government revenue and as such may hinder the 
economic growth of the country   
Furthermore, cross-country fragility models often fail to distinguish between “pockets 
of fragility” in a country and a fragile state (Kaplan, 2015). For example, it is possible 
to have manifestations of some dimensions of state fragility in a country at a 
particular point in time, but that does not necessarily mean it is a fragile state. State 
fragility is, therefore, the exhibition of manifestations of characteristics of a fragile 
state in any of its various dimensions at any point in time while fragile states are 
those that continue to exhibit dimensions of fragility over a protracted period of time.  
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The build–up to a fragile state and its effect are transnational (Ikpe, 2007). Such 
fragility may create spillover effects to neighbouring countries, as seen in the case of 
Nigeria and her neighbours in the fight against insurgencies. It can, therefore, be 
argued that perhaps almost all countries exhibit some manifestations of fragility at 
particular points in time, but that does not qualify all nations to be called a fragile 
state.  
While definitions of fragility and country circumstances differ, fragile states tend to 
have a combination of weak and non-inclusive institutions, poor governance, low 
capacity, and constraints in pursuing a collective national interest. According to 
Kaplan (2015), fragile states are often characterised by governmental inability to 
deliver essential services to secure the population and they face severe and 
entrenched obstacles to economic and human development. As a result, these 
countries typically display an elevated risk of both political instability (including civil 
conflict), and economic instability (through a low level of public service provision, 
inadequate economic management, and difficulties in absorbing or responding to 
shocks). 
In contrast, resilience can be defined as a condition where institutional strength, 
capacity, and social cohesion are sufficiently strong for the state to promote security 
and development and to respond effectively to shocks (Kaplan, 2015),). Given the 
multiple sources of fragility and the reinforcing interactions among them, fragile 
countries find it very difficult to build resilience, and many seem to be caught in what 
can be termed a “fragility trap”. This fragility trap refers to a  closely interlinked circle 
of underdevelopment, political instability or conflict and weak social cohesion. This 
makes the transition out of fragility neither simple nor rapid: for instance, it is 
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estimated that, of the 26 sub-Saharan African countries identified as fragile, only 12 
could be expected to become more resilient by 2039 (Cilliers and Sisk, 2013). The 
transition process seems to involve some intermediate phases ranging from state 
failure and conflict to less extreme symptoms of weak governance and institutions, 
with each phase entailing different challenges. 
 In the early 1990s, much of sub-Saharan Africa could be regarded as “fragile” 
(Milliken and Krause, 2002). Periods since then have witnessed substantial changes 
in some countries: societies and leaders have moved towards an agenda based on 
peace and development; the end of the Cold War has put an end to surrogate 
conflicts, producing a global “peace dividend”; the world economy and the demand 
for natural resources have grown strongly; the international community has written 
off most of the debt of the heavily indebted poor countries through multilateral debt 
relief initiatives; and various initiatives have sought to enhance and redirect aid to 
respond better to recipient country needs and to build domestic capacity. More 
specifically, seven SSA countries: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, and Uganda have made relative progress in building resilience (Cilliers and 
Sisk 2013). These countries have benefited from factors such as natural resource 
windfall, more inclusive political arrangements, strengthening of institutions, and 
investment incentives. They have also been able to maintain macroeconomic 
stability and increase domestic revenues to support higher levels of public 
investment and improved social services. However, several other countries have not 
been able to make similar transitions and some have even regressed (e.g., Côte 
d’Ivoire, Malawi, Zimbabwe).  
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Most of the fragile economies were low-income economies about a decade ago, but 
recent development has seen about half of them classified as middle-income level 
economies (OECD, 2013, p.19)10. Almost half of the fragile states (21 out of 47) have 
upgraded from low-income country to middle-income country status. This has 
implications for the upgraded states and can be interpreted to mean progress and 
less dependence on aid, with aid accounting for about 3% of their GDPs (ibid). 
However, the use of income (GDP) as a determinant of status has been criticised as 
not having any direct relationship with the actual living standard of the citizens of a 
country (Kahneman et al., 2004). The Economist (11 February 2006, p. 70) 
described GDP as ‘‘badly flawed as a guide to a nation’s economic well-being”. More 
so, if the said growth is a function of natural resource endowment in a country as in 
the case of most of the upgraded countries.  
Growth resulting from natural resource endowment exploration has been criticised to 
be non-inclusive. Such activities do not employ much of the population and hence do 
not affect the lives of most citizens very much, sometimes even leaving them worse 
off as natural resource exploration can have negative impacts on the environment in 
the absence of strong government to ensure best practices and safety guidelines for 
the environment (Sachs and Warner 2001). This explains the importance of strong 
governance in the management of such natural resources (Kolstad and Soreide, 
2009). Furthermore, it also reveals that natural resource-driven growth in such fragile 
states only widens the inequality gap, hence, the poor who need to be assisted still 
exist in these societies, but they may lack access to aid because of the nominal 
nature of the measure of national development status.  
                                                          
10
 See appendix 3.2 for income level classification of fragile state 
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The presence of natural resource in most stable economies with efficient institutions 
is a blessing as it means more income in addition to other fiscal sources of income 
(Collier, 2007). The case in most fragile states may not be the same.  In many 
countries, the discovery of resources has led to reduced attention to other sources of 
income, as seen in the case of Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2008).  
Collier and Venables (2009) argued that there are three main reasons why resource 
abundance can make a state more fragile. The first is that it increases the 
opportunity to take resources away from the incumbent government, which is termed 
looting; there are increased incentives for corruption, theft and insurgency, all of 
which undermine governance and can lead to state fragility. The second is that 
resource abundance can change the characteristics and behaviour of the incumbent 
government, primarily by reducing its accountability. Resource revenue may reduce 
citizens’ scrutiny of their government, and also allow government to buy its way out 
of “trouble”. The third reason is that resources may contribute to a more difficult 
economic environment; resource rich economies are subject to extreme volatility and 
may face particular difficulties in creating new jobs, both factors that pose threats to 
stable government. However they noted that, while these are negative effects of 
resource abundance for fragility, it is important to recall that there is also positive 
potential. A resource rich state has the funds to build state capacity, to educate the 
population and to develop the infrastructure for economic development. 
3.2.2 Conceptual Framework 
The categories of ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states did not emerge simultaneously, nor did 
they follow the same trajectories. According to Nay (2013) The concept of a ‘failed 
state’ was introduced by foreign policy analysts in the early 1990s, in the context of 
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the post-Cold War, when scholars sought to describe the alarming proliferation of 
civil conflicts that engendered, in some countries, the fragmentation of state 
institutions, economic recession and deterioration of security conditions. The 
outbreak of wars in Bosnia and Croatia, factional conflicts in Somalia, poverty and 
social anomie in Haiti, the failure of the Cambodian government to put an end to the 
guerrilla activity of the Khmer Rouge, and, more generally, the development of ‘new 
wars’ beyond the model of conventional warfare induced a growing number of policy 
analysts to forge new categories – such as ‘quasi-state’ (Jackson, 1990), ‘failed 
state’ (Helman and Ratner, 1992/1993) or ‘collapsed state’ (Zartman, 1995). 
Subsequently, the concepts of ‘failing’ and ‘failed states’ have been widely 
disseminated by US administrations and policy analysts after 11 September 2001 
especially in the field of international security.  
The notion of a ‘fragile state’ has had a slightly different trajectory. It has spread 
internationally among donors, technical agencies and some governments, especially 
in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and peace-building. In 
particular, it has been widely used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the World Bank since the mid-2000s to designate the 
poorest and most unstable countries that cannot meet minimum standards set by 
major donors of development aid. Many other notions are also used: states are 
described as weak, vulnerable, unstable, insecure, in crisis, collapsed, fragmented, 
suspended, broken, shadow, and as quasi- and warlord states. The list could go on. 
Each concept refers to a specific situation. Nevertheless, the concept of the ‘fragile 
state’ is an overarching concept used by many scholars and analysts to depict 
countries where the legitimacy, authority and capacity of state institutions are 
dramatically declining, weak or broken. ‘Fragile state’ is a generic and 
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comprehensive category adopted by a large number of Western governments and 
international organizations since 2005, while ‘failed’ and ‘failing states’ remain more 
controversial notions. 
As it stands, there are about forty-seven economies that are still classified as fragile 
(OECD, 2013). This reveals the importance of the issue of state fragility for global 
growth and development in this age of globalisation. Initially, the fragile states’ 
agenda focussed mainly on conflict and post-conflict countries, however, recent 
discussions have explained that fragility is a broader concept (Maier, 2010). The 
OECD revealed the necessity to broaden and deepen the fragility concept from a 
focus on “a state’s capacity or willingness to provide services” to a multi-dimensional 
understanding that takes into account social, economic and political situations in a 
country (OECD, 2013, p.15).  
The OECD pledged to move from a ‘thin’ technocratic view of governance 
performance to a ‘thicker’ concept, which takes into account the quality of “state-
society relations” (OECD, 2013, p. 15 and 35). Such a concept also pays “greater 
attention to potential stress factors”, which can be internal or external: e.g. economic 
crises, demographic pressures and development issues such as human capital 
enhancement (ibid, p.15). 
From the shift to a broader and deeper understanding of fragility follows the need for 
a new quality of international engagement with fragile countries, which takes into 
account their peculiarities (Collier 2007). A “New Deal” for engagement in fragile 
states was endorsed in 2011 by fragile states, donor countries and organisations as 
an important framework to answer this need (Nussbaum, 2012). 
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The five ‘peace building and state building goals’, which the ‘New Deal’ identifies for 
fragile states, are legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and 
revenues and services. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State 
building (IDPS) reflects the above mentioned broadened and deepened 
understanding of fragility in its new terms of engagement in fragile states (IDPS, 
2013). It also provides measures that could put fragile countries in the ‘driver’s seats’ 
of their individual development processes. According to the Brookings institution 
policy paper on “implementing the new deal for fragile states” (Hughes et.al 2014), a 
major recommendation for any effective fragility assessment and development policy 
in fragile states, has to be locally owned rather than solely produced by external 
technical experts. Before this the commitments of the 2005 ‘Paris Declaration’ were 
rarely fulfilled in fragile states because they were based on “assumptions about state 
capacity and legitimacy that simply did not exist in these states” (International Peace 
Institute (IPI), 2012, p. 2).  
Analysis bringing fragility into context on fragile state economies requires a 
meticulously customised and pragmatic approach rather than the generalistic 
approach that has been proposed by the international community (Kaplan, 2014).   In 
essence, each fragile state is unique and requires a self-tailored approach that 
considers its history, economic potential, weaknesses and composition. This 
therefore makes theorising with regard to fragile states challenging. The Fund for 
Peace, remains a torchbearer in research on fragile state economies in attempting to 
conceptualise fragility identifying the major dimensions of state fragility (Fund for 
Peace, 2015). Table 3.1 below presents an explanation of fragility dimensions. Their 
explanation of fragility dimensions is consistent with that of the OECD (2016).   
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Table 3.1: Fragility Dimensions 
Dimensions   Description 
Social The risk vulnerability is affecting societal cohesion emanating from 
horizontal differences, social cleavages, differences among 
culturally defined or other forms of group construction. 
Political and 
Military 
The risk vulnerability as a result of inherency in political 
processes, governance legitimacy, security and protection of life 
and properties. 
Economic The risk vulnerability is emanating as a result of weakness in the 
foundations of the economy and economic activities.  
Source: Fund for Peace (2015: p.17) Fragile State Index 2015  
 
3.3 Fragility Indices: An Overview 
Indices on fragility are extensively considered as a welcome contribution to the data 
sets of the social sciences (Marshall 2008, p. 2, and  Ferreira, 2017). Conducting a 
time series analysis of the nature of the bigger theme of this study often requires 
data sets covering a reasonable time spread. Unfortunately, most existing fragility 
indices have a relatively short temporal coverage, with a range from five to fifteen 
years.  
According to Maier (2010), a related challenge is the classification and measurement 
of fragility. In reality there appears to be a broad sprectrum of heterogenous country 
experiences.11 The term fragile states may hide the diversity of country experiences 
ranging from countries in a situation of early recovery to countries with chronic levels 
                                                          
11
 Taking into account the heterogeneity of fragile states and situations, the European Report on 
Development (2009) presents some common socio-economic features of fragile states in sub-
Saharan Africa: an inability to mobilise domestic capital and dependence on external sources; 
reliance on primary products; concentrated exports; low human development; and poor infrastructure. 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012), in explaining what determines state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa 
also included variables such as inflation, youth bulge, ethnic fractionalisation, religion and conflicts. 
The fund for peace (2015) presented a similar narrative but included a political and military dimension 
that included weak democratic structure and high cost of security among others.  
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of underdevelopment or protracted conflict (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009).  From 
the development perspective of fragility, for example, studies have suggested the 
plausibility of a relationship between fragility and MDG levels (Harttgen and Klasen, 
2009). Maier (2010) however cautioned that the heterogeneity of MDG performance 
among fragile states is so vast that it is not very useful to treat fragile states as a 
group. He argued that taking into account the difficulties in defining and measuring 
fragility as well as the considerable differences between agncies in listing countries 
as fragile, a certain degree of political reasoning may matter in the decision to label a 
state as fragile.  
Extant knowledge on current fragility indices remains fragmentary and mainly refers 
to topically conceptual issues. Sanín (2011) provides one of the most relevant 
statistical critiques on fragility indices, paying attention to the ranking and 
aggregation technique of some fragility indices. One of the most researched indices, 
perhaps due to its relatively older status, is Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
the WGI Political Stability and Absence of Violence index (Kaufmann et al. 2009). 
Most of the other existing studies have been more involved with taking of stock of 
useful potential indicators (USAID 2006). Nyheim (2009) opined that they had 
focused rather more on “early warning approaches”,  which are primarily of a 
qualitative form and not readily available or useful for quantitative research, but can 
be helpful in the understanding of other findings.  With regard to quantitative fragility 
indices, it is opined that there is still not yet a systematic analysis of their statistical 
properties or the procedures used in their measurement (Ziaja, 2012).  
Another widely used definition of fragility is based on the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) that has been conducted by the World Bank since 
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1999. The ratings are intended to capture the quality of a country’s policies and 
institutional arrangements, with a focus on the key elements that are within the 
country’s control, rather than on outcomes (such as growth rates) that are also 
influenced by elements outside the country’s control. Since the CPIA ratings 
represent criteria for aid allocation, they play a significant role for donor bodies. On 
the basis of the CPIA, the World Bank defines as fragile those low-income countries 
scoring 3.2 and below (over a 1–6 range). From 1999 to 2005, the individual ratings 
have been kept confidential. However, the general rankings of countries have been 
made public. On the basis of the rankings, it is therefore possible to infer the 
distribution of the countries by quintile. On the basis of the resulting quintile 
distribution, the OECD defines as fragile those countries in the bottom two quintiles 
as well as those that are not rated. There is a partial overlap between the CPIA-
based definitions of fragility and other related indexes such as the Failed State Index 
(published by the Fund for Peace), the Index of State Weakness (published by the 
Brookings Institution), the Indicator of Failed & Fragile States (published by the 
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project), and the Fragility States Index 
(published by Polity IV). While all these indicators record similar components, the 
choice of variables and their weighting schemes remain largely arbitrary (Bertocchi, 
2011). 
3.3.1 Objectives of Existing Indices 
The constituting attributes of an ideal fragility index and what should be its 
organisational format remain germane questions limiting the fragility discussion 
within the quantitative framework. A lot of the existing models focus on some 
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assumed drivers for all countries in the same manner12. However, considering the 
dynamic, non-universal, peculiar characteristics and manifestations of fragility across 
countries, there are no corresponding impacts for different drivers and indicators 
across the board, and they can only be best accounted for based on context (Ziaja, 
2012 and Kaplan, 2015).  
Another major limitation of fragility measurements is that most existing fragility 
indices have been skewed in such a manner to suit the purpose of the hosting 
organisation. For example, a major state fragility index like the CIFP defines fragility 
to be  “the extent to which the actual institutions, functions, and processes of a state, 
fail to comply with the strong image of a sovereign state” (Carment, Prest and Samy 
2009, p. 84). However, questions regarding what should be the ideal functions to be 
satisfied by a “sovereign state”  continue to trail this index. One frequently referred to 
function in the literature is “monopoly of the use of force”. Some other indices have 
also mentioned “public services” (Fund for Peace, 2009), “legitimate, transparent and 
accountable political institutions” and “fostering economic growth” (Rice and Patrick, 
2008, p. 3). 
Most of the seemingly holistic and all-encompassing indices have been driven by 
international development policy motives, with their focal objectives centred around 
the identification of countries whose stance exhibits development hindrances and 
difficult to consolidate peace (Sanín, 2011). Indeed, these various indices seek to 
include a wide range of deficiencies which characterise fragile states and societies. 
However, they tend to cater to peace and perhaps governance issues and dynamics 
in these countries with little regard to other dimensions which have been widely 
                                                          
12
 See Appendix 3.3 and 3.4 for a comprehensive overview of measures and method used in the 
construction of existing fragility indices as adopted from Ferreira (2018) and Ziaja (2012) respectively.  
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accepted as crucial in identifying the fragility of a country (Carement, Prest and 
Samy, 2009). While this may be a welcome idea in answering questions that concern 
identifying which countries of the world require the most urgent attention of the 
international community, other crucial dimensions such as economic and social are 
often missed out.  
While it remains possible for these variables and factors to covary, in reality they do 
not necessarily always follow a given algorithm. For example, comparing fragility in 
two similar states may reveal a situation whereby a relatively small but violent 
conflict afflicts one, and the other is affected by an economic crisis that is on a large 
scale.  Classification of this situation would, therefore, require a conscientious and 
meticulous framweork to assess their relative performances.  This, in essence, 
provides the basis upon which most fragility indices have been criticised, suggesting 
the need for an individual country fragility index that captures each country's peculiar 
fragility. Each fragile country is unique in its fragility, and a one size fits all approach 
in determining country's fragility only scratches the surface of the discussion.  
In quite a lot of cases, fragility index authors are knowledgeable of their instrumental 
limitations as attested to by some of them and have instead referred to their index as 
only suitable for identification of early warning signs, and perhaps not for economic 
analysis. The BTI Weak Stateness Index puts forward perhaps, one of the most 
modest fragility definitions and index. The indices are limited to the features 
“functioning administration structures” and “monopoly on the use of force” 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008, p.6). However, apart from achieving their organisational 
purpose, it remains a welcome idea in academics and indeed the fragility literature, 
in the sense that given levels of parsimony remain pivotal in achieving quantitatively 
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differentiating concepts to investigate state fragility causes and ultimately the 
consequences.  
The multiple definitions of state fragility and inability to achieve a general and holistic 
definition of state fragility make it rather impossible to employ most of the emerging 
indices in quantitative studies. Most of the emerging definitions are products of 
peace studies and political science studies. They tend to cover issues mainly 
bordering on peace within a country, leaving out other indicators such as economic 
and social. Hence, they are often inappropriate for econometric analysis  (Gutiérrez 
Sanín 2009, p. 5). For example, the model-based structure of the WGI Political 
Stability Index and the PCIL Risk Ratio do not spell out their fragility features in a 
conceptual manner. In feeding their models, they barely utilised indicators focused 
on political stability.   
The PCIL Risk Ratio authors employed same indicators employed by the  “global 
model for forecasting political instability” of the Political Instability Task Force 
(Goldstone et al., 2010). The model is designed on perhaps one of the most 
exhaustive data generating studies in the political science fields and attempts to 
predict different types of political violence as well as civil wars.  Other indices, such 
as the State Fragility Index and the Political Instability Index have referred to the 
Political Instability Task Force as a springboard for their indices (EIU 2009; Marshall 
and Goldstone 2007: 3). 
 In contrast to the Political Instability Task Force, these indices are focused on 
measuring fragility and social unrest respectively, which differ entirely from the 
political violence and civil war objectives of the Political Instability Task Force.  Other 
indices such as the State Fragility Index only provides an operational definition and 
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no descriptive definition that states its scope and subject of interest.  The IDA 
Resource Allocation Index focuses largely on institutions and policies, subjecting the 
index to an increased level of sensitivity to impromptu and sharp changes in 
comparison to structural indices (Ziaja, 2012).  
3.3.2 Aggregation Techniques of Existing Indices 
A major area of concern in the fragility index literature remains the aggregation 
techniques to be utilised. While most existing indices make use of similar techniques 
founded upon simple addition of "equally weighed or uniform attributes", rules of 
additive aggregation reveal that negative variance in the value of one variable will be 
compensated for by positive variance in another variable (Munck, 2009). However, 
the validity of this judgement may largely be a function of the dimensions stipulated 
in the index. A case can, however, be made for such an aggregation technique by 
arguing that the selected variables and indicators reflect the same unidimensional 
concept, or by arguing that although the variables do not covary, they are parts of 
one phenomenon and are "combined to form a whole" (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). 
While the argument may be visible in a unidimensional phenomenon, in the case of a 
multidimensional phenomenon like that of fragility, perhaps the compensation 
argument becomes too simplistic, problematic and may defeat the purpose of 
aggregation. For example, how do high inflation or religious variance and low 
education and indeed human capital compensate for one another? The justification 
for this becomes even more difficult in the absence of a unified measurement unit 
(Gutierrez Sanin, 2009). 
For example, the CIFP index is made up of six dimensions of equal weight and 
aggregated by the use of arithmetic summation. It is, therefore, possible for a country 
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to perform woefully in one dimension but be cushioned by the remaining five 
dimensions. While, it is improbable empirically, it does reveal the pitfalls of this 
technique in the face of dimensions that cannot be easily compensated for.  Similar 
to most fragility indices, in defending their approach, the Index of State Weakness 
authors argued the non-availability of a standard formula for the appropriation of 
weights to the different dimensions of fragility. Hence their choice of equal weight 
(Rice and Patrick, 2008, P.26).  
A major challenge with most of the existing indices is their simplification of the 
complicated reality existing in the fragile states, in an attempt to aggregate and rate 
the levels of fragility existing in these countries. Recent studies such as Fabra Mata 
and Ziaja (2009) and  Gutiérrez Sanín (2011) have argued that the challenge is not 
with the measurement; instead, the challenge is the “construct“  that seeks to create 
a rating scale for a multidimensional phenomena that affect various countries in 
varying ways and degrees based on internal dynamics. Grävingholt, Ziaja, and 
Kreibaum (2012) argued that this manner of bias in aggregation results in the kind of 
proximity at the tail end of the failed state index of 2010 that exists between two 
completely diverse countries and at different economic and development stages - 
Haiti and North Korea. In the case of Haiti, the nation is struggling with basic needs 
of survival for its people. In North Korea, a repressive regime with the capacity to use 
nuclear weapons  potentially to threaten the rest of the world. They argued that, this 
kind of challenges renders these indices of somewhat limited use in a critical 
operational task such as policy making that suits the economic conditions in each of 
these countries. 
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Appropriate quantification technique in building fragility index, remains a largely 
debated issue (Ziaja, 2012).  Marshall and Cole (2014) suggested that, with the 
emerging nature of the discussion on state fragility and its quantification, fragility 
indices would contribute immensely to the understanding of the state fragility 
concept.  Extant knowledge on the quality of current fragility indices remains 
fragmentary and mainly relates to topically conceptual issues only. Most of the 
existing indices have been driven by international development policy motives, with 
focal objectives centred around the identification of countries whose stances exhibit 
development hindrances and make it difficult to consolidate peace. Nyheim (2009) 
opined that existing indices have focused mainly on the same “early warning 
approaches”, which are primarily of a qualitative form for all countries, and not 
readily available or useful for quantitative research, but instead can be helpful in the 
understanding of other findings.  
Ziaja (2012) critiqued the wide use of an equal weight average in aggregating the 
various indicators of fragility.  However, considering the dynamic, non-universal, 
peculiar characteristics and manifestations of fragility across countries, the impacts 
for different drivers and indicators are not the same across the board, and they can 
be best accounted for based on each state's context. Studies such as Grafe (2015) 
have made a case for the use of this technique, especially where data is “lousy“, as 
in most fragile states.  However, the use of an equal weight technique in the 
quantification of a multidimensional phenomenon such as fragility is prone to 
misquantification or misrepresentation. Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum, (2012) 
elaborated the multidimensionality of fragility using it to expound the bias in the 2010 
failed state index. According to Ferreira (2017), one prominent aspect of some of the 
current approaches is their focus on different dimensions of state fragility. However, 
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considering the rankings of countries based on fragility indices, they do not take into 
account the multidimensional character of the concept when operationalising it 
(particularly when it comes to the choice of aggregation procedure). 
 Recent views in the academic world warn that, by using additive indices to rank 
countries according to a single aggregate measure, these proposals overlook the 
heterogeneity among fragile states (Gravingholt et al., 2015 and Ferreira 2017). 
Ferreira (2018) presented an alternative multidimensional approach using principal 
components analysis (PCA) in quantifying state fragility, for selected fragile states 
following the line of recent work taking multidimensionality into account (e.g. 
Gravingholt et al. 2015).  
In the light of these debates, this study seeks to contribute to the knowledge on state 
fragility and its quantification by providing a contextual quantification of fragility. This 
was done by adopting the widely used approach by existing fragility indicies and then 
going further to use the alternative multivariate technique as proposed by Ferreira 
(2018).  
3.4 Country Specific Issues and Nigeria’s Fragility Dimensions and Indicators 
Before analysing fragility indices, their context has to be defined.  It is widely debated 
in the literature on what precisely fragility problems are. However, there appears to 
be a consensus on the varying scope and nature of fragility which revolves around 
specific functions, gaps and dimensions. Authors over the years following the views 
on the fragility concept such as Milken and Krause (2002), Schneckener (2004) and 
Call (2011) amongst others have all expressed some form of agreement on the 
variation in the dimensionality of state fragility ranging from two, three and more 
dimensions. 
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Contemporary economic analysis is yet to fully or adequately and efficiently 
understand the various forms of mutual interactions and feedback systems of state 
fragility and the economy.  More attention to state fragility over the years has 
appeared to be coming from the peace and humanitarian fields of study. It is, 
however, impossible to deny that fragility defines both the social and economic 
atmosphere within a country. 
According to the Fund for Peace (2015), dimensions of state fragility can be broadly 
grouped into social, economic,political and military indicators. Unfortunately, such 
categorisation can be interwoven as in the case of Nigeria. In as much as the 
categorisation of dimensions of state fragility has been established, country-specific 
issues vary and the way they play out vary. This explains the lack of a universally 
harmonised definition of state fragility. In most cases, the relationships between the 
dimensions are not exclusive, but instead, the interplay across countries varies.  
This study identifies relevant variables to explain state fragility, following the 
multidimensional approach in defining and grouping fragility and its indicators based 
on the commonalities of various definitions and symptoms of fragility and 
dimensional categorisation of the manifestations of fragility proposed by the Fund for 
Peace (2015),. These variables were identified in line with Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 
(2012)13 and adapted to suit the context of Nigeria. This study has identified the 
quantifiable variables most relevant to Nigeria‘s fragility under three broad 
categorisations in line with previous country studies that have tried to conceptualise 
state fragility within the Nigerian context (Ikpe 2007 and Tonwe and Eke, 2013).  
Income levels have been excluded from the indicators as suggested by the OECD, 
                                                          
13
 Bertocchi, G. and Guerzoni, (2012) presents a framework that investigates what explains state 
fragility along social economic and institutional dimensions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
70 
 
as they often obscure more germane issues relating to the internal dynamics of a 
country and its people. The selected variables focused on quantifiable symptoms 
and manifestations with the most economic relevance and not necessarily causes, 
symptoms and consequences as proposed by Besley and Pearson (2011).    
3.5 Variable Definitions 
The sample includes variables reflecting the determinants of fragility as expressed 
by Bertocchi and Guerzoni, (2012), adjusted to fit the Nigerian context and 
categorised within the dimensions of state fragility as posited by the Fund for Peace 
(2015).  
F= (OR, INF, SE, YB, S, TR, G, E, R)        (3.1) 
Where: F= Fragility,  OR= Oil revenue,  INF = Inflation, SE = School Enrollment, YB 
= Youth Bulge,   S = Security, TR= Terrorism Incidence,   G= Governance,   E = 
Ethnicity,   R = Religion 
 
Table 3.2: Variable Definition and Description 
Variable Description 
Oil revenue 
(E) 
Oil revenue measured as a percentage of total revenue of Nigeria measured 
on an annual basis. Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual statistical report 
2015. 
Inflation (E) Inflation is captured using the Consumer price index reflecting the annual 
percentage change in cost levels of a basket of goods and services. Source: 
Central Bank of Nigeria Annual statistical report 2015. 
School 
Enrollment 
(E) 
Human capital is captured by proxying with total secondary school 
enrollment expressed as a percentage of the official national secondary 
school-age population.  
It also serves as proxy for institutional quality. In the absence of better 
information about the initial institutional quality, studies such as Jalilian, et.al, 
(2007) have used educational attainment as a proxy variable. They 
explained that, while at first reading this may seem an unusual choice, 
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secondary school enrolment is often correlated with regulatory governance. 
They cited other studies that have done this such as Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994) that argued that the initial level of human capital can affect the growth 
path of productivity. Olson et al (1998) also use secondary school enrolment 
as a proxy explanatory variable in their growth study. 
Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
Security 
(P&M) 
The Security variable is captured by the summation of defence and internal 
security expenditure made by the government as a percentage of annual 
government expenditure over the years. Source: Central Bank of Nigeria 
Annual Statistical Report 2015. 
Terrorism 
Incidence 
(P&M) 
Terrorism incidence is captured by using data from the Global Terrorism 
Database. The GTD defines terrorist attack "as the threatened or actual use 
of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation". 
Source:  National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) (2015). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved 
from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
Governance 
(P&M) 
Governance in this study is divided strictly between Military and civil rules. 
Where governance( democracy=0 military=1) Source: National Bureau of 
Statistics 2015. 
Youth Bulge 
(S) 
As explained by Gunnar Heinsohn (2003), continued growth in youth 
population often leads to social unrest especially where the unemployment 
level is high, hence the impetus to compete by religion or political ideology. 
In capturing this youth percentage of the total population was used using the 
World Bank youth age criteria. Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
Ethnicity (S) The number of major ethno-lingual groups in Nigeria Source: National 
Bureau of Statistics 2015. 
Religion (S) The number of major religious groups in Nigeria  Source: National Bureau of 
Statistics 2015. 
 Where E = Economic Indicator, P&M = Political and Military Indicator and S = Social Indicator in line 
with the Fund for Peace (2015) classification.  
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3.6 Indexing Nigeria’s Fragility 
 In indexing Nigeria‘s fragility, existing  and an alternative approach will be utilised by 
this study. Firstly the existing ("traditional" equal weight arithmetic aggregation 
technique) which is the most common approach will be utilised. Subsequently, 
principal component analysis approach will be utilised.  
3.6.1 The Equal Weight Arithmetic Aggregation Technique 
This technique is perhaps the simplest and most widely used form of aggregation 
technique used in generating fragility indices. This study adopts it using existing 
fragility indicies such as the CPIA, FSI and CIFP. The regular steps followed in the 
development of linear models for prediction of a proxy variable for a phenomenon 
are identifying the most relevant dimensions associated with the phenomenon, 
followed by the estimation of best-fit weights based on the presumed contribution of 
each dimension to the phenomenon. This approach is widely used with datasets of 
few but reliable and large dimensions. Following from fragility, literature apportioning 
of weight to fragility dimensions can be quite challenging. Furthermore as fragility, 
and its characteristics varies from country to country, equal weights were used. 
Assigning of equal weights is an alternative technique to multivariate analysis in a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Equal weights pre-specification to all dimensions 
ignores dependencies between and among the various dimensions. This, therefore, 
makes the method a less flexible way of understanding underlying trends in the data 
on the various dimensions. Hence the predictive ability is rather low. According to 
Armstrong et al., (2015), the golden rule in dealing with equal weight models is to “be 
conservative”.  
The acknowledgement of environmental uncertainties such as causal relationship 
ambiguity and poor data quality has been argued to provide the “theoretical 
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rationale” for the application of equal weights in indexing (Graefe, 2015). According 
to Dana (2008), the intentional introduction of this bias (equal-weight) explains the 
difficulty of prediction in such situations.  In equal weight models,  data are not 
allowed to determine the weight of variables, rather, the weights are based on prior 
intuition and the directional effects of the various dimensions determined (Graefe, 
2015). The various dimensions are brought to the same unit. The values are then 
aggregated in calculating the index.  
This can be mathematically stated in a generic form as : 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑑 + 𝑤 ∑ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑣
𝑘
𝑖=1               (3.2)                                                             
where: d is the estimated constant, w is the estimated coefficient of the predictor 
variable, and v is the error term. 
As shown in the equation as adapted from Graefe (2015), the scheme for variable 
weighting in the equal weight model is exogenously determined. Going further, 
ethnicity (E) and religion (R) were constants over the period of study.  
Based on the diverse form of nature of the data used, all variables were used in 
percentages to ease aggregation except governance14. 
Figure 3.1: Equal Weight Aggregated Fragility (F(EWA)) 
 
                                                          
14
 Governance was measured from 0 – 1. Where (Democracy=0 military=1) 
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3.6.2 A Multivariate Approach (Principal Component Analysis) 
Principal component analysis is a statistical analysis technique used for a 
multivariate dataset. It is mainly used to reduce the dimensions of observation and to 
simplify data analysis and interpretation (Armeanu and Lache, 2008). It is often used 
but not limited to economics and social research, as it is used in other fields of study 
including engineering. It performs best when faced with correlated variables. The 
crux of principal component analysis is the transformation of an initial data set with 
its dimension to another set with a lower dimension while still optimising the amount 
of information captured from the original set.  
In mathematical terms, it is mostly a procedure for identifying a new dataset to which 
the initial datasets can be forecasted. The amount of principal components is, 
therefore, the same as the number of variables theoretically, but the whole essence 
of the analysis is to deduce as little amount as possible and still not jeopardise the 
original sets variability. 
As earlier stated principal component analysis is hinged on the transformation that 
connects different dimensions of vectors. It is worth stating that principal component 
analysis views data from a vector perspective, i.e., with magnitude and direction as 
against scalar quantities that are viewed from just a magnitude dimension alone. 
Going further, “principal components are standardised linear combinations of initial 
variables and are uncorrelated” (Armeanu and Lache, 2008). Previous economic 
studies using principal component analysis have found their basis in the works of  
Hibbs (1973) Vainers and Gupta, (1986) and Gupta (1990) who used it in quantifying 
political instability. The mainstreaming of this method, however, came after Alesina 
and Perotti (1996). Other studies such as Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999) 
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Asteriou and Price (2001) and Ponzio (2005) amongst others remain prominent 
studies that have utilised principal component analysis.  
This study therefore adopts the framework from previous studies such as Dunteman 
(1984) and Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999).  Dunteman (1984) presented the 
prinicipal component  generic framework as: 
𝑐𝑖 = ∑ ∝𝑗
(𝑖)
𝑥𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1
        (3.3) 
Where 𝑐𝑖 is the principal components I, ∝
(𝑖) is a vector with the element that defines 
SLC15 i and xj the initial variable
16
. 
Exploratory analysis 
A preliminary statistical test was conducted on the data set to provide a general 
overview of the characteristics of the dataset. The result is presented in Appendix 
3.5. A sample adequacy analysis was conducted using Kaisers measure of sample 
adequacy. The measure ranges from 0 to 1. A measure from 0 to 0.49 suggests that 
the data set is not suitable for principal component analysis. 0.5 up to 1.0 reflects 
adequacy. A higher figure across the range, usually the closer to 1.0, the more 
suitable the data set is. The result suggests adequacy with most independent 
variables ranging from 0.7 to 0.9 and an aggregate of 0.8 as presented in Appendix 
3.6.  Furthermore, an initial correlation analysis was carried out on the data, which 
revealed significant levels of correlation between the variables. Due to this high 
correlation as presented in table 3.3 below for example (terrorism and youth bulge), 
among others, there is a likelihood of the problem of redundancy of information. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 SLC (Standardized linear combination) 
16
 See  appendix 3 for equation 3.4 to 3.10 for  further breakdown as adopted from Dunteman (1984)   
76 
 
Table 3.3: Correlation matrix 
 OR R YB INF TR G E SE S 
OR 1.000         
R 0.253 1.000        
YB 0.094 0.090 1.000       
INF 0.182 -0.084 -0.341 1.000      
TR -0.058 0.172 0.766 -0.409 1.000     
G -0.030 -0.142 0.702 -0.415 0.611 1.000    
E 0.252 1.000 0.090 -0.084 0.172 -0.141 1.000   
SE -0.073 0.349 0.624 -0.320 0.855 0.512 0.350 1.000  
S -0.241 0.066 0.732 -0.501 0.720 0.554 0.066 0.549 1.000 
          
 
A core basis for the use of principal component analysis is to eliminate this 
redundancy as well as dimensionality. 
It is, however, worthy to note that eigenvalues greater than one alone are those that 
are of interest. According to the Kaiser-Guttman criterion, extraction should be on the 
basis that only the principal components that have a variance  greater than the initial 
standardised variables should be extracted. The eigenvalue plot below reveals that 
the other six eigenvalues are negligible. 
Figure 3.2: Scree Plot 
 
In the above scree plot, three eigenvalues are greater than one. Hence three 
principal components have been retained in the analysis accounting for  80.71 
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percent of the variability in the initial space. From the preceding, it can be inferred 
that this analysis has transformed a nine-dimensional space into a three-dimensional 
space losing 19.29 percent of the variability in the initial space. It is also worth noting 
that the first principal component on its own accounted for about 44.50 percent of the 
variability in the initial space, meaning it can be used to a large extent to determine 
fragility in Nigeria. 
Table 3.4: Principal Component (Eigen Value) 
    Cumulative Cumulative  
Number Value    Difference Proportion Value Proportion  
       
       1 4.005 1.802 0.445 4.005 0.445  
2 2.203 1.147 0.245 6.207 0.690  
3 1.056 0.336 0.117 7.264 0.807  
4 0.720 0.292 0.080 7.984 0.887  
5 0.428 0.083 0.048 8.412 0.935  
6 0.345 0.192 0.038 8.757 0.973  
7 0.153 0.063 0.017 8.910 0.990  
8 0.090 0.090 0.010 9.000 1.000  
9 -0.000 ---     -0.000 9.000 1.000  
Beside reducing the dimensionality as well as redundant information elimination, 
principal component analysis stresses the control of common, latent factors on initial 
variables. Simar (2003) argued the potency of ensuring that most of the important 
and crucial information in a multivariate variable is summarizable in a limited number 
of latent factors. For the factor analysis, individual initial variable behaviour is often a 
function of three different factor types: (common, individual and residual). The 
individual and residual factors affect individual variables in individual ways and 
thereby generate a particular influence type.  
Furthermore, communalities for individual initial variables can be determined as the 
sum of squares of the factor loadings.  Uniqueness can be determined as one minus 
communality.  The principal component analysis does construct new characteristics 
that can summarise the initial data set, by finding and aggregating the most 
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prevalent characteristics that summarise the data set. The results are as presented 
in Appendix 3.8. 
A typical situation in this method is such that numerous variables moderately load on 
each component and can sometimes be moderated by rotating the components of 
the initial PCA. This helps to obtain simple structures where the coefficients in a 
component assume their closest possible values to one or Zero (Jolliffe, 2002). 
Based on this, the result for the PCA was rotated using the orthogonal Varimax 
method as used by (Larru, 2009). This technique generates new coordinate axes 
perpendicular to one another. It maximises the Varimax criteria17. The results are as 
presented in Appendix 3.9. 
Earlier studies using principal component analysis for constructing economic time 
series indices have often made use of the first principal component in computing 
their index. The analysis of Asteriou and Price (2001), however, varied from others, 
in which they used all the principal components in computing their indices as 
stipulated by the scope of the study. In the light of this, this study utilised the first 
principal component in line with the convention from most previous studies such as 
Alesina and Perotti (1996); Annet (2000) and Ponzio (2005) but not with Asteriou 
and Price (2001).  
Based on the preceding, the fragility index for Nigeria using PCA is presented as 
below:  
                                                          
17
 Varimax criteria=maximizing the sum of the variances of the square loadings within each column 
(Dunteman, 1989). 
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Figure 3.3: Principal Component Analysis Fragility (F(PCA)) 
 
The principal component analysis does construct new characteristics that can 
summarise the initial data set, by finding and aggregating the most common 
characteristics that summarise the data set. 
Components are arranged in a manner of their explanatory power such that the first 
component (C1) explains the most variation amount of the initial data, under the 
assumption that the squared weights sum equals to one. Eigenvalue sum equals the 
number of variable in the original data set, and the variability accounted for by each 
component (C) = λi/n. Principal component (C2) is uncorrelated with (C1), and 
explains more variations but not as much as (C1), under the same assumption. 
Similarly, other components are uncorrelated with other components and account for 
an additional amount of variation but less than its previous component. A major 
limitation, however, for principal component analysis is the unit choice of series. This 
is so as the analysis will not identify factors that have not significantly contributed to 
variability (Fifield et al., 2002). This was however tried to be remedied by log-
transforming the series, except the one for governance where the data were in 1s 
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and 0s. Also, dimensions of state fragility were aggregated using this technique and 
presented in Appendix 3.10.  
3.6.3 Implications of a Multivariate Approach to Fragility Measurement  
Despite the many challenges of effectively quantifying state fragility, fragility indices 
remain a valuable tool for the analysis. As highlighted in Ziaja and Fabra Mata (2010: 
1), this can be a useful tool for development policy. As argued by Carment, Prest 
and Samy (2008: 3), fragility is a matter of degree and “while some countries are in 
fact failing or failed, in general, aspects of fragility can be identified in virtually all 
states”. As suggested by Nay (2013) an empirical analysis such as this therefore 
helps in filling the gap in providing in-depth case studies that could help provide 
empirical evidence on the effect of state fragility for economic growth and 
development.  
Figure 3.4: Plot of (F(PCA)) and (F(EWA))Fragility Indices 
 
From the trends of the results generated, as evidenced in Figure 3.4 above, it 
becomes clear that state fragility trends in Nigeria have continued to be on the rise, 
however not in a straight linear path. The upward trend in state fragility corroborates 
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studies that have suggested the difficulty for most fragile states to build any form of 
resilience, such as (Cilliers and Sisk 2013).  In the light of the results generated from 
both techniques used in this study to quantify state fragility, the relevance and 
implications of a multivariate approach can be discussed. Firstly there have been in 
recent times continued calls for scholastic efforts that approach fragility from a 
multidimensional perspective (OECD, 2015). The multivariate approach used in this 
study positions it among the emerging studies that attempt to provide a 
multidimensional analysis of fragility albeit from a contextual (country specific) 
perspective. This, therefore, makes this index apposite as a fragility proxy for further 
studies. 
 The multivariate measure utilises a principal component analysis approach to 
develop a measure of state fragility that serves as an alternative to the arbitrary 
weighting scheme. This method, therefore, creates a variable that maximises the 
correlation between itself and the individual components of the various dimensions of 
state fragility18. In calculating the index, the variables were normalised to ensure that 
the resulting principal component indicates a deviation of state fragility from its 
mean, and in effect produces standardised scores.  This was done in line with the 
seminal work of Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, (1999), where they used the 
principal component analysis to calculate a measure of political instability. They 
argued that the use of this approach ensures the use of a statistically determined 
variable which, although not based on economic and political science theories, is 
free from the potentially arbitrary hands of the researcher in its development.  
                                                          
18
 Principal components create a composite variable which accommodates the highest possible 
correlations with the individual components of state fragility dimensions. This is accomplished by 
choosing the vector of weights, which maximise their variance (Dunteman, 1984). 
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Secondly, going by the commonalities of the various definitions of fragility, that 
perceive it as a multidimensional phenomenon, the use of a univariate approach to 
quantification becomes inadequate. The word "multidimensional" suggests the need 
for a vector19 or multivariate approach in quantifying fragility and renders the use of a 
scalar20 or univariate approach inappropriate.  
Thirdly by using a multivariate approach, unsubstantiated assumptions of the equal 
weight approach that allow for dimensional compensations are easily controlled for. 
This approach, therefore, avoids the unscientific apportioning of weights to fragility 
dimensions. The weights generated can be used in the generation of datasets apt for 
time series econometric analysis. In an attempt to have a deeper and clearer 
understanding of the implications of state fragility, the state fragility index was 
disaggregated to three constituent dimensions of state fragility namely economic, 
social and military and political.  
3.7 Summary 
This chapter aimed to conceptualise fragility in the context of Nigeria within the 
premise of existing literature. In doing this, it examined seminal works on fragility. It 
identified the various forms of the dimension of fragility and ongoing arguments on 
the fragility concept. It went further to highlight the consensus on the 
multidimensional approach adopted in dealing with fragility and found out that 
fragility is contextual. Going further a brief contextual background on Nigeria was 
carried out, providing the context for this study with an economic focus, thereby 
situating the study into context.  A brief review of indexing fragility was carried out, 
and major methodological concerns were raised. The study went further in 
                                                          
19
 Vector quantity is quantity that has both magnitude and dimensions. 
20
 Scalar quantity is quantity that has magnitude with no dimensions   
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presenting a time series fragility index for Nigeria using methods suggested by 
existing literature as well as introducing a multivariate approach in the principal 
component analysis.  
84 
 
CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CAPITAL FLOWS: A THEORETICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
This chapter seeks to provide a review of theoretical development in the growth 
literature and to survey the empirical findings on economic growth, capital inflows 
and state fragility. 
4.1 Introduction 
An understanding of theories of economic growth provides a springboard for how 
developing countries and developed countries have progressed over time. More 
explicitly, theories of growth have aimed to provide first order growth conditions that 
are crucial for all economies regardless of what stage they are. Perhaps, they may 
be more apposite for developing economies as they provide insight into the essential 
areas that require more attention to drive the much needed economic growth in 
these economies. However growth models have continued to be augmented to suit 
specific scenarios over the years, but they still tend to have some principal 
considerations that have remained relevant to perhaps all growth models.  
There have been quite extensive study surveys discussing the continuous and most 
recent contributions to the growth discussion.  They include Alesina et al. (1996); 
Aghion and Howitt (1998); Easterly, (1998); Hoeffler, (2002); Dollar and Kraay 
(2003); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004); and Aghion and Howitt (2009). The focal 
objective of this review is to understand the core properties of theories of economic 
growth, and their development as well as the empirical evidence about these growth 
theories across the developing world.  
The continuous development and progression of theories of economic growth from 
the classical notions to the current frontier of knowledge of economic growth theories 
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have created rather robust competing frameworks jointly referred to as modern 
growth theories (exogenous and endogenous).   The exogenous growth proponents 
posit output growth to be exogenously determined by technological advancement 
and that government policy has little or no permanent long-run growth effect. 
Endogenous growth proponents posit that output growth is endogenously 
determined, and government policy has a permanent long-run growth impact. 
Theoretical build up to what is now often classified as modern theories of growth are 
founded upon the frameworks of the Classical, Schumpeterian and Harrod-Domar 
schools of thoughts.  
4.2 Theoretical Schools of Thought of Economic Growth  
Economic growth remains a germane concern to economists from developed and 
developing countries alike. This has led to a situation where divergent opinions and 
models have been generated based on the various existing schools of thought, as 
well as continued progression in the knowledge frontier based on empirical findings 
and new knowledge; however, they do have some core founding properties in 
similarity. This section seeks to trace the continued theoretical progress that the 
schools of thought on economic growth have witnessed from the classical schools to 
modern growth theories.  
4.2.1 Classical School of Thought 
The concerns of classical economists were widely expressed in the seminal inquiry 
into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations of (Adam Smith, 1776). 
According to Kan and Omay (2006), various notions of classical growth theory have 
played fundamental roles in informing modern growth theories. Concepts, which 
include fundamental dynamic equilibrium approaches in perfect competition 
environment; the effect of population growth on capital per capita; technological 
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advancements as the basis for specialisation and evolution of new production 
techniques, as well as the concept of accumulation of capital (human and physical) 
form the basis of modern growth discussions.  The classical proponents include 
Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Rev. Thomas Malthus among others.  
Adam Smith posited two distinct economic growth sources, one in association with 
the increase in specialisation and the other related to the level of specialisation. His 
quite optimistic growth model involves isolated leaps with a gradually increasing rate 
of technological process (Thirlwall, 2002). Spontaneous leaps in output per capita 
are regarded as functions of improvements in specialisation which are driven by 
institutional and changes in mobility. Advancements in research and innovation are 
seen as a result of specialisation levels which in essence drive output per capita. 
This advancement in specialisation leads to resultant advancements in technology 
and subsequently leads to further specialisation. Greiner et al. (2005), in discussing 
the classical school of thought, opined that, while growth and development 
necessitated an increase in market size, it, led to more division of labour which 
subsequently led to increasing externalities and returns. The arguments for an 
increase in externalities and returns laid basic foundations for what is often referred 
to now as models of endogenous growth.  
Other proponents of the post-Smith classical school of thought expressed some form 
of caution as to the economic growth and development processes. For example, 
Thomas Malthus expressed some fears as to what he termed as population and food 
supply imbalances. He opined that the differences in the growth rates of population 
and food supply, with the former growing at a faster rate than the latter, would only 
lead to a situation where living standards will keep fluctuating within a subsistence 
frame. Malthus (1798) posited perhaps one of the simplest production and 
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population relationships.  He argued that production growth fosters population 
growth and that population growth fosters production growth in return with geometric 
growth and productivity. However, Malthus expressed concerns about the realism of 
this relationship in a finite resource world, arguing that an unchecked population 
grows geometrically while production only grows arithmetically.  
David Ricardo stressed the crucial role of investment in per capita income growth 
through the technological process, which he referred to as machinery. However, he 
argued that diminishing returns is a function of resource scarcity, and explained the 
possibility of stagnation in the absence of capital accumulation. He opined that 
technological advancements could raise the productivity of labour and profit only for 
a brief period (t). However, he argued that the increase in rents due to capital 
accumulation can force profit rates down to zero (Thirwall, 2002, p.8-9).  
Karl Marx in advancing this perspective stressed the significance of investment in the 
technological process as well as the accumulation of capital in ensuring per capita 
income growth. Marx posited that the drop in the profit rate is a result of capitalist 
competition. Supply can exceed demand as a result of overproduction leading to 
unconsumed production, as well as social disturbance. He argued that accumulation 
of capital stimulates production leading to wage increase, however reducing profit 
margins. However he noted that any wage reduction effort would exacerbate societal 
problems. These contributions of Marx to the growth discussion remain pivotal as he 
did not just provide a rigorous formulation for growth, but he did this from a more 
comprehensive scope of economic and welfare effect, thereby contributing to the 
steady-state growth concepts. John Stuart Mill on the other hand, however, stressed 
the role of science and education as growth drivers. 
88 
 
Classical notions of increasing returns and division of labour of Adam Smith were 
revisited by other scholars such as Young (1928) Ramsey (1928) and Schumpeter 
(1942).  Ramsey focused more on simultaneously increasing returns in association 
with optimisation behaviour of the household (utility function).  Young in his seminal 
work “Increasing returns and economic progress” reemphasised the association 
between industrial output and increasing returns; his model involved the interplay of 
activities in macroeconomic industrial expansion. A revisit of these notions by Myrdal 
(1957) and Kaldor (1957) gave birth to non-equilibrium models.  
The classical growth school of thought’s construction remains inadequately 
harmonised and not entirely utilisable by the market. Irrespective of the divergent 
perspectives and contributions in the formulations of the classical school of thought 
they had common grounds such as the crucial role of private agents in a market 
economy and the need for public and social infrastructure provision to facilitate their 
activity (Greiner et al., 2005).  This school of thought has provided fundamental 
works that have metamorphosed into the modern and new growth theories.  
4.2.2 The Harrod-Domar School of Thought 
The Independent works of Harrod (1939; 1948) and Domar (1946; 1957) generated 
a fresh breath to the growth discussion. In doing their independent works, they 
utilised inferences from the “The general theory of interest, employment, and money” 
the seminal work of Keynes (1936). They sought to extend the static equilibrium 
proposition of Keynes. In doing this, they advanced on the fixed-coefficient 
technology assumptions as well as constant returns to scale assumptions within the 
framework of the production function.  Their models posit that labour and capital are 
utilised in a constant ratio without substitution between the factors. Both emphasised 
the relationship of the critical areas of efficiency and savings for capital 
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accumulation. This model provides a near accurate short-term growth prediction 
hence its extensive patronage in developing economies, for growth strategy 
formulation. This is so as it simply focuses on the determination of required 
investment levels needed to achieve a targeted growth rate in the immediate short 
term.  However, labour and capital disequilibrium raise long-run concerns for this 
model, often referred to as “Knife edge dilemma”. If the rate of savings is 
endogenously determined and capital intensity as against labour intensity is 
encouraged within an economy, this will boost capital’s marginal productivity, 
revealing a balanced growth path for the economy. However, if the reverse is the 
case, it can be argued that such an economy has low levels of capital productivity in 
line with the original Harrod-Domar model, as it does not provide adequate 
consideration of productivity, technological progress, and money.  
The Harrod-Domar model remains one of the most fundamental models in the 
explanation of economic growth. It begins with the basic economic concepts of 
consumption and savings as components of income in developing a growth 
framework. It can be depicted mathematically by utilising the basic notions of 
income, consumptions and savings and capital accumulation in generating equations 
to form a growth framework. 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡           (4.1) 
Where Y= income, C= consumption, S=savings and t = time-specific effects. 
Indeed if the capacity of savings to drive the required investment levels to achieve 
the desired growth in an economy is inadequate, and if the model is to be a complete 
predictor of growth, economic growth in such an economy becomes problematic. 
Shortages of this form have often been used as a basis for the inadequate growth of 
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some developing economies hence, foreign capital inflows. These foreign capital 
inflows, therefore, provide a substitute for the much-needed capital to drive growth in 
these countries. These inflows can come in the form of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign remittances.  
Easterly (1997) argues that relationship between investment and growth is not 
necessarily long term, but short term particularly in the case of foreign investment to 
developing countries. This, therefore, explains the wide acceptance of this model for 
growth analysis in the developing economies through the short-term growth potential 
of foreign capital inflows which augment the constrained level of domestic capital 
formation and investment.  
As explained earlier, the “knife edge dilemma”, the impact of advancements in 
technology, money, and productivity are all considered to be crucial for long-run 
growth but are left out of the Harrod-Domar model (Nedomlelova, 2007).  However 
Zuleta (2007) argued for long-run balanced growth for the economy on the basis of 
the ability to endogenise the rate of savings and capital-intensive technologies in 
driving high marginal productivity of capital.  The construct of the Harrod-Domar 
equilibrium stimulated crucial debates in the growth discussion from the 1950s until 
the 1980s.  
This debate has been between the schools of exogenous growth with significant 
proponents such as Robert Solow, Paul Samuelson and Franco Modigliani and the 
Keynesian school with substantial proponents such as Nicholas Kaldor, John 
Robinson, Richard Kahn and Luigi Pasinetti. While the critical focus of the 
exogenous school of thought is on the capital-output ratio in achieving economic 
equilibrium, the Keynesian school of thought argues from a ratio of savings 
perspective in attaining economic equilibrium. However, according to this school of 
91 
 
thought, long-run growth may not be a function of investment as labour and 
productivity are determined exogenously in the exogenous model. Capital output 
ratio increase would compensate for savings and investment and have no 
disturbance effect on growth in the long run. The rudiments of exogenous growth 
assume a diminishing return to capital and variable factor proportions of labour and 
capital (Thirwall, 2002). The capital accumulation equation can, therefore, be 
expressed as in equations 4.2 to 4.14 (see appendix 4).  
Kaldor (1961) however stressed that steady growth of income per capita remains a 
fundamental concept observable across countries over time. Greiner et al. (2005) 
noted that Kaldor remains a leading proponent of the notion of steady income per 
capita growth. Growth theorists such as Uzawa, (1965), Romer (1986) Lucas (1988) 
and Barro (1990) have represented this steady income per capita growth view of 
Kaldor.    Classical notions that reflect inter-temporal behaviour and the economic 
agent’s dynamic optimisation have been revisited in more recent times. Summarily, 
although the Harrod-Domar school of thought has been subjected to quite a lot of 
criticism, the model was quite successful in its time and has often been revisited in 
modern times, especially in dealing with developing economies. Their perspective 
provides a springboard for subsequent growth proponents in establishing the 
equilibrium mechanism. Notions such as the knife-edge in-equilibrium dilemma have 
led to the advancement of modern theories of growth (exogenous and endogenous). 
4.2.3 The Modern Economic Growth School of Thought 
Recent theoretical approaches to economic growth have established two different 
but competing schools of thought on economic growth. Both models are 
advancements on the previously existing models, and they have been categorised 
as exogenous and endogenous growth models.  
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Pivotal to the exogenous models is the seminal work of Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956), which were originally aimed at catering for the drawbacks of the production 
function of the neo-classical school of thought. A particular feature of the neo-
classical production function remains its isoquant curve. It presents flexibility for 
labour and capital combinations with constant returns to scale and diminishing 
returns to capital per labour.  The exogenous model posits that growth is partially 
exogenously determined through technological advancement, and technology boosts 
productivity through an augmentation of labour.  An implausible notion of this model, 
however, is that, since growth is a function of labour and its productivity, which are 
determined exogenously through technological advancements, investment, 
therefore, become less relevant for growth in the long run (see, Barrell and Pain, 
1997). The capital-output ratio adjusts with fluctuations in savings and investments 
and maintains the stability of growth in the long term. Thirwall (2002) argues that 
these counterintuitive notions of the exogenous framework are the core basis that 
has driven the birth of the endogenous models.  
Indeed the endogenous growth framework includes the role of externalities in 
understanding steady growth. Although the endogenous framework was only 
developed by economists of the 1980s and 90s such as Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) 
and Barro (1990), the core fundamentals of their frameworks were derivatives from 
previous seminal works of the classical and Schumpeterian schools. Externalities 
can be as a result of any factor involved in boosting labour productivity at aggregate 
levels. This emphasises the importance of investment for the endogenous framework 
in explaining long run growth, since investment can be used to sustain constant 
productivity as well as to increase productivity.  Perhaps, it can be argued that 
characteristic features of the framework reveal a reincarnation of some of the notions 
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of the classical and Schumpeterian schools alike, while the relaxation of the Harrod-
Domar knife edge is reflected in the exogenous framework.  
4.2.3.1 The Exogenous Growth Framework 
As earlier stated, exogenous growth, often referred to as the neo-classical model, 
was pioneered by the seminal works of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). The theory 
posits that economic growth can be achieved through exogenous factors such as 
labour and capital stock accumulation. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) opined that 
the relationship over time between accumulation of the capital stock and economic 
growth is positive. A thorough look at this theory reveals that, for growth to occur in 
an economy, the stock of available capital needs to increase on the basis that 
technology and labour stay constant (De Jager, 2004). Going further, it can be 
opined that economic growth in the short run is a function of the capital stock and 
this accumulation of capital is a function of the savings rate as well as the rate of 
depreciation of capital.  However, economic growth is equally a function of 
exogenous factors like advancement in technology, which in the long run augment 
labour (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995). In essence, this model postulates that the 
growth of economies is a function of its accumulation of capital as well as its labour 
augmentation.  
Drawing inspiration from the Harrod-Domar growth equation, the Solow model posits 
that output (Y) is a function of two inputs: capital (K) and labour (L). 
Mathematically it is represented as 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿)     (4.15) 
Where K>0, L>0 
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The features assumed for this function includes a constant returns to scale, positive 
marginal productivity and diminishing marginal rate of substitution. A natural growth 
rate is assumed for labour, i.e., 𝑛 =  ∆𝐿/𝐿, as a result of exogenous growth in the 
population.  Capital (K) is in line with the Harrod-Domar capital accumulation 
assumption of  
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿) where new capital stock (𝐾𝑡+1) is a function of existing capital 
less depreciation (𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿)) in addition to investment (It).  
This is so due to the classical argument that income is either consumed or saved 
and that savings are invested (𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡). Therefore representing the fraction of income 
saved with the constant s, change in the capital stock over a period of time can be 
represented as shown in equations to 4.16 to 4.29 (see appendix 4). 
The steady state of growth is achieved through a condition where each variable of 
the model grows at a constant rate over time. This implies a constant capital-output 
ratio (i.e. that as output grows, investment and capital stock grows proportionately), 
on the assumption that 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 and 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿). Therefore in the long run 
as all variables grow at equivalent rates, the growth rate will be decided by the 
growth of the supply of labour as well as its productivity. Changes in the savings rate 
and investment levels will transcend to proportionate changes in the steady state 
growth rate. “The steady state is however not a bad place for the theory of growth to 
start but may be a dangerous place to end” (Solow, 2000 p.7). Capital per capita 
growth is often higher for developing countries initially, however over time they tend 
to converge with those that already have high capital per capita ratio (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin, 2004; McQuinn and Whelan 2007). 
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In the case of most developing countries, the domestic capital stock and 
technological levels often remain insufficient to drive the required growth levels. 
Foreign capital inflows come in to substitute for the deficiency in capital accumulation 
with the attendant technological transfers and can drive growth in developing 
economies. DeJager (2004), in explaining technology transfer explains that it leads 
to a boost in returns to capital through its augmentation of labour and improved 
productivity of the capital stock, which then drive the economy towards a new 
“steady state” through the resultant accumulation of capital stock. Herzer and Klasen 
(2008) explained that foreign capital inflows impact on short-run growth through the 
diminishing returns mechanism on capital; hence, promoting growth by raising the 
capital stock level within an economy.  
A significant drawback to this framework has been its unfounded assumption of 
labour to be human capital. Indeed, labour has been well differentiated from human 
capital in advancements on this model. While labour is a function of the size of the 
working class in an economy, human capital has been distinguished as a function of 
the quality of the working class. According to (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995 and 
DeJager, 2004), the framework remains deficient in the explanation of production, 
assimilation of technology as well as knowledge. Also, it does not allow for the 
explanation of the long run growth and advancement in technology.   
Solow (1957) empirically analysed data from the US for the 1909 to 1949 period. The 
analysis was based on the assumption that technological advancement was 
important in growth determination. The basic Solow model is depicted as a 
production function. In accounting for changes in technology levels, a variable (t) is 
introduced, which considers shifts in the production function as neutral, as they can 
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decrease or increase output from a given input holding the marginal substitution rate 
constant.  
𝑌 = 𝑇(𝑡)𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿)             (4.30) 
Where T (t) is the accumulation of shifts in the production function over time, Y is 
output and K and L are inputs of capital and labour respectively. 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) extended the Solow aggregate production function 
by the introduction of a human capital variable which is proxied by educational 
attainment. They found that this model explains cross-country income level variation, 
more particularly when augmented with human capital. They concluded that the 
model was consistent with empirical evidence, especially when taking into 
consideration human and physical capital inputs. Gundlach (2007) posits this to be 
the basis for essential changes in the textbook presentation of the Solow model. 
Since the pivotal work of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), several empirical studies 
have been generated.  Findings from studies, such as Islam (1995), Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Gundlach (2007) contrasts with the work of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992). For example Islam (1995) using a panel data approach found higher rates of 
conditional convergence and lower values of the elasticity of output with respect to 
capital compared to those of Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992). These results were 
explained in terms of correction for omitted variable bias involved with the single 
cross-section regression.  Other studies such as Barossi-Filho, et. al. (2005) and 
Klump, et al. (2007) are consistent with the original work of Solow.  
The debate on whether or not there is a need for the augmentation of the exogenous 
growth model is still ongoing. According to Thirwall (2002), many factors can cause a 
shift in output such as technological advances and institutional changes. The 
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exogenous model despite the augmentation, still presents a basic and relatively 
usable model for empirical studies. While, the strength of this model is in its 
simplicity and ability to incorporate various factors that can influence growth. 
Similarly, the weakness of the exogenous model also lies in its simplicity. The 
shortcomings include its inability to explain income per capita differences across 
nations. The unconditional convergence notion of the model which assumes ultimate 
equal income levels for all countries may be unrealistic. The endogeneity of factors 
influencing advancement in technology remains a challenge of this model. Although 
attempts have been made to exemplify technological advancement in variables such 
as labour and physical investment, this advancement remains exogenously 
determined. The model also posits that the steady state growth rate is indifferent to 
fluctuations in the investment level, implying that increase in the investment level will 
translate to increase in income levels. There has, however, been evidence that 
increase in investment positively and significantly affects growth rate in a country.  
These downsides of the Solow model have continued to prompt heated debates and 
interest in the formulation of other growth models that take into consideration some 
of the downsides of the Solow growth model, hence, the birth of the endogenous 
growth models. The endogenous growth models are focused on providing more 
tenable explanations for some of the arguments of Solow which were acceptable at 
the time but are somewhat losing their tenability with more and more empirical tests 
and evidence.  
Mankiw Romer and Weil 1992  
As earlier mentioned, the study by Mankiw, et al (1992), although subjected to 
continued debates, remains a crucial contribution to the growth discuss.  They 
examined whether the growth framework of Solow provides explanations for global 
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living standard variations. They presented a model which they termed as an 
augmentation to the original work of Solow which incorporates an accumulation of 
human capital as well as physical capital and tested this using a cross-country data 
set from 1960 to 1985 as constructed by Summers and Henston (1988). They found 
an inconsistency with the long-run steady state proposition of the Solow framework. 
They opined that the real output per worker level by country should have a positive 
correlation with the country’s rate of saving, and a negative relationship with labour 
growth rate.  Their study also examined the implications of the Solow growth 
framework for living standard convergence and found consistency with the 
convergence predictions of the augmented Solow model holding constant capital 
accumulation and labour growth.  Their estimates of the Solow model inferred a 
proportion of factor income for capital to be about 0.60, which is high relative to the 
US conventional value of about 0.33. In addressing this inconsistency, they utilised 
their augmentation concept of the Solow model which symmetrically introduces 
human capital into the original capital and labour Solow model. They found that this 
new augmentation provides “an excellent explanation of their cross-country data”.  
This Pivotal work of the augmented Solow model by Mankiw, et al (1992), has 
however received extensive patronage especially in the significance of the 
introduction of qualitative factors to growth, such studies include (Durlauf and Quah, 
1999). The analysis of the augmented Solow growth framework as by Mankiw et al 
(1992) was subsequently extended to panel data analysis by Islam (1995).  
The fact that the Mankiw, et al (1992), model fits the cross-country data analysis 
remains an interesting result. However, it remains unclear as to what degree the 
goodness of fit of the Mankiw, et al (1992), specification can be attributed to the 
features shared with other growth models such as the Cobb-Douglas production 
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function and what fraction of this fit can be associated to the Solow specification 
such as exogeneity of the growth rate of the steady state. Indeed the primary 
estimation of the Mankiw, et al (1992), framework is consistent with all models of 
growth that consents to “balanced growth path”. This categorisation, however, 
captures perhaps all known growth models (Durlauf and Quah, 1999).   
An advantage of the Mankiw, et al (1992), framework is that it can have a broader 
scope of individual growth, which is useful in evaluating since the policy implications 
of Solow growth model and other growth models such as the endogenous ones vary 
(Bernanke and Gürkaynak, 2002). They argued further that perhaps the Mankiw, et 
al (1992), framework had more potentials than its postulators utilised it, claiming that 
it could be used in analysing any growth model which assumes balanced growth 
path. They posited that the framework could be considered from two perspectives: (i) 
an applicable structure to any model that assumes steady growth path (ii) specific 
growth framework restrictions imposed on this structure such as the Solow model. 
Assuming a given country at time t, with an output Yt and inputs labour Lt and 
accumulated factors of types: Kt, Ht.
21  The combination of these inputs, therefore, 
gives output, in line with the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas form. The 
model kicked off with the textbook statement of Solow. 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)   (4.31) 
Where Y = total income, K = capital stock, L = Labour and A = technology 
parameter. 
                                                          
21
 The inputs: Ht and Kt accumulated by the savings from current output, and are human and physical 
capital. It assumes advancement in technology through human capital as a result of learning by doing 
process under the assumption that it is accumulated as an economic activity by product which does 
not require current output sacrifice. 
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Mankiw, et al (1992) augmented this by introducing a symmetrical introduction of 
human capital as physical capital H which then gives 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
∝𝐻𝑡
𝛽(𝐴𝑡(𝐿𝑡))
1−𝛼−𝛽   (4.32) 
See equations 4.33 to 4.37 for expansion (see appendix 4).  
In the work of Mankiw, et al (1992), the saving rate of capital 𝑠𝑘 was proxied by 
share of investment in GDP: this is based on equilibrium condition (S=I), the savings 
rate of human capital was proxied by the fraction of the labour force that are enrolled 
in secondary school. The estimation of this model by the use of cross sectional 
samples from across 98 and 75 economies respectively in 1985 resulted in 
significant improvements in the findings as against the original Solow model where 
there was no provision for human capital as a contributory factor to growth. 
Parameter estimates were found to be statistically acceptable. The implied income 
shares of both capital i.e (human and physical) were found to be plausible. The 
authors of the Mankiw, et al (1992), framework upon the findings of their studies 
concluded that, perhaps, the Solow model is more reasonable than previously 
conceived.  
Although the Mankiw, et al (1992), framework was a, breath of fresh air in the growth 
discuss, their augmentation of the Solow model with the inclusion of human capital 
has generally improved its fitness, it has however continued to be subjected to 
various criticism on various grounds. While some have argued that the model is not 
actually an augmentation of the Solow work as there is some divergence in 
assumptions, others have critiqued it on the basis of its assumptions in itself. For 
example, Kalaitzidakis et.al (2001) critiqued the Mankiw, et al (1992),  framework on 
the notion that it is restrictive in terms of its choice of proxy. This they did by picking 
101 
 
on the Secondary school level education as human capital definition. They argued 
that a more robust definition of human capital will explain a larger proportion of 
variation in income per capita.  
4.2.3.2 The Endogenous Growth Framework 
Critics of the exogenous growth framework have expressed concerns about its 
inadequate explanation of long-run growth. Cesaratto, (1999) highlighted that the 
inability of the exogenous model to explain technological advancement is a major 
drawback on its ability to explain growth. Technological advancement is one of the 
assumptions of the exogenous model, but the model failed to account for it. Solow 
based this on the assumption of perfect competition.   Perfect competition models 
assume constant returns to scale and that factors of production are accounted for by 
marginal output, i.e., all output is expended on factor payments: 
 𝑌 =  𝐹𝑘𝐾 + 𝐹𝑙𝐿   (4.38) 
Where: Y=Output, 𝐹𝑘𝐾 and 𝐹𝑙𝐿 are for capital and labour factor inputs receipts 
respectively.  
Based on this model, the firm that is perfectly competitive therefore has no excess to 
finance research or patentable technologies or any other form of investment aside 
from payment for factors of production; hence, no options exist for an assumption of 
exogenous advancement in technology.  
This assumption was widely accepted for a while as there were no alternative 
explanations for growth until a new generation of theories that endogenised growth 
process came around in the 80s and 90s. The birth of these models has revived the 
interest of economists to understand economic growth within different contexts. A 
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major contributor to this model is the seminal work of Paul Romer (1986), which led 
to the development of modern frameworks and models that accommodate 
investment in knowledge as a driver of growth. This seminal work of Romer indeed 
forms a platform for a host of theoretical reviews of the growth model. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) provided an interpretation for the summation of the objectives of 
the growth model as by Rebelo (1991). 
They considered a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function as:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼  𝐿𝑡
𝛽
    (4.39) 
Where Y = total income, K = capital stock, L = Labour and A = technology 
parameter. No restrictions are placed on coefficients α and β as against the 
exogenous assumption α+β=1. 
These models, however, assume saving to be a constant fraction of gross income in 
an economy. The growth in the stock of capital can, therefore, be represented as 
expressed in equations 4.40 to 4.43 (see appendix 4).  
The endogenous growth framework places importance on knowledge and human 
capital (Liu and Premus, 2000). For example studies, such as Romer (1986) and 
Lucas (1988), noted innovation, new knowledge and public infrastructure as three 
crucial drivers of growth. Romer (1990), Barro (1990), Grossman and Helpman, 
(1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) among others have further developed the model. 
They all posited that externalities such as policies have a significant impact on long-
run growth (Petrakos et al., 2007). The accumulation of knowledge process for these 
models does not have a constant assumption but is rather a characteristic of the 
model. Knowledge accumulation can be of diverse nature such as research and 
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development, skill acquisition and transfer at firm level, based on experience, 
innovation and new ideas in production techniques, managerial skill and 
organisational structure (Savvides and Stengos, 2008). 
According to Rao and Cooray (2009) “the endogenous growth models focus on the 
very long-run and on the incentives for expanding the technological frontiers. This is 
not particularly useful for most developing nations, whose primary interest is in 
restoring short-to medium-term growth and accelerating technological catch-up by 
adopting already known innovations”. They argued that the potential of the Solow 
(1956) model and its extended variants such as the Mankiw, et al (1992), are 
inadequately explored. For example, the Solow model can be used to analyse the 
short to long run effects of investment on the level of growth. Pritchett (2006) noted 
that short to medium term transitionary growth effects are of particular interest to the 
policy makers  in developing countries because increasing the investment level is a 
relatively easier policy option to implement compared to institutional reforms.  
The Solow model, when extended, is simpler to estimate and simulate to understand 
the dynamics of growth (Rao and Cooray, 2009). Apart from this it is difficult to state 
that one of these models is better than the other although there are some strong 
views against the merits of endogenous models. For example, Mankiw, et al (1992) 
argued that the Solow model can explain the observed growth evidences better than 
the endogenous models. Jones (1995) argues that observed time series evidences 
do not necessarily support the conclusions of the endogenous models. Solow (2000, 
p.153) himself highlighted that “the second wave of interest in growth theory the 
endogenous growth literature sparked by Romer and Lucas in the 1980s, following 
the neoclassical wave of the 1950s and 1960s appears to be dwindling to a modest 
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flow of normal science. This is not a bad thing.”22 The more important reason for the 
development of endogenous models is that the Solow model could not explain why 
countries grow at a sustained rate for long periods. The endogenous model on the 
other hand made significant progress in explaining convergence hypothesis. 
However, this may not necessarily be the immediate need of developing countries. 
According to Rao and Cooray (2009), developing countries are least interested in 
knowing whether per capita incomes in their countries will converge, in about 200 
years, to the level of per capita income in the USA. 
Subsequent extensions to the Solow model by Mankiw, et al (1992), have shown 
that the Solow model, if augmented with appropriate measures can satisfactorily 
explain growth dynamics of countries. Rao and Cooray (2009) concluded that an 
augmented version of the Solow model can be extended and used to examine the 
dynamic growth effects of policies both in the short and long run. They estimated the 
extended Solow model with data from Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to check for 
the growth effects of variables such as the investment ratio, trade openness, and the 
ratio of government expenditure to GDP and human capital. They also concluded 
that there are a few more fundamental variables that may have larger effects on the 
long run growth of developing countries. For example Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 
and Thaicharoen (2003) find that institutional issues which characterise state fragility 
are more powerful than macroeconomic policy issues in explaining long run growth.  
While the discourse on state fragility mainly emanates from the state-building 
perspective as a necessary prerequisite for transformation and development, recent 
studies have   highlighted its growth hindering   capacity as the starting point. For 
                                                          
22
 See Parente (2001) for other criticisms of endogenous models. 
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example Maier (2010)   explained   that   one reason is that fragility can be easily 
defined by low economic and social performance.   According to Easterly (2005), 
modern growth models such as the augmented Solow model are able to explain the 
effects of prevailing national conditions and policies. Empirical findings tend to 
confirm the relevance of some these indicators. There is a growing list of growth 
determinants which include among others fiscal and monetary policy, political 
instability and institutions, among others (Alesina et.al, 1996; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).    
Easterly (2005), however criticizes the fact that the large empirical effect of 
economic policies seem to depend on extreme observations in growth regressions 
and are not consistent with several stylised facts. Furthermore in fragile countries 
with the high level of social, economic and political instabilities, the theory would 
predict a modest effect of domestic policy on economic growth. A similar argument 
has been put forward by Rodrik (2007). His approach is hinged on the context 
specificity of growth-enhancing policies resulting from the limited generalisation that 
can be drawn from empirical research on the policy effects of growth. He first 
argued that neoclassical economic analysis does not necessarily lead to policy 
packages, but allows for a broad area of plausible policy activities adapted to the 
specific country context. Similarly, the World Bank (2005) report argued that general 
policy priorities need not be translated in a unique set of actions. In addition, 
different policies can yield the same outcome and the same policy can yield different 
outcomes depending on country institutional contexts and growth drivers.  
The key insight of economic growth theory is that a high rate of capital accumulation 
fundamentally has a positive influence on growth. Fragile states are usually unable 
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to accumulate capital and often rely on foreign capital.  Modern theories of 
underdevelopment argue that severe distortions and inefficiencies which 
characterise fragile states may hinder economic growth. The critical question then is 
to explain how state fragility affects economic growth. Since virtually all growth 
models consider capital as pivotal for economic growth and development to occur, a 
development economics perspective is therefore such that sees capital as an 
essential criterion for growth to occur irrespective of the source of such capital 
(Waheed, 2004). Other studies in modelling growth and capital accumulation in 
developing economies have broken down capital to reflect two forms of capital 
domestic and foreign (Akinlo, 2004; Driffield and Jones 2013; Adeniyi, et.al, 2015). 
𝐾𝑡 = 𝑑𝐾𝑡 + 𝑓𝐾𝑡         (4.44) 
Where: K=capital, dK = domestic capital, fK = foreign capital, t = time specific effects 
Driffield and Jones (2013) argued further that capital deficient countries; majorly 
developing economies have often relied mainly on foreign capital to supplement 
domestic capital to fast-track their growth. Their underlying theory is premised on a 
standard growth model where foreign capital (FDI, ODA and remittances) are 
introduced as components of investments (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and 
Catrinescu et.al, 2009). Theoretically, foreign capital has been shown to be 
beneﬁcial to the host country (Prasad et.al, 2007). However the empirics do not 
provide a clear relationship23. While Malikane and Chitambara, (2017) have argued 
that foreign capital inflow has a major impact for the economies of fragile state, 
Bénassy‐Quéré, et.al (2007) have argued the possibility of an adverse impact on 
recipient countries.  
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 The lack of clarity in the literature are discussed In subsequent sections below 
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 In the neoclassical growth model for instance, foreign capital promotes economic 
growth by augmenting the capital stock and/ or its efﬁciency (Li and Liu, 2005). In the 
endogenous growth model, foreign capital such as FDI raises economic growth by 
not just raising stock of capital but also generates technological diffusion from the 
developed countries to the developing host country (Borensztein et al., 1998). 
Foreign capital is often seen as a composite bundle of capital stock, knowledge and 
technology which can improve the existing stock of knowledge in the recipient 
economy through labour training, skill acquisition and diffusion, and the introduction 
of efﬁcient management practices (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996 and De Mello, 
1999).  
Empirical studies on the impact of foreign capital on economic growth have produced 
mixed results. While a number of studies have indicated a positive impact of FDI on 
economic growth, others suggest a negative or insignificant impact on growth 
(Slesman et.al, 2015). In response to these inconclusive ﬁndings, a recent emerging 
view on the merits of foreign capital ﬂows is that it does not come directly but is 
contingent on various host country initial conditions or absorptive capacities. In other 
words, there are certain conditions for developing countries to maximize the growth 
contribution potentials of capital inﬂows (Kose et al., 2011 and Alguacil et al., 2011). 
Klein (2008), for instance, reports that institutional environment plays a crucial role in 
facilitating the positive growth effects of capital account liberalization. 
However, the connection of capital flows to growth seems to be more than just the 
connection through financing. According to Prasad et.al (2007), if financing were all 
that mattered, because it expands the resource envelope, then net foreign liability 
positions would be positively correlated with growth. They argued that the opposite is 
true: positive net foreign asset positions are positively associated with growth. They 
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posited that although developing countries do absorb some forms of capital inflows 
such as FDI, on net they rely little on foreign capital. This suggests that the full 
explanation for the relationship between growth and foreign capital inflows has to go 
beyond financing. Alfaro et al. (2008) suggested that the prevailing conditions in the 
host country institutional infrastructure, such as political stability, social cohesion and 
general macroeconomic may directly inﬂuence the volumes and types of capital 
inﬂows.   According to Slesman et.al (2015), the ability of a developing country to 
attract foreign capital and more importantly for the capital to have significant 
contribution to growth depends on these issues as highlighted by Alfaro et al. (2008).   
The case of the fragile states, first as developing countries but more importantly with 
severe challenges to development pose a challenge to their ability to attract foreign 
capital for domestic capital augmentation and for the foreign capital to effectively 
perform its augmentation expectations. For example, Holden and Pagel (2012) 
highlighted that the major reason why FDI flows to fragile state are resource motives 
and sometimes market seeking motives24. They highlighted that fragile states, 
receiving investment purely for extraction may have other consequences as the 
literature suggests a link to further fragility. 
 Ingarm and Papoulidis (2017) highlighted the “new deal”25 in dealing with fragile 
states. They critiqued the conditionality approach to development aid. They argued 
the challenge of state fragility is such that would ensure that fragile states are 
deprived of development aid. The development impact of foreign capital flows 
                                                          
24
 Resource seeking FDI: The resource seeking investors are motivated by their need for cheap 
resources including human, physical, technological or organisational resources.  Market seeking FDI: 
The market seeking investment is motivated solely by entering new markets and increasing 
company’s profits. This type of investment is justified by large market size and purchasing power of 
the consumers. 
25
 The New Deal was born out of the recognition that development efforts were not sufficiently 
addressing the root causes of fragility. 
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remains widely debated Easterly et.al (2004). Dambisa (2009) argued that foreign 
capital can sometimes worsen the development potentials in recipient countries.  
Lum et.al (2013) posited that in the case of diaspora remittances, it can serve as a 
natural bridge into developed countries’ markets; but clearly, when neglected or 
poorly conceived, government policy can represent a significant barrier to diaspora 
involvement.  They argued that to a large extent, the positive impact of remittances 
depends on the existence of sound government policy designed to enable and 
encourage diaspora investment in areas of primary importance to the country. They 
therefore concluded that there is no certain relationship between the maximization of 
remittances as component of foreign capital and fragility.  Some studies have argued 
that the inability of developing countries to maximise foreign capital in driving growth 
to be an actual signal of presence of state fragility. For example Tintin (2013) opined 
that the presence or absence of state fragility in a developing country is a significant 
factor for foreign capital inflow and for it to have the expected positive contribution to 
growth. 
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4.3 Empirical Review on Economic Growth, State Fragility and Capital Inflows 
Scholarly efforts on the economic growth issue have created a significant amount of 
empirical studies and literature within the context of both developed and developing 
economies. This review will focus on previous studies on economic growth in 
developing and emerging economies as well as its relationship with state fragility and 
its dimension. It remains noteworthy that findings of studies on economic growth 
have only continued to reveal divergent outcomes. This review will initially focus on 
empirical findings in line with the theoretical frames earlier discussed before 
reviewing findings of capital inflows and economic growth.  
4.3.1 Empirics of Modern Growth Framework 
The roots of growth theories such as classical among others were premised on 
conditions obtainable in developed/advanced economies. The empirical testing of 
growth models in developing economies only started gaining momentum a few 
decades ago (Zarra-Nezhad and Hosainpour, 2011).  Chenery et al. (1986) made a 
significant contribution to growth empirics. Their analysis focused on growth 
accounting framework, using the approach pioneered by Solow (1956). They found a 
significant unexplained residual which was attributed to technology. In developed 
economies, the residual made up about half of the growth rate.  However, in 
developing economies, factor input explained about three-quarters of the growth rate 
while the residual accounted for about one-quarter of the growth rate.  In a study of 
12 Latin American economies by De Gregorio (1992), he found that the labour share 
in income in these economies is less than its share for developed economies, and in 
the fastest growing economies, the growth of factor productivity accounts for a 
substantial fraction of the growth. In his panel data, he found that aside from the 
pivotal role of capital both physical and human; macroeconomic stability is of crucial 
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importance. He, however, found growth to be negatively correlated to a lower degree 
with consumptions of government and political instability and terms of trade to be 
rather insignificant. Sachs and Warner (1995) with a sample size of 111 economies 
which were categorised along the lines of openness and closeness of the economies 
argued that for open economies there was a rather faster growth rate as well as 
convergence than for the closed ones.  
 Radelet et al. (1997) extended the neoclassical growth framework in analysing the 
rather fast economic growth of the Asian economies. They found that East Asian 
economies experienced somewhat faster growth than other economies across the 
globe. They attributed this growth to a combination of policies such as: 
macroeconomic stability, convertible currencies, relatively free trade and innovative 
institutions as well as incentives for foreign capital inflows amongst others. They 
argued that the South Asian economies that implemented somewhat protective 
policies and more extravagant fiscal policies recorded very little or no growth and 
increased poverty levels and widened inequality as the case may be during the 
period. They concluded that the difference between a fast-growing and a slow-
growing developing economy is simply the nature of domestic economic institutions 
and policies they choose to pursue.  
The debate around the contribution of capital to growth has however, continued to 
generate an empirical test for example Hall and Jones (1999) found that capital 
could only provide a partial explanation for the per capita output variation. They 
argued that a significant proportion of the variation in the Solow residual level can be 
evidenced across economies. They explained further that the differences in the 
accumulation of capital, productivity and per capita output are a function of 
differences in institutions and policies of government which they quantified in terms 
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of social infrastructure. They treated social infrastructure as an endogenous input 
and found a significant association between per capita output and their social 
infrastructure measure across a range of 127 countries. They found that economies 
that have had productivity friendly policies for a while had better per capita output. 
They cited the example of Niger and United States where more than 35 fold of per 
capita output difference can be explained by social infrastructure difference. Using a 
panel data set Hoeffler (2002) tried to explain the growth performance of African 
economies within the augmented Solow framework. The study found that after 
unobserved country-specific effects, as well as investment endogeneity, have been 
accounted for, the model can explain growth performance of African economies. 
They concluded that the low ratio of investment vis high growth rates of population 
alone is almost enough to explain the low growth performance of African economies.  
 In a similar vein, Senhadji (2000) empirically tested an augmented production 
function for 88 economies from 1960 to 1994. The empirics revealed that total 
production function contribution to growth is overall small in developing economies. 
The result provided support for conditional convergence as well as validates the 
application of augmented Solow model for economies with divergent economic 
structures. Life expectancy, capital account convertibility, and reserves to import 
ratio positively affect growth in an economy, while, ratio of external debt to GDP, war 
casualties to population ratio, real exchange rate and public consumption impact 
growth negatively. These findings, however, are quite useful for developing 
economies, as evidence from East Asia, India and China has continued to support it. 
Although longer periods may be required to ensure growth sustainability as there will 
be need for political stability, health, and human capital formation advancement as 
well as institutional reforms to sustain growth.   
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Prichett (2006) argued that despite, the quantum of growth literature and the 
progress made in the growth discuss, the concerns of developing economies is 
rather short to medium term growth and advancement of catch-up with technological 
frontiers through innovation adoptions as against the long run focus of mainstream 
endogenous growth frameworks.  Similarly, Rao and Cooray (2008) investigated the 
gap between theoretical growth literature and empirical findings. They found a wide 
divergence between theoretical growth literature and empirical findings and the 
developing economies policy needs. They argued that the literature is rather focused 
on the long-term as against the short and medium term growth needs of developing 
economies. They opined that in bridging the gap, a modified version of the Solow 
model might be more compatible with understanding growth in developing 
economies. They tested this by taking a sample of Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia, and found that in the short and medium term, investment ratio is affected 
by growth much more than growth in the long run. A dynamic simulation they made 
for Singapore revealed that these short and medium growth effects are higher to a 
significant level than that of the steady state for about ten years. Despite a few 
limitations Rao and Cooray (2009) opined and concluded that their framework is 
adequately suited for achieving short term and medium term policy needs of 
developing economies.  
Indeed, empirical findings testing the performance of the exogenous model in 
explaining the growth performance in the developing world have continued to 
emerge. More recent periods have seen more specific analysis focusing on time 
series analysis that tries to capture growth experience in these economies as they 
have over the years expressed divergent growth performance and drivers.  For 
example, Kweka and Morrissey (2000) conducted an empirical study on government 
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spending and economic growth in Tanzania from 1965 to 1996. The study focused 
on understanding the impact of government expenditure on growth performance of 
Tanzania, using the Engle and Granger technique. They found that while growth was 
positively associated with increase in consumption expenditure, physical expenditure 
had a negative impact and human capital was rather insignificant. However, Saad 
and Kalakech (2009) in investigating the impact of government expenditure on 
sustainable economic growth in Lebanon from 1962 to 2007 using a multivariate co-
integration analysis, found a positive long-run relationship but negative in the short 
run. They, on the other hand, found expenditure on defence and health insignificant 
in the short run and negative in the long run and agriculture insignificant in both short 
and long run.    Although Samimi and Habibian (2011) using a panel data set to 
investigate the impact of consumption expenditure of government in a set of 18 
developing economies from 1990 to 2007 found a negative relationship.  
More recent studies on developing economies have however continued to test and 
emerge with more empirical findings. Ahmad, et.al (2000) examined a sample of 54 
economies made up of a mix of developed developing and underdeveloped 
economies. They grouped these economies into rich, upper and lower middle 
income and poor economies. This they did to evaluate commonalities among these 
various group of economies. They found no significant difference in the average of 
these four classes of economies, over time. Although slight fluctuations reflected in 
the averaged positions of lower middle income and poor classes, they, however, 
were not substantial. Acemoglu et al. (2006) in explaining the possibility of variation 
in findings of endogenous growth theories in developing and developed economies 
argued that technologies and sophistication used by developed economies when 
adopted by developing economies failed to yield optimal results. They hinged their 
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finding on divergence in human capital quality in these economies. They argued that 
these technologies were created for a workforce in the developed economies that 
could optimally utilise them to yield maximal results, which is not often the case with 
developing economies.   
 Kanu and Ozurumba, (2014) examined the impact of capital formation on the 
economic growth of Nigeria using the vector autoregressive estimation technique. 
They observed that in the short run, gross fixed capital formation had no significant 
impact on economic growth; while in the long term; the VAR model estimate 
indicates that gross fixed capital formation, total exports and the Lagged values of 
GDP had positive long-run relationships with economic growth in Nigeria. Shuaib 
and Ndidi, (2015) examined the capital formation impact on the economic 
development of Nigeria, using time series data from 1960 to 2013. From the 
empirical findings, it was discovered that there is a significant relationship between 
capital formation and economic development in Nigeria. They recommended policies 
that encourage savings, create conducive investment climate and improve the 
infrastructural base of the economy to boost capital formation and hence promote 
sustainable growth. 
Sena and Fontele (2004) focused more on the major growth drivers for developing 
economies. They found key macroeconomic variables such as capital accumulation, 
and public spending contributes to growth in developing economies. They found that 
policy environment is very important for growth in developing economies. Petrakos 
and Arvanitidis (2008) studied growth determinants in both developing and 
developed economies by surveying experts such as policymakers, business owners, 
and academicians.   The study was conducted to verify factors either inhibiting or 
promoting growth potential as well as their degree of significance. They found 
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divergent views on the determinants of growth for the developing and developed 
economies.  While, for the developed economies, they found factors such as 
technology, human capital, innovation, and knowledge to be most important, in the 
developing economies, on the other hand, they found socio-political framework as 
the most important issue.   In essence a simple neoclassical model is adequate in 
understanding growth particularly in developing countries. 
4.3.2 Economic Growth and State Fragility 
There is a small but expanding literature on the link between fragility and economic 
growth and development. According to Ferreira (2018), despite being at the core of 
the discourse on fragile states, the link between state fragility and economic 
development has only been examined in the context of cross-country regressions in 
a few studies.26 Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) distinguish between empirical studies 
focusing on the direct impact of fragility on economic development, and those 
exploring an indirect effect through capital flows. In an early account, Chauvet et al. 
(2007) explore the costs of failing states, defined as the Low-income Countries under 
Stress (LICUS) that have been in this position for a continuous period of at least four 
years. Considering the period 1998–2001, they add dummy variables for failing 
states, for states in civil war, and for neighbourhood spill over to a growth regression, 
and then use ordinary least squares (OLS) and Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) methods to estimate the percentage of reduction in the growth rate. They 
conclude that being a failing state at peace corresponds to a decrease in the growth 
rate by 2.6 per cent when compared to countries at peace with adequate policies 
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 The field of political science is not short of accounts of the challenges imposed by failing and failed 
states, especially before the fragile states term came into use. However within the economic growth 
framework, the empirics are only recently emerging.   
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and governance. Furthermore, a switch from peace to war leads to a further 
reduction in growth of 1.6 per cent.  
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011) employ the OECD definition of fragility within a yearly 
panel dataset covering sub-Saharan Africa in the 1999-2004 periods. Following the 
benchmark specification of Barro (1991) and Bertocchi and Canova (2002), they 
include in their growth regressions an initial condition for per capita income and a 
wide range of economic, demographic, geographic, and institutional factors. Their 
results indicate that the conventional measure of fragility employed by the OECD 
exerts no effect on economic development, once standard regressors are accounted 
for. However, when they apply a more severe definition of fragility, which only 
includes the countries in the bottom quintile, they find a clear, negative impact of this 
condition. Using a comparable sample and the OECD conventional definition, 
Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) highlighted that fragility exerts a non-linear impact on per 
capita income and that it rather tends to alter the performance of other growth driver.  
In a subsequent study, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) examined the relationship 
between fragility and various economic social and political variables. Their central 
finding was that social and political variables are adversely affected by fragility 
directly. They however did not find any clear relationship between state fragility and 
economic variables. In particular they found no significant relationship between GDP 
per capita and fragility after controlling for other economic variables such as 
investment.  Ferreira (2018) which is the most recent addition to the direct state 
fragility and economic growth link literature, using a neoclassical growth model found 
that the estimated coefficient did not show any robust effect between a 
unidimensional measure of state fragility and growth. However the result for the 
disaggregated measure for state ineffectiveness had a significant negative effect on 
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economic growth. The conclusion for the effect of political instability is less clear-cut. 
In contrast to the expectation, they recorded some evidence suggesting a positive 
effect, but the result was not robust.  
Fosu (2009) explores the growth impact of policy syndromes, which is in turn close 
to fragility since it refers to a condition involving civil wars and acute political 
instability.27 His findings are that the absence of policy syndromes encourages 
growth in Africa. The potential endogeneity of fragility is a serious concern, which 
has been addressed by Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) by gauging the links between 
fragility and other standard growth determinants. They find that within Africa, fragility 
tends to be shaped by institutional development, a conclusion which questions its 
exogeneity. In particular, the probability of a country having a fragile state appears to 
decrease with the level of civil liberties and to increase with the number of 
revolutions, while economic factors do not matter. These findings differ sharply from 
those presented by Carment et al. (2008) for a world sample, over which per capita 
income appears to be the main driver of fragility. This radically different conclusion 
can be explained, once again, by the specificity of the African region, but also by the 
fact that the former study employs the OECD definition of fragility, while the latter 
employs the index of failed and fragile states. 
 Beside these empirical investigations, Besley and Persson (2011) propose a 
theoretical framework to understand how fragility can hamper development and 
growth. They highlight how a state may become fragile in situations of ethnic and 
religious conflict, high political instability, and heavy economic distortions, and how 
fragility may in turn lead to poverty traps. It is cautioned that “economic growth is no 
panacea to state fragility” (Naudé, 2012, p. 3). Suhrke and Buckmaster (2006) using 
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 see Fosu and O’Connell, 2006, for a definition of policy syndromes 
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seven post-conflict states28 found no strong relationship between stability and 
economic growth. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2007) however, concluded that 
economic development substantially reduces the risk of tension in a fragile situation 
using 74 post-conflict states. 
Several empirical investigations have tested the effects of various fragility 
dimensions such as political instability on economic growth in several economies. 
These studies have established the relationship between political stability and 
economic growth in various ways. For instance, using cross sectional analysis Barro 
(1990) found that economic growth is affected negatively by political instability as 
property rights are hardly implemented in unstable political situation. In a similar 
manner Fosu (1992) used cross-national data and a single equation model to 
investigate the effects of political instability on economic growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa for 1960-1986. They found a significantly negative direct relationship between 
political instability and economic growth after controlling for other economic 
variables.   Devereux and Wen (1996) argued that unstable political situation 
discourages private investments which in turn affects economy negatively.  
Alesina and Perroti (1996) used three different variables to proxy for the political 
instability and found it causing a decrease in economic growth. According to Edward 
(1998), there exists a negative relationship between political instability and 
productivity growth for a panel of 93 countries for the period of 1960-1990, though 
the relation was relatively weak. Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, (1999) explores 
the relationship between political instability and economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
African nations. They used a comprehensive measure of political instability that was 
developed using a principal component analysis technique and analysed it in a 
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 Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Rwanda 
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simultaneous equations model and dynamic panel estimation approach. They found 
a statistically significant inverse relationship between political instability and 
economic growth identified by earlier studies. In addition to the direct impact that 
political instability has on growth, they also suggested that political instability 
indirectly decreases economic growth by decreasing long-run capital accumulation. 
They argued that the broad measure of political instability used in the study can 
better capture the effects of political instability on economic growth than 'elite' 
instability that has been used by earlier researchers. 
Taking a panel date of four countries, Bildirici (2004) examined the relationship 
between political instability and economic growth. The study found out a negative 
relationship between the variables under study, Drazen (2000) identified two reasons 
for which political instability affects economic performance. Firstly, it creates 
uncertainty about future return from the investment of firms and private agents, 
which inhibits the society as a whole to accumulate physical capital. Again, there is a 
direct effect of political instability on productivity as it distorts the functions of the 
market. Lower economic growth due to lower human capital accumulation owing to 
endemic political instability is the finding of Maloney (2002) for his study of Latin 
American countries. Yunis et. al (2008) investigated the effects of various political 
instability factors on economic growth for selected Asian countries during 1990-2005. 
The study found close relationship between political stability and economic growth 
and the results showed that the role of political stability is more important than 
economic freedom. Aisen and Veiga (2010) used GMM estimator for linear dynamic 
panel data models on a sample of 169 countries, and 5-year periods from 1960 to 
2004 to investigate the link between political instability and economic growth, and 
found that lower growth is associated with higher degree of political instability. 
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Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, (2005) combined both social and political instability to 
analyse the effects of socio-political instability on growth, for a panel of countries 
over a 30-year period. They found a weak relationship between socio-political 
instability and growth. They found that political instability in particular has the 
greatest adverse effects on growth. Also, the impact of socio-political instability is 
greater in countries with high levels of development and democracy. 
Country specific studies include the studies by Munoz (2009), Astteriou and Price 
(2001) and Campus and Karanasos (2007). Munoz (2009) used ARDL framework to 
investigate the link between political instability and economic growth for Venezuela 
for the period of 1983-2000. They found that political instability affects growth 
negatively but not through the channel of investment. Astteriou and Price’s study 
was to test the influence of political instability on UK economic growth for 1961-1997 
using GARCH-M model. Their study revealed a negative effect on growth. Also, 
Campos and Karanasos (2007) used power ARCH framework with yearly data for 
Argentina for the period 1896-2000 and came up with the conclusion that both the 
informal political stability (assassinations and strikes) and the formal political stability 
(constitutional and legislative changes) have direct negative effect on economic 
performance. The effect of formal instability was stronger in the long run while the 
effect of informal instability was stronger in the short run in their study.  
Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2000) examined the relationship empirically for Greece 
and found strong negative association. Abeyasinghe, (2004) reported that, political 
stability regardless of the level of democracy has the greatest effects on the 
country’s economic growth. Few studies however found a negative relationship 
between political stability and economic growth. Goldsmith (1987) found that for 
LDCs, political stability negatively affected economic growth. However, it was only to 
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a little extent. Ahmed and Pulok (2013) investigated the direct effect of political 
stability on the economic performance of Bangladesh for the period of 1984-2009. 
Their study found out that, political stability has negative effect on economic 
performance in long term while the short run effect is positive. Nomor and Iorember, 
(2017) empirically investigated the relationship between political stability and 
economic growth in Nigeria for the period 1999 to 2014 using the ARDL model 
approach. The result revealed a positive and significant relationship between political 
stability and economic growth both in the long run and in the short run. The study 
concludes that a stable political environment is an indispensable element for 
economic growth. 
A broader stream of research has tried to uncover the economic and non-economic 
determinants of a wide range of institutions. The connection with this literature 
comes from the fact that in discussing state fragility, institutions play a crucial role. 
North (1981) has become the standard reference for the idea that institutions shape 
economic outcomes and are in turn affected by them. Engerman & Sokoloff (1997) 
show how factor endowments shape economic and political institutions through 
history. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2004) distinguish between economic and 
political institutions, while Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) unbundle the relative 
importance of property-rights vs. contracting institutions.  
Over the last decades, there has been an increasing focus on governance and a 
tendency towards assessing its level by using the lenses of the state, and 
underlining the importance of state capacity as an essential feature for effective 
governance (Savoia and Sen 2015: 442). Due to its multidimensionality, state 
capacity has been conceptualized and measured in a variety of ways, and different 
authors have focused on different mechanisms through which the state affects 
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development outcomes29. Evans and Rauch (1999) find a strong association 
between ‘Weberianness’ and economic growth in 35 emerging economies for the 
period 1970–90. Their ‘Weberianness Scale’ is a measure of the degree to which 
meritocratic recruitment and the offer of predictable, rewarding long-term careers 
characterizes core state agencies (Evans and Rauch 1999: 749). The results in 
Bockstette et al. (2002) show a positive association between state antiquity and 
economic growth for 94 countries over the period 1960–1995.  
Another line of work uses measures of institutional quality in the empirical analysis. 
Focusing on the period 1974–1989, Knack and Keefer (1995) found that institutions 
that protect property rights are crucial for investment and growth. Extending the 
period until 2000 and using three alternative measures for the level of corruption, 
including the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index, Mendez and Sepulveda 
(2006) concluded that there is a non-linear relationship between corruption and 
growth, with corruption being favourable at low levels of incidence and harmful to 
economic growth at high levels of incidence. Bosworth and Collins (2003) argue that 
a part of the cross-country variation in economic growth over the period 1960–2000 
can be explained by the quality of the governing institutions (e.g. law and order, 
absence of corruption, and protection of property rights). Some authors have started 
to unpack the concept of state capacity by distinguishing between different 
components30. For instance, using different indicators of governance from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database, but focusing on the impact of 
regulatory quality, Jalilian et al. (2007) suggests that there is a strong causal link 
between this dimension and growth. 
                                                          
29
 Cingolani (2013) present an overview of the state capacity concept 
30
 Bardhan (2016), present  a comprehensive overview of the different components of state capacity 
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While there are scanty studies focused on understanding the direct role of fragility on 
economic growth, however, studies focused on various dimensions of fragility such 
as political instability, corruption religion and its implications for the economy have 
evolved. Indeed, current growth models have not fully understood cultural variables 
and country-specific issues. Leiknes (2009) examined how norms and societal goals 
affect economic growth and development. The study found that among attitude 
towards institutions, religion and overall trust in society are quite significant for an 
economy’s growth trajectory. He found an inverse relationship between religion and 
economic performance. Easterly and Levine (1997) suggested ethnic and religious 
fragmentation while Van Hear (1998) found diasporas playing an influential role in 
the onset and course of conflict. The literature on conflict, war, and failed and fragile 
states while important for the understanding of the causes of state fragility and 
implications of the national security dimension of development, may however be too 
narrow a lens for broader economic development policy options. 
While the above contributions focus on the direct link between fragility and 
development, others have looked at its indirect influence through capital flows. Since 
the condition of fragility is a crucial determinant of the amount of capital that flows to 
a country. In essence growth can therefore be affected by fragility also through this 
channel.  
The interaction between aid and fragility is addressed in a number of studies, none 
of which is specifically focused on Africa. However, given the preponderant role 
played by African countries among fragile ones, their results are still useful to the 
present perspective. Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide evidence that aid is most 
effective in developing countries with sound institutions and policies. However, this 
conclusion is questioned on several grounds by Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard 
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et al. (2004), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). McGillivray and Feeny (2008) 
study the growth impact of aid in a world sample of fragile countries and find that it 
depends on the relative degree of fragility.  
Chauvet e Collier (2008) analyse the preconditions for sustained policy turnarounds 
in failing states and show that aid matters, but its effect depends on its kind (e.g., 
financial aid vs. technical assistance). As emphasized by the theory proposed by 
Besley and Persson (2011), fragility is closely associated with conflict. Therefore, the 
literature that has evaluated the growth impact of conflict is also relevant. Examples 
within this stream include Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002), who search for the 
economic causes of conflict and then establish that Africa is indeed more vulnerable 
to it, because of its poverty; Blanton et al. (2001), who focus on the relationship 
between colonial domination and post-colonial ethnic conflict in Africa; and Bleaney 
and Dimico (2011), who distinguish between the correlates of the probability of onset 
of civil war and the probability of its continuation. 
 In essence, the introduction of the broad concept of fragility, which reflects a 
complex combination of the dysfunctions that are typical of several African countries, 
has stimulated renewed interest for research on the deep roots of development in 
the region. At the same time, a clear impact of fragility on economic outcomes has 
proved hard to assess, partly because of the different definitions employed and 
probably also because of its indirect way of reacting with the economy. The study 
therefore proceeds by reviewing the literature on how state fragility indirectly impacts 
on economic growth through capital flows. The uncertain policy environment and 
institutional weakness that characterises fragile states, suggests the challenges of 
optimising their capital inflow potentials as well as growth (Ostry, Berg, and 
Tsangarides, 2014).  
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4.3.2.3 Capital Flow and Economic Growth 
The weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure as well as insufficient capital in 
fragile state economies have remained significant impediments to their growth. 
International capital inflows to these economies have provided considerable panacea 
in reducing the impact of this deficits. These inflows include Foreign direct 
investment (FDI), Official development aid (ODA) and remittance inflows.  An 
increase in the level of these international capital inflows into fragile state economies 
can stimulate economic growth and welfare through various channels. Capital 
inflows augment for domestic savings promote domestic productivity through the 
transfer of technical skills and managerial knowledge; enhance financial 
development and supports physical infrastructure development.  The subject as to 
the growth impact of capital inflows in developing economies has remained a subject 
of extensive debate. Various studies have investigated these concepts within 
isolated frameworks. Perhaps the most investigated in developing economies is the 
growth impact of FDI as well as determining factors for the level of FDI received by a 
country.   
Waheed (2004) argued further that capital deficient countries, mainly the developing 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, have largely relied on foreign capital to 
supplement domestic capital to enhance their growth. However, he concluded that 
empirical evidence has failed to reach a consensus on the actual impact of foreign 
capital on the economy primarily because of methodological inconsistencies as well 
as data limitations. He noted that most of these studies were cross-country studies 
and identified the need for more country-specific studies that will factor in country-
specific economic characteristics and realities. 
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Two main theoretical perspectives are used to explain the effect of capital flows on 
an economy: The neoclassical and structuralist views (Klobodu and Adams, 2016). 
The neoclassical view posits that capital-deficient economies as is characteristic of 
fragile states with a decent level of openness will attract foreign capital from capital 
surplus economies to supplement domestic capital and in essence growth and 
development. The economic welfare benefit of this process is not just limited to the 
reallocation of surplus capital but includes efficiency gains (Summers, 2000). An 
underlying assumption, in this case, is that capital flows complement domestic 
sources, bridges foreign exchange gaps and supplements domestic investments. It 
provides substantial direct and indirect spillover effects such as access to 
managerial and technical know-how, access to foreign markets amongst others 
(Kose et al., 2006; Levchenko and Mauro, 2007). Delachat et al. (2009) reported a 
significant positive relationship between capital flows and economic performance in 
developing countries. Their position was hinged on their analysis conducted on 44 
sub-Saharan African economies using data that from 2000 to 2007. 
The structuralists, on the other hand, posit capital flows as potent in displacing 
domestic investment, and as such detrimental to the economy of recipients 
(Papanek, 1973; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). More recently, it has been 
argued that capital flows to developing economies in the past few decades have 
widened income differentials between developing economies (Taylor, 1996; 
O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). It is argued that foreign capital distorts the 
distribution of income in poor developing economies through the stimulation of 
inappropriate technology importation (Griffin and Enos, 1970). Gerschenkron (1952) 
posited that “in perfect capital mobility world, an increase in capital inflows may have 
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no impact on domestic investment levels since capital only flows to finance 
investment deficits on demand but does not necessarily stimulate demand by itself”.  
Papanek (1973) investigated 85 developing economies and found capital inflow 
culpable of deepening foreign dependency in these economies. Similarly, Bussiere 
and Fratzscher (2008) examined 45 developing economies using a 1980 to 2002 
dataset. They found that while financial openness may stimulate short-run growth, it, 
however, does not translate to medium and long-run growth. They conclude that the 
empirical evidence on the positive relationship between growth and capital inflow 
either remains murky or not robust enough. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) 
investigated capital inflow to non-OECD countries from 1980 to 2000. They found no 
evidence to support that the fastest growing of those countries received the most 
capital.  
Carkovic and Levine (2002) opined that while there are logical rationales for the 
assumption of capital flow to drive growth, the empirical evidence may not be robust 
enough.  Weeks (2012) investigated 31 sub-Saharan African countries from 1980-
2008 and concluded that capital inflow impact in the region is overrated. Diao and 
McMillan (2017) utilised a framework that incorporated the coexistence of a closed 
and open modern economy and controlled for other activities that characterised 
modern African economies. They found that capital inflow only promotes growth in 
closed systems. Gossel and Biekpe (2014) found that economic growth in South 
Africa is driven by domestic capital and not foreign capital using data from 1995 to 
2011. This kind of relationships has in recent times generated a lot of curiosity into 
the role of capital inflows in developing economies. The inability of capital inflow to 
effectively drive growth in most SSA countries has however been linked to the 
presence of state fragility (Tintin, 2013).  
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To understand the impact of capital flows on economic growth in developing 
economies, several studies have empirically evaluated the relationship at both total 
and individual type of flow levels (Aizenman et al., 2013; Gossel and Biekpe, 2014; 
Raheem and Adeniyi, 2015).  This study, therefore, proceeds to investigate the 
relationship between the different types of capital inflow and the economic growth.  
Foreign direct investment and economic growth 
FDI is seen as a tool to boost productivity and economic growth in developing 
countries; however, the effect of FDI on economic growth in literature is largely 
ambiguous. Theoretically, there is a strong basis for expecting FDI to have a positive 
impact on growth but the empirical evidence supporting this is rather frail. Hermes 
and Lensink (2003) reckon that the circumstances in recipient countries determine 
the nature of contribution FDI makes. Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek 
(2004) examined the complementarities between FDI and financial development in 
driving economic growth; they explored the importance of having better financial 
markets in amassing full benefits from FDI. Developing countries expend a lot of 
funds to attract FDI in the hope that the presence of multinational companies (MNCs) 
will transform their economy (Moosa, 2002). However, evidence on the positive 
externality that FDI affords to these economies is mainly inconclusive. Haskel et al. 
(2007) concluded that the returns from FDI do not necessarily justify the investment 
used to attract them. 
  As an overview, the findings on the FDI–growth nexus are inconclusive. It is 
argued by Carkovic and Levine (2002) and Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2008) 
that the causal relationship between economic growth and FDI is characterised by a 
significant level of heterogeneity and varies across countries specific cases. Akinlo 
(2004) investigated the impact of FDI on economic growth in Nigeria for the period 
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1970 to 2001 using the error correction model (ECM). The results show that both 
private capital and lagged foreign capital have a small and insignificant impact on 
economic growth. This study, however, established the positive and significant 
impact of export on growth. Financial development which he measured as M2/GDP 
has a significant adverse impact on growth. This he attributed to capital flight. In 
another manner, labour force and human capital were found to have a significant 
positive effect on growth.   
 Ayanwale (2007), using the OLS estimation technique investigated the 
empirical relationship between non-extractive FDI and economic growth in Nigeria. 
He found that FDI had a positive link with economic growth but doubted the overall 
effect of FDI on economic growth as it may not be significant.  Ajide and Adeniyi 
(2010) investigated the causal relationship among FDI, economic growth and 
environment using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach by applying 
the annual time series data for the period spanning 1970- 2006. The findings show 
that there was no existence of a long-run relationship between FDI and growth on 
the one hand while there exists a long-run causal link between environmental quality 
and FDI inflows on the other hand.  
Remittances and economic growth 
In the case of remittances, although some studies have suggested unfavourable 
effects or relationships with other macroeconomic variables, evidence as to its 
positive effects in developing nations abound.  For example, various studies have 
found that remittances positively influenced economic growth in developing 
economies (Mundaca, 2009, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009, Omobitan, 2012 and 
Laniran and Adeniyi, 2015).   Other variables which have been found to be positively 
influenced by remittances inflows include a reduction in poverty (Adams and Page, 
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2003), development of financial sector (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009, and 
Aggarwal, et al. 2011) and output volatility smoothening (Chami et al., 2009). Kapur 
(2005) posits that remittance inflows provide a relatively stable source of foreign 
capital to developing economies particularly those faced with challenges of socio-
economic and political unease. Quite a lot of the empirical evidence on remittances 
and output volatilities in developing economies suggest that remittances inflow are 
resilient to economic volatilities, thereby helping recipient economies militate against 
adverse business cycle effects (Ratha, 2003; Kapur 2005; Chami et al., 2009; and 
Jackman et al., 2009).  However, studies with contrary perspective do exist (Lueth 
and Ruiz-Arranz 2008; Chowdhury 2011; Ahamada and Coulibaly 2011 and Mallaye 
and Yogo2011). 
ODA and economic growth 
Empirical evidence on the impact of ODA on various economic outcomes provides a 
mixed finding across the developing world. For example, Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2010) using a meta-analysis to test the effectiveness of ODA found the growth 
impact of ODA to be positive but insignificant. According to Roberts (2003), evidence 
as to the ability of ODA in achieving development objectives often rely on the public 
expenditure program effectiveness in a country. He suggested that there was a 
seeming relationship between fiscal ability in an economy and ODA effectiveness. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) provided an earlier argument as to the positive 
relationship existing between institutional structure and domestic policies in ODA 
receiving countries. Boone (1996) found no growth impact of ODA in developing 
economies. In a more recent study by Rajan and Subramanian (2007) empirical 
evidence as to growth impact of ODA was not found to be significantly robust. They, 
however, argued that these findings could be attributed to weakening governance as 
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a result of aid inflows itself which in return weakened the growth impact of ODA. 
Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2012) did a robust study on the ability of ODA to improve per 
capita income in developing economies. They found an insignificant or negative 
significant relationship between ODA and per capita income in economies with 
varying human development levels. Burnside and Dollar (2000) studied the 
interactions among a choice of macroeconomic policies and growth and revealed 
that aid is beneficial to countries that adopt appropriate and stable policies. However, 
the study revealed no evidence that foreign aid encourages the adoption of good 
macroeconomic policies. The study then showed that foreign aid is a waste to 
countries without appropriate and stable domestic policies. 
Ekpo (2011) examined the nature, scale, use and impact of aid flow to Nigeria during 
the period 2002-2008. The analysis shows that aid increase during the period 2004-
2008 was partly due to the Paris Club debt forgiveness in the country and the aid 
impacted positively on GDP per capita during the period under review. Also, in a 
similar study conducted by Ekpo and Afangideh (2012), they examined the 
challenges, policies, principles, and impact of official development assistance (ODA) 
on economic performance in Nigeria from 1970-2010. The result shows there is a 
positive but insignificant relationship between ODA and economic development in 
Nigeria and also found a significant relationship between capital expenditure and 
economic development while oil revenue indicated a negative relationship with 
agricultural output. Kolawole (2013) examined the impact exacted by foreign 
assistance in the form of official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on real growth in Nigeria over the period 1980 to 2011. The results 
reveal that there is no causality between any pair of the variables. Findings of the 
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study also established a negative relationship between FDI and real growth as ODA 
exacts no impact on real growth in the country. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a review of available literature on economic growth, 
capital inflows and the relationship between fragility and the economy. It has also set 
up the theoretical framework for this research by reviewing relevant literature 
available on the individual variables. It has also revealed that regarding empirical 
evidence, issues regarding how the exhibition of state fragility affects the economic 
performance remain not clear, as there is relatively very scanty empirical evidence 
as to the role of state fragility on economic performance. As a matter of fact what 
becomes clear from the literature are the recently continued calls for further research 
to investigate the economic cost of fragility in the fragile state economies. Also 
regarding the methodological approach to the growth and capital flow literature, 
especially the time series literature, it appears that Co-integration estimation 
techniques although various variants of it have been the most widely utilised. Also 
while a more significant percentage of the literature across the board has focused on 
FDI relatively less attention has been placed on other forms of capital inflow such as 
ODA and remittances. 
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CHAPTER 5: CAPITAL FLOWS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA: DOES 
STATE FRAGILITY MATTER? 
This chapter presents an empirical investigation into the implications of state fragility 
for capital flows and economic growth in Nigeria. It does this by presenting a 
theoretical framework for the investigation before engaging in a stepwise approach in 
conducting the empirical analysis that will inform the conclusions of this chapter. 
5.1 Introduction 
Recent growth in Africa has not been accompanied by structural transformation or 
reduction in unemployment levels and has not been inclusive (AERC, 2015).  This 
raises the issue of what drives the witnessed growth. Kaplan (2015) opined that 
perhaps the prevalence of fragility in most of these African economies explains the 
socially inefficient growth experienced. Interestingly, quite a lot of the existing models 
on economic growth as an area of academia as well as research interest tend to be 
sightless to fragility and its manifestations in fast-growing African economies. Some 
of the most significant exhibitions of dimensions of state fragility have included a 
youth population bulge, resource dependence, armed conflicts and economic 
instability among other germane issues. High inflation rates have been exhibited by 
hitherto relatively stable middle income, fast-growing economies or economies with 
substantial growth potential. This diverts the attention of external observers from the 
internal strains of fragility within such economies.  
The economic, social and political environment in fragile states is generally not 
conducive for capital inflow, a potential driver of growth. Due to their fragility, these 
economies often may not be able to mobilise their domestic capital optimally, raising 
further questions about their growth experience. It, therefore, becomes crucial to 
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understand the impact of state fragility on economic growth and capital flows. Given 
the multiple sources of state fragility and the reinforcing interactions among them, 
fragile countries find it very difficult to build resilience, and many seem to be caught 
in a “fragility trap”31. This makes the transition out of fragility neither rapid nor 
straightforward. For instance, it is estimated that, of 26 sub-Saharan African 
countries identified as fragile, only 12 could be expected to become more resilient by 
2039 (Cilliers and Sisk 2013). However, some of these economies have maintained 
a positive growth trend. 
According to the OECD (2015), fragile states have received more development 
assistance and remittances per capita than other developing economies, however, in 
terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), the trend has appeared to be almost the 
opposite. Disaggregation of capital flows reflects acute volatility in FDI to developing 
countries between 2000 to 2012. Capital flows to developing economies (fragile 
states inclusive), maintained an upward trend through the 2000s until the financial 
crisis. Post-crisis periods, however, saw the steady recovery of FDI flows to almost 
pre-crisis levels in non-fragile developing countries by 2012. However, on aggregate, 
FDI to fragile states has not maintained the same trend as discussed earlier in 
chapter 1 (see appendix1.1 to 1.3).  
In a previous publication by the OECD (2013), it was estimated that, despite general 
trends, some fragile state economies have witnessed significant levels of capital 
inflows. For example, it was highlighted that Nigeria had remained the fragile state 
with the highest levels of FDI for over a decade, although its share of total FDI to 
fragile states dropped from 29.8 percent in 2005 to 21.9 percent in 2010. It was 
                                                          
31
 A closely interlinked circle of  reinforcing interplay of state fragility dimensions which manifests as 
inadequate economic development, political instability and lack of social cohesion (Cilliers and Sisk, 
2013). 
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noted further that more than three-quarters of FDI to fragile states went to only seven 
fragile states, coincidentally, all of which are resource-rich states. Diaspora 
remittances to Nigeria have followed a similar trend, with a total of 21.1 percent of 
total remittance flows to fragile states in 2010 making it the second highest 
remittance recipient fragile state from 15.4 percent in 2005 when it was third. 
However, regarding development assistance, Nigeria ranked 8th by 2010 with a total 
of 4.1percent of development assistance to fragile states, from a 2005 rank of 2nd 
with a total of 11.5 percent (OECD, 2013) (see appendix1.1 to 1.3). 
Contemporary economic analysis is certainly yet to adequately and efficiently 
comprehend the various forms of mutual interactions and feedback systems of 
fragility on the economy. Most attention to state fragility over the years has appeared 
to be coming from the humanitarian point of view. It is, however, impossible to deny 
that fragility defines both the social and economic environment within a country. This 
chapter, therefore, proposes to investigate whether the role of state fragility really 
matters for economic growth and capital inflow by conducting a country-specific 
study for Nigeria. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 discusses the 
theoretical framework on which the analysis of this study is built on. Section 5.3 
focuses on the empirical models and data analysis, while section 5.4 discusses the 
results and the fifth section concludes the chapter.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
5.2Theoretical Framework 
This study adopts a growth accounting model, where economic growth is the 
measure of economic performance, and for economic growth we look at real output 
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per capita. The approach used in modelling accounts for a country’s production 
through a simple Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
𝛽
            (5.1) 
Where: Y=output level; A= productivity level, K= capital stock, L = labour and t = 
time.  
As discussed earlier, Driffield and Jones (2013) argued that capital deficient 
countries, particularly developing economies, have often relied on foreign capital to 
supplement domestic capital to fast-track their growth i.e. Kt = dKt + fKit where dK 
= domestic capital, fK = foreign capital.  Their underlying theory is premised on a 
standard growth model where foreign capital (FDI, ODA and remittances) are 
introduced as components of investment (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000 and 
Catrinescu et.al, 2009). Studies have also linked the performance of these flows as 
indicators of fragility in an economy and indirect channels through which state 
fragility can have implications on an economy (Tintin, 2013).  
Weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure and capital scarcity are highly 
associated with developing and fragile state economies and have remained major 
impediments to their growth. International capital inflows to these economies have 
contributed significantly in reducing the impact of capital scarcity. These inflows 
include foreign direct investment (FDI), official development aid (ODA) and 
remittance inflows (REM). An increase in the level of international capital inflows into 
a developing economy or fragile state economy can stimulate economic growth and 
welfare through various channels (Hasen, and Giorgioni, 2007). However, the ability 
of an economy to fully optimise this capital inflow varies across type of inflow and 
other domestic issues in the domestic recipient economy. It is argued that capital 
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inflows augment domestic capital, promote domestic productivity through the transfer 
of technical skills and managerial knowledge, enhance financial development and 
support physical infrastructure development. In line with previous studies, such as 
Driffield and Jones (2013), Nwosa and Akinbobola (2016) and Jawaid, and Saleem 
(2017), this study disaggregates capital stock (k), into domestic capital (dk) and 
foreign capital (fk). Further disaggregation of fk into foreign direct investment (fdi), 
remittances (rem) and official development aid (oda) was done to capture the 
individual relationships of each capital flow with economic growth. Other foreign 
capital such as portfolio investment and loans were not introduced due to data 
unavailability.  
Given the assumption of constant returns to scale for physical inputs, (5.1) can, 
therefore, be rewritten as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑡
𝛼            (5.2) 
Where: y and k refer to output and capital stock in per capita terms respectively.  
Taking into consideration the simple Keynesian capital accumulation rule,  
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑠𝑦 − (𝑛 − 𝛿) 𝑘           (5.3) 
Where:  
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑡
 = rate of change of capital stock per capita; 𝑠𝑦 − (𝑛 − 𝛿) 𝑘 = savings after 
the deductions of depreciation of capital and labour force growth. s= gross savings 
as a share of per capita output, δ= capital depreciation and n =labour force growth.  
Note: Keynes assumed S=I Where: S = Savings and I =Investment 
Solving where (5.3) is equal to zero provides a steady state solution for per capita 
capital stock; 𝑘 = 𝑠𝑦/(𝑛 + 𝛿). Taking the log of equation (5.2) and substituting k with 
the steady state solution 
ln(𝑦𝑡
∗) = [
1
1−∝
] [𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡+∝ ln 
𝑠𝑡
𝑛𝑡+𝛿𝑡
]        (5.4) 
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Where ln=logarithm: natural log, (*) represents a steady-state signification 
In line with Mankiw et al. (1992) countries gravitate towards their steady state as the 
following approximation: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0 = 𝜆(𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0)        (5.5) 
Where: 𝑦0 represent initial per capita income level, λ = (1-e
-Ƞt) is the adjustment 
dynamics toward steady state where Ƞ is the convergence speed.  
Therefore, the growth of output per capita can be expressed as: 
𝑔𝑡 = (
𝜆
𝑡⁄ )(𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0)                   (5.6) 
Where g =output per capita growth. 
By substituting (𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗) with equation (5.4),  
𝑔𝑡 = (
𝜆
[𝑡⁄ (1 − 𝛼)] ) [𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡+∝ ln
𝑠𝑡
𝑛𝑡+𝛿𝑡
] − (𝜆 𝑡⁄ )𝑙𝑛𝑦0)     (5.7) 
Since the study has adopted a neoclassical model, and in the neoclassical 
framework one key determinant of economic growth is capital, this study therefore 
looks at the prevailing condition within the country, as this can influence the 
performance of an economy and its drivers. To do so, measures of state fragility 
were introduced.  The effects of state fragility were taken into account through the 
total factor productivity. Considering the importance of total factor productivity (A), 
similar to Temple and Johnson (1998), a generic form of A is represented as: 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑓𝑡)            (5.8) 
Where 𝑓𝑡 represents measures of state fragility  
In line with the multidimensional approach to state fragility, as suggested by 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012), Graveingholt et.al (2015) and Ferreira, (2018), this 
study introduces aggregate measures of state fragility as well as disaggregated 
dimensional measures of state fragility.  As discussed in the previous chapter, these 
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include economic social and military and political dimensions. This helps us to 
understand which dimensions of state fragility have the most effects on economic 
growth. The corresponding coefficients measure how growth is affected by 
aggregate fragility and each of these dimensions, bearing in mind that higher levels 
of each of the measures of fragility and their dimensions are interpreted as higher 
levels of state fragility. Accordingly, it is expected that higher levels of fragility have a 
detrimental effect on growth; the expectation is that they have a negative sign. 
By substituting A with equation 5.8 into equation 5.7, in line with Mankiw et al. (1992) 
and Temple and Johnson (1998), output per capita growth therefore becomes: 
 𝑔 = 𝜙1𝐴0 + 𝜙2𝑓𝑡 + 𝜙3ln (𝑠𝑡 (𝑛𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡⁄ )) − 𝜙4𝑙𝑛𝑦0      (5.9) 
Where 𝜙1= λ/[t(1-α)], 𝜙2 = λ/(1-α), 𝜙3 =λα/[t(1-α)], and 𝜙4 =λ/t 
Within the policy oriented literature, such as World Bank (2015), indicators of the 
quality of government and its interventions in the realms of fiscal and monetary 
policy have been used as additional proxies for the stability or otherwise of the 
economy. Recent efforts that have contributed to the growth and fragility discussion 
have also used monetary and fiscal policy variables for robustness (see Bertocchi 
and Guerzoni, 2012 and Ferreira, 2018).   Similarly, time series studies addressing 
the relationship between growth and capital inflow have introduced various variables 
to capture the macroeconomic environment. These studies include (Klobodu, and 
Adams, 2016; Nwosa and Akinbobola, 2016; Jawaid, and Saleem, 2017). In a similar 
vein, relevant variables to capture the macroeconomic environment were introduced 
into the model used in the study through the fiscal and monetary arms of the 
economy, using government expenditure and the money supply as proxies 
respectively. 
141 
 
The inclusion of a measure of quantification for state fragility will allow the model to 
evaluate the effect of state fragility on economic growth (Ferreira, 2018). 
Jalilian.et.al. (2007), in evaluating the impact of regulation on economic growth 
opined that the inclusion of a relevant qualitative and control variable improves the 
model and helped their model to assess the impact of regulation on economic 
growth. They did this in line with the specifications of Temple and Johnson (1995). In 
the context of this study, measures of state fragility used were in line with the 
existing fragility framework literature (Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2012; Kaplan, 2014 
and OECD, 2016). Since the main objective of this research is to investigate the 
impact of state fragility and economic growth, human capital was dropped because 
of multicollinearity with state fragility. In the process of indexing state fragility, human 
capital level was incorporated and as such explains the multicollinearity, hence, it 
was dropped.  
The base model for this study, as earlier discussed, is such that it captures per 
capita output as a function of capital (domestic and foreign) and monetary and fiscal 
policies. Measures of state fragility are subsequently introduced to the base model at 
both aggregate and disaggregate levels. The results of these provide evidence as to 
the relationship between state fragility and per capita output. A comparison of the 
results of the base model without state fragility and with state fragility measures will 
provide support as to whether or not state fragility impacts economic performance. 
The first model presents the base model that captures the relationship of capital 
flows and economic growth along with relevant variables to capture the 
macroeconomic environment. The second model presents an equally weighted 
average measure of state fragility introduced to the base capital flow and growth 
model. This measure of state fragility is used as most existing indices make use of 
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similar techniques founded upon simple addition of "equally weighed or uniform 
attributes". Rules of additive aggregation reveal that negative variance in the value of 
one variable will be compensated for by positive variance in another variable 
(Munck, 2009). However, the validity of this may largely be a function of the 
dimensions stipulated in the index. A case can, however, be made for this 
aggregation technique by arguing that the selected variables and indicators reflect 
the same unidimensional concept, or by arguing that although the variables do not 
covary, they are parts of one phenomenon and are "combined to form a whole" 
(Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). While the argument may be visible in a unidimensional 
phenomenon, in the case of a multidimensional phenomenon like that of fragility, 
perhaps the compensation argument becomes too simplistic, problematic and may 
defeat the purpose. Given the preceding, the third model presents a multivariate 
measure of state fragility, introduced to the base capital flow and growth model. The 
fourth fifth and sixth models present disaggregated measures of state fragility 
dimensions introduced to the base model. These dimensions are economic, social 
and military and political respectively. 
5.3 Data Description  
The summary of the variables used in the analysis, their respective representation 
and definition are presented and outlined in table 5.1 below. Data for this study were 
primarily sourced from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank data 
bank.  Data was log transformed to stabilize the variance of the series.   
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Table 5.1 Growth Model Variable Definition and Description 
Variable Representation Definition 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 US$) Y 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
Gross capital 
formation 
(%GDP) DK 
Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) 
consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy 
plus net changes in the level of inventories as a percentage of 
current US$. Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
FDI (%GDP) FDI 
This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less 
disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors. 
Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
ODA(%GDP) ODA 
Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of 
disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Source: 
World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
 
Remittances 
(%GDP) REM 
Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and 
compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current 
transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households 
to or from non-resident households as a percentage of GDP in 
current US$. Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
Money 
Supply2 
 (%GDP) MS 
Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside 
banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, 
and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central government. Source: World Bank Data 
Bank 2016. 
Government 
Expenditure 
(%GDP) GE 
General government final consumption expenditure (formerly 
general government consumption) includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). Source: World Bank Data Bank 2016. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Traditional time-series approach to studying this type of relationship is dependent on 
at least 25 observations for the analysis to be statistically significant. The period 
1980 to 2015, which is the period of this study, has more than this and allows for the 
analysis to be credible, while maintaining a reasonably good degree of freedom in 
the model.  
Econometrics theory does not have any single clear method for the detection and 
elimination of multicollinearity in a model but rather proposes several methods to 
detect and mitigate against its impact. A possible method to avoid this is conducting 
a prior correlation analysis of the variables intended for the model and eliminating 
any variable found to have a high correlation coefficient from the model. Some 
researchers have offered rules of thumb for interpreting the meaning of correlation 
coefficients, and by extension determining the degree of multicollinearity within a 
model but these rules of thumb are domain specific. Some researchers suggest that 
a high pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient value of 0.8 or above indicates 
 Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(EWA) F(PCA) 
 Mean  7.368  5.236  3.586  2.529  2.134  5.922  4.954  3.927  5.817 
 Median  7.249  5.140  3.621  3.595  2.271  5.879  5.101  3.972  5.640 
 Maximum  7.838  6.546  4.921  5.489  5.035  6.856  5.651  4.203  8.470 
 Minimum  7.040  4.466  2.228 -2.276  0.039  5.118  4.156  3.688  4.135 
 Std. Dev.  0.261  0.586  0.687  2.567  1.137  0.389  0.451  0.1424  1.241 
 Skewness  0.587  0.512 -0.023 -0.543  0.123  0.087 -0.282 -0.017  0.737 
 Kurtosis  1.787  2.190  2.315  1.692  3.375  2.815  1.829  2.082  2.541 
 Jarque-
Bera  4.270  2.558  0.708  4.333  0.302  0.097  2.531  1.265  3.577 
 Probability  0.118  0.278  0.702  0.115  0.860  0.953  0.282  0.531  0.167 
 Sum  265.237  188.482  129.092  91.050  76.821  213.183  178.330  141.388  209.340 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  2.391  12.038  16.508  230.677  45.231  5.288  7.115  0.710  53.936 
 Observatio
ns  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 
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the existence of serious multicollinearity. However Gujarati (2004) argues that a high 
pair-wise correlation coefficient on its own is a sufficient condition for the existence of 
collinearity, but it is not a necessary condition for its existence within any given 
model. He points to cases where multicollinearity has been detected in model with 
correlation coefficients of less than 0.5.  
Table 5.3 Correlation Analysis  
 Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(EWA) F(PCA) 
Y  1.000         
DK  0.675  1.000        
FDI -0.013 -0.431  1.000       
RR  0.513 -0.133  0.611  1.000      
ODA  0.403 -0.180  0.662  0.693  1.000     
MS  0.740  0.712 -0.154  0.127  0.007  1.000    
GE  0.561  0.571 -0.154  0.192 -0.191  0.654  1.000   
F(EWA)  0.304  0.062  0.260  0.396  0.201  0.107  0.035  1.000   
F(PCA)  0.046 -0.320  0.298  0.351  0.438 -0.055 -0.229  0.040  1.000 
The result of the correlation analysis above in table 5.3 suggests a decent level of 
correlation across board. Generally no correlation exceeded the 0.8 coefficient value 
limit. The correlation is positive largely for most variables with economic growth 
except in the case of FDI which was very low and negative as well. In the case of 
domestic capital, remittances, Money supply and government expenditure, they have 
relatively decent levels of positive correlation to economic growth. In the case of 
state fragility, and ODA the correlations were positive but quite low. 
5.4 Data Analysis  
Preceding any meaningful regression analysis is an investigation of the individual 
characteristics of the variables as well as the collective characteristics of the model. 
To this effect, unit root test, co-integration estimates and lag selection are conducted 
and presented in Table 5.4, Table 5.5 and Appendix 5.1 respectively. The dynamics 
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of whether state fragility matters for the capital flows and economic growth 
relationship are presented in Tables 5.6 to 5.8.  
5.4.1 Time series properties of Data 
Investigating the time series properties before analysing the relationship among 
variables is crucial owing to the challenges that non-stationary series present in 
regression analysis. It is well established in the literature that an ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression estimate can produce spurious regression when the data 
used contain a unit root, except where co-integration exists (Hamilton, 1994). 
Therefore insufficient investigation of the existence of a unit root may result in 
estimates that may appear meaningful but in actuality are meaningless or inaccurate 
at best. To avoid this type of spurious estimate, stationarity properties are checked 
by unit root tests, namely Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (see Dickey and Fuller, 
1979) and Phillips–Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988). Results of unit root tests 
are reported in Table 5.4. Also, investigating the presence of a unit root gives an 
insight into the order of integration of the variables. Knowledge of this helps to 
ensure that the best fit estimation technique is applied. For example, it is argued that 
in the presence of I (2) variables, the computed F-statistics provided by Pesaran et 
al. (2001) are not valid because the bounds test is based on the assumption that the 
variables are either I (0) or I (1) therefore suggesting that a combination of I (0) and I 
(1) is valid for the bound test (Ouattara, 2004b). The results of the stationary tests 
are presented in table 5.4 below.  
 
 
 
147 
 
Table 5.4: Stationarity Test Result 
 ADF PP 
At Level 1st Difference At Level 1st  Difference 
T STAT PROB T STAT PROB T STAT PROB T STAT PROB 
Y 0.039 0.956 -4.842 0.000 -0.364 0.905 -4.839 0.000 
FDI -2.878 0.058 -9.906 0.000 -2.769 0.073 -10.101 0.000 
DK -2.068 0.259 -2.366 0.059 -2.136 0.233 -4.631 0.000 
REM -1.087 0.710 -2.993 0.046 -1.040 0.728 -6.596 0.000 
ODA -2.489 0.127 -5.544 0.000 -2.015 0.279 -5.570 0.000 
MS -1.729 0.409 -5.051 0.000 -1.868 0.343 -5.093 0.000 
GE -2.424 0.143 -4.002 0.004 -2.470 0.131 -6.541 0.000 
F(EWA) -2.197 0.211 -6.223 0.000 -4.636 0.000 -20.252 0.000 
F(PCA) -21.690 0.000 -5.836 0.000 -14.082 0.000 -10.384 0.000 
F(ECO) -0.758 0.852 -4.980 0.000 -0.654 0.845 -5.040 0.000 
F(SOC) -1.167 0.676 -3.328 0.022 -0.218 0.927 -4.600 0.000 
F(M&P) -4.229 0.002 -9.341 0.000 -4.311 0.002 -14.649 0.000 
Where: Y is Gdp per capita, FDI is foreign direct investment, DK is gross domestic capital formation, 
REM is Remittances, ODA is official development assistance, MS is money supply, GE is government 
expenditure, F(EWA) is fragility (equal weight average), F(PCA) is fragility (principal component 
analysis), F(ECO) is fragility (economic), F(SOC) is fragility (social) and F(M&P) is fragility (military 
and political). 
The ADF test reveals a mixed level of stationarity. Variables F(PCA), F(M&P) and 
FDI were stationary at levels at 5, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively, 
while others are stationary at first difference.  Other variables Y, REM, MS, GE, 
F(SOC), F(M&P)  and F(EWA) were stationary at first difference at 5 percent level of 
significance and DK at 10 percent.  The PP unit root test reveals a similar pattern.  
Variables F(EWA), F(PCA) and F(M&P) were stationary at level at 5 percent level of 
significance and FDI at 10 percent level of significance while others were stationary 
at first difference at 5 percent level of significance.  Therefore, the unit root results 
confirm that some variables are stationary at level {i.e., I (0)} and others at first 
difference {i.e., I (1)}.  
The maximum numbers of lags was determined using the Akaike criterion (AIC), 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQ). From the 
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results presented in Appendix (5.1), it is evident that most of the lag selection criteria 
produced similar results that suggested the selection of three lags.  
5.4.2 Econometric Estimation Technique 
To empirically explore the relationships identified in the objectives of this study, the 
study conducted multiple regression estimations. Econometric theory suggests that 
there is a long run relationship between variables under consideration (Klobodu and 
Adams, 2016).  This means that the mean and variance are constant and time 
independent. However, empirical studies have shown that the constancy of the 
means and variances are not satisfied in analysing time series variables (Nkoro and 
Uko, 2016). To overcome this problem of non-stationarity, time series econometric 
analysis has increasingly gravitated towards the issue of co-integration. The 
rationale for this is that co-integration is a very useful tool for analysing the presence 
of steady-state equilibrium between variables. Co-integration has become an over-
riding requirement for economic models using non-stationary time series data. If the 
variables do not co-integrate, this suggests problems of spurious regression. In 
resolving this, various co-integration techniques have emerged.  
In applied econometrics, the Granger (1981) and, Engle and Granger (1987), co-
integration technique and, Johansen and Juselius (1990) co-integration techniques 
have been used to determine the long run relationship between series that are non-
stationary, as well as re-parametrising them to the Error Correction Model (ECM). 
The re-parametrised result gives the long and short-run dynamics of the underlying 
variables. Recently, however, a series of studies by Pesaran and Shin (1996); 
Pesaran and Pesaran (1997); Pesaran and Smith (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001) 
have introduced an alternative co-integration technique known as the 
‘Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bound test. This technique has some 
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benefits over the Johansen co-integration techniques. According to Ghatak and 
Siddiki, (2001) the ARDL technique provides a more statistically significant approach 
to determine the co-integration relationship in small samples as in this study (with 36 
annual observations per variable) while the Johansen co-integration techniques often 
require large data samples for validity.  
Also, the ARDL technique does not require the same order of integration for all 
regressors as against other techniques (Ouattara, 2004a). It can be applied 
irrespective of the regressors being of the order of integration one I(1) and/or level 
I(0). The estimations can proceed with or without the knowledge of variables being of 
I(0) or I(1) (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997: 304). This suggests that the ARDL 
technique does not necessarily require the pre-testing issues associated with other 
co-integration techniques, which requires variables classified into I(1) or I(0) 
(Pesaran et al., 2001). In the case where there is a mix or doubt with regards to the 
unit root properties of the data, applying the ARDL technique remains the most 
appropriate technique for empirical analysis (Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir, 
2004:485).  They argued that the order of integration of a variable can be a function 
of the choice of unit root test used. Hence the contradictory results often recorded on 
a variable and concluded on the ability of the ARDL technique in avoiding this 
problem. It is, however, crucial to note that this technique crashes in the presence of 
a variable integrated of order two I(2).  To avoid a wrong application of the ARDL 
technique, it, therefore, becomes important to test for unit root. 
In a similar vein, unlike most other co-integration estimation techniques, which are 
sample size sensitive, the ARDL is less sensitive to sample size and can produce 
reliable results with even a small sample size. Harris and Sollis, (2003), posited that 
the ARDL generates unbiased long-run estimates and valid t-statistics, even if there 
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are some endogenous regressors in the model. The procedures of the ARDL bound 
test is hinged on the joint F-statistics (Wald statistics) for testing co-integration 
(Odhiambo, 2009). The F-statistics asymptotic distribution is non-standard under the 
null hypothesis (Ho) of no cointegration. The computed test statistics has to exceed 
the value of the upper critical bounds for the null hypothesis to be rejected. The test 
becomes inconclusive if it falls within the bounds, and the null hypothesis gets 
accepted if the computed test statistics falls below the lower bounds (Pesaran and 
Pesaran, 1997 and Pesaran et al., 2001). 
Another advantage of this technique over other techniques is its ability to avoid a lot 
of decisions which must be made before estimation as these techniques are very 
sensitive to these decisions. These decisions include the number of endogenous and 
exogenous variables (if any) to be included, the treatment of deterministic elements, 
as well as the order of VAR and the optimal number of lags to be used (Pesaran and 
Smith, 1998). They noted the ability of the ARDL technique to accommodate a 
varying number of lags for different variables in one model as against other 
estimation techniques which do not. 
According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), the ARDL technique involves the 
following steps. The first step tests for the existence of any long-term relationship 
among the variables of interest using an F-test. In this stage, each behavioural 
equation is transferred to the error correction form of the underlying ARDL model. 
According to Pearsan et al. (2001), the error corrected version of the ARDL (p,q) for 
variables 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡 is  represented as : 
∆𝑋𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖∆𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗∆𝑍𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐶0𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 𝐶1𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1    (5.10) 
Where 𝑋𝑡 = endogenous variable, 𝛼 = intercept, 𝑍𝑡 = explanatory variable and 𝜇𝑡 
=error term 
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The F-statistics for the joint test of the coefficients 𝐶0 and 𝐶1 is computed to test for 
the long run relationship between endogenous variable 𝑋𝑡 and explanatory 
variable𝑍𝑡. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients 𝐶0 and 𝐶1 in the equation 
above are both equal to zero (i.e. null hypothesis is that there is no long run 
relationship between endogenous variable 𝑋𝑡 and explanatory variable 𝑍𝑡). The 
computed F-statistics is then compared with critical value bounds of the tabulated F-
statistics. If the F-statistics is higher than the upper bound of the critical value, the 
null hypothesis is rejected and vice versa (Narayan, 2004).  
The second step involves the estimation of the coefficients of the long-run 
relationship, followed by an estimation of the short-run elasticity of the variables with 
the error correction representation of the ARDL model. This is only proceeded to if 
the null hypothesis in the first step is rejected.  By applying the ECM version of 
ARDL, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium will be determined. According to 
Pearsan et al. (2001), the dynamic structure of the ARDL (p, q) model is represented 
as:  𝑋𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑍𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=0 + 𝜇𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1        (5.11) 
Where the lag length for  𝑋𝑡 and  𝑍𝑡  are p and q respectively and 𝜇𝑡  is the random 
error term. 
The study proceeds by conducting a formal investigation for co-integration by using 
the ARDL co-integration technique, due to the nature of mixed integration among the 
variables. A direct regression of output per capita on the variables of interest is likely 
to produce biased estimates due to the well-known problems of time-series 
regression. To deal with these issues, the study utilises the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) or Bounds Testing framework of Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001). This framework is known to possess a number 
of advantages over the traditional co-integration models (such as Engle and 
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Granger, 1987, and Johansen and Juselius, 1990). Some of these advantages 
include; (1) appropriate for modelling limited data (2) applicability in data with a 
mixture of I(0) and I(1). (3) Different variables in the model can be assigned different 
lag-lengths (4) involves a single-equation set-up making it simple to interpret.  
The estimates of the co-integration tests are presented in Table 5.5. The co-
integration test revealed that the null hypotheses of no co-integration among the 
variables should be rejected, implying the presence of co-integration among the 
variables. This therefore suggests the existence of a long-run relationship among the 
variables in the model. The co-integrating result as presented in Table 5.5 below 
reveals that the calculated F-statistic for the six models32 to estimate the effect of 
state fragility on capital flows and economic growth is higher than the upper bounds 
levels at 5 and 1 percent for the base and fragility models respectively. The base 
model, aggregate state fragility model as well as the dimensional state fragility 
models all present existence of a long-run relationship. 
  
                                                          
32
 Model 1 is base model  
   Model 2 is the base model with an introduction of an aggregate measure of state fragility using the EWA approach.  
   Model 3 is the base model with an introduction of an aggregate measure of state fragility using the PCA approach. 
   Model 4 is the base model with an introduction of a disaggregated measure of state fragility  F(ECO)  
   Model 5 is the base model with an introduction of a disaggregated measure of state fragility F(SOC)  
   Model 6 is the base model with an introduction of a disaggregated measure of state fragility F(M&P) 
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Table 5.5: ARDL Bounds Test for the Impact of State Fragility on Capital Flows 
and Economic Growth 
                      F-statistics  
BASE 3.559∗∗∗ 
F(EWA) 7.034∗∗∗∗ 
F(PCA) 4.326∗∗∗∗ 
F(ECO) 20.761∗∗∗∗ 
F(SOC) 9.452∗∗∗∗ 
F(M&P) 4.472∗∗∗∗ 
Critical Values 
 I (0) Bound I (1) Bound 
Significance 
(%) 
BASE F  
(EWA) 
F 
(PCA) 
F 
(ECO) 
F 
(SOC) 
F 
(M&P) 
BASE F 
(EWA) 
F 
(PCA) 
F 
(ECO) 
F 
(SOC) 
F 
(M&P) 
10 1.99 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.94 2.89 2.89 2.89 2.89 2.89 
5 2.27 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 3.28 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 3.21 
2.5 2.55 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 3.61 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 
1 2.88 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
****, ***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 2.5%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
5.4.3 Long Run Relationships 
To empirically explore whether state fragility really matters for capital flows and 
economic growth, the study proceeds by investigating the long run relationship 
among the variables of interest in a consistent stepwise manner (Table 5.6). 
The first model presents the base model that captures the relationship of capital 
flows and economic growth along with relevant variables to capture the 
macroeconomic environment.  The second model presents an equally weighted 
average measure of state fragility introduced to the base capital flow and growth 
model. The third model presents the multivariate measure of state fragility, 
introduced to the base capital flow and growth model. The fourth, fifth and sixth 
models present measures of economic, social and military and political 
disaggregated dimensions of state fragility, introduced to the base capital flow and 
growth model. 
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Table 5.6: Long Run Relationship on the Impact of State Fragility on Capital 
Flows and Economic Growth 
REGRESSOR BASE 
MODEL 
F(EWA) 
MODEL 
F(PCA) 
MODEL 
F(ECO) 
MODEL 
F(SOC) 
MODEL 
F(M&P) 
MODEL 
DK 0.205∗ 
(0.109) 
0.395∗∗ 
(0.017) 
0.135∗∗∗ 
(0.023) 
0.262∗∗∗ 
  (0.004) 
0.160* 
(0.021) 
0.302** 
(0.022) 
FDI -0.095 
(0.078) 
−0.122∗∗ 
  (0.006) 
−0.047∗∗∗ 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.076 
(0.026) 
-0.107* 
(0.017) 
REM 0.054∗ 
(0.027) 
0.037∗∗ 
  (0.002) 
0.006∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
0.020** 
(0.001) 
-0.045* 
(0.005) 
0.052** 
(0.004) 
ODA 0.144∗∗ 
(0.064) 
0.043 
(0.013) 
0.065 
(0.005) 
0.092** 
(0.005) 
0.137* 
(0.016) 
0.083* 
(0.009) 
MS 0.1478 
(0.138) 
-0.045 
(0.010) 
0.070∗∗ 
(0.023) 
0.085** 
(0.005) 
0.031 
(0.011) 
0.264* 
(0.034) 
GE -0.079 
(0.178) 
0.094∗∗ 
 (0.007) 
0.109∗∗∗ 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.007) 
0.181** 
(0.010) 
-0.052 
(0.023) 
F(EWA)  -0.015 
(0.003) 
    
F(PCA)   −0.102∗ 
  (0.011) 
   
F(ECO)    -0.003** 
(0.000) 
  
F(SOC)     0.006 
(0.000) 
 
F(M&P)      -0.037 
(0.006) 
C 5.764∗∗∗ 
(0.890) 
5.416∗∗∗ 
  (0.023) 
5.142∗∗∗ 
 (0.054) 
5.275*** 
(0.024) 
5.228** 
0.144 
4.641** 
(0.122) 
***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and standard error in parenthesis. 
Results indicate that domestic investment has significant positive effects on the base 
and aggregate state fragility models, however at different levels of significance. 
While in the base model it was significant at 10 percent, the introduction of state 
fragility in second and third models improved its significance to 5 and 1 percent 
respectively.  Similarly, capital flow remittance and development aid had positive 
effects on growth in the base and aggregate state fragility models. It is, however, 
important to note that while remittances followed the same pattern as domestic 
investment in these models, ODA, which was positive and significant in the base 
model, became insignificant in both aggregate state fragility models although it 
remained positive.  
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This, therefore, gives an insight into the ongoing debate as to the not proportionate 
aid-growth impact in developing countries (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009).   FDI 
capital flow has a negative effect in the base and aggregate state fragility models, 
however at different levels of significance. While in the base model it was only 
negative but not significant, the introduction of state fragility in the second and third 
models resulted in it becoming significantly negative at 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
This relationship of FDI and economic growth is, however, consistent with the 
findings of Akinlo (2004), and Jawaid, and Saleem (2017).  
The finding of Akinlo (2004), which in particular focused on the impact of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on economic growth in Nigeria, found that FDI in Nigeria only 
has a positive effect on growth after a considerable lag. Akinlo argued that the 
explanation for this cannot be wholly dissociated from the nature of FDI in Nigeria, 
which is often extractive industry driven and not manufacturing driven. He posited 
that the extractive industry in Nigeria is not adequately linked in a manner that can 
appropriately propel the economy to growth and he claimed that extractive FDI, 
especially oil, might not be as growth enhancing as manufacturing FDI. The failure of 
the country to attract the right type of FDI can however not be dissociated from the 
presence of state fragility, which explains the significance levels in the face of state 
fragility.  
Additional variables of money supply and government expenditure were introduced 
into the model to capture the monetary and fiscal macroeconomic environment 
respectively (Nwosa and Akinbobola, 2016). The results of these present a rather 
interesting result. The coefficient of the money supply was positive, however 
insignificant in the base model. After the introduction of state fragility in the second 
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model, money supply became negative, although it remained insignificant. However, 
in the third model, it became positive as expected and significant.  
In the case of government expenditure, the coefficient was negative, although 
insignificant in the base model. After the introduction of state fragility in the second 
and third models, it became positive and significant at 5 and 1 percent respectively.  
The coefficient for state fragility in the second model was negative as expected, 
although insignificant, however, in the third model, it was negative and significant at 
10 percent. The constants were positively signed across the models and significant 
at 1 percent level of significance. The third model (F(pca) model), however, gives the 
best fit model that captures the overall interaction of state fragility and the economy, 
following from the coefficient estimates, levels of significance as well as residual 
diagnostics.  
The state fragility dimension models present a more disaggregated set of findings. 
The findings help to understand in more explicit terms how various dimensions of 
state fragility interact with capital flows and economic growth.  In the case of 
domestic investment, a significant positive effect was found for all disaggregated 
models, as seen in the aggregate models, however at different significance levels. 
The significance levels were 1, 10 and 5 percent’s for the economic social and 
military and political dimensions respectively.   
In the case of FDI, the introduction of the economic dimension of state fragility into 
the model presented a positive, however, very weak and insignificant coefficient. The 
other dimensions presented negative coefficients which were insignificant for the 
social dimension and only significant at 10 percent for the military and political 
dimensions.  
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Coefficients for other capital flows; remittances and ODA were positively signed for 
all growth models with fragility dimensions, at various levels of significance, except 
for the social dimension. While both capital flows were significant at 5 percent levels 
of significance in the economic dimension growth model, they were significant at 5 
and 10 percent respectively in the military and political dimension growth model. For 
the social dimension, ODA was significant at 10 percent while remittances became 
negative and significant at 10 percent. 
The coefficients of the additional variables, money supply and government 
expenditure, were positively signed, albeit at varying levels of significance except for 
government expenditure which was insignificant in the economic state fragility 
dimension model and negative, but insignificant as well in the military and political 
dimension model. As for money supply, it was only insignificant but still positive in 
the social dimension. 
The coefficient of the economic dimensions of state fragility for economic growth was 
negatively signed in line with the aggregate state fragility-growth relationship and 
significant at 5 percent. In the same vein all the capital flows were positively signed 
and significant at 5 percent, except for FDI which, although positive, was 
insignificant. Issues captured in this dimension of state fragility included oil and its 
attendant revenue, inflation as well as human capital.  
More interestingly, variables that make up this dimension such as human capital 
have been used by previous studies such as Olson et.al (1998) and Jalilian et.al 
(2007) as proxy for regulation level, and they found strong causal link with economic 
performance. In the case of fragile states the low levels of such proxies such as 
human capital, which is a major characteristic of these countries, therefore explain 
the negative relationship.  
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For the case of the implications of social dimensions of state fragility for capital flows 
and economic growth, while there is no direct negative relationship between itself 
and growth, the behaviour of capital flows in its model is somewhat interesting. The 
coefficients of all capital flows were mostly negative except for ODA, which was 
positive and significant at 10 percent. As for FDI and remittances, they both were 
negative and were insignificant and significant at 10 percent respectively. This, 
therefore, provides some very intriguing insights, as issues captured in this 
dimension include ethnicity, youth bulge and religion. It can be deduced that the 
interplay going on in this dimension of state fragility, remains very potent in 
undermining the positive contribution of capitals flows to economic growth in Nigeria.    
The coefficients of the results of the economic growth models with disaggregated 
dimensions of state fragility generally reflected weaker performance in the military 
and political dimension of state fragility in Nigeria. In the long run, while it appears 
that the negative impact of the military and political dimension of state fragility on 
economic growth in Nigeria is insignificant, its ability to render FDI and government 
expenditure negative, as witnessed in the base model, albeit insignificant in the case 
of government expenditure makes it a germane issue. It is, however, crucial to note 
that this dimension of state fragility captures issues relating to form of governance, 
terrorism incidence and security.  
5.4.4 Short run Dynamics 
Having estimated the long run co-integration models, an investigation into the short 
run dynamics within the ARDL framework was carried out. The lagged value of all 
variables (a linear combination is denoted by the error-correction term ECMt−1) is 
retained in the ARDL model. The error correction term indicates the speed of 
adjustment to adjust to equilibrium in the dynamic model. The ECM coefficient shows 
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how quickly variables converge to equilibrium. It is expected to be negatively signed 
and significant. Bannerjee et al. (1998) noted that an error correction term with high 
significance levels further confirms the existence of a long-run relationship that is 
stable. Table 5.7 below shows that the expected negative signs of ECM are highly 
significant. This, therefore, also confirms the existence of the co-integration 
relationship among the variables in the models. The coefficient of ECMt−1 are -
0.316***, -1.493** and -0.480*** for the base model and aggregate state fragility 
models at 1, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance respectively. In the case of the 
disaggregated dimensions of our state fragility models; economic, social and military 
and political dimensions, the coefficients of ECMt−1 are -0.138**, -0.305*** and -
0.789** at 5, 1 and 5 percent levels of significance respectively. These findings 
suggest a slow adjustment speed in the base model, however a faster speed after 
the inclusion of state fragility and its dimensions in the respective models. 
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Table 5.7: Short-Run Estimates of the Impact of State Fragility on Capital 
Flows and Economic Growth 
Regressors BASE 
MODEL 
F(EWA) 
MODEL 
F(PCA) 
MODEL 
F(ECO) 
MODEL 
F(SOC) 
MODEL 
F(M&P) 
MODEL 
 D(DK) 0.071* 
(0.039) 
2.913** 
(0.121) 
0.192*** 
(0.021) 
0.273** 
(0.008) 
-0.045* 
(0.005) 
-0.362* 
(0.028) 
D(FDI) -0.042* 
(0.021) 
0.480** 
(0.023) 
-0.197*** 
(0.014) 
0.311** 
(0.010) 
-0.146*** 
(0.002) 
-0.072* 
(0.008) 
D(REM) 0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.231** 
(0.011) 
-0.026** 
(0.010) 
-0.095** 
(0.005) 
0.080** 
(0.002) 
0.339** 
(0.016) 
D(REM(-1)) -0.041** 
(0.016) 
-1.300** 
(0.054) 
-0.228*** 
(0.015) 
-0.831** 
(0.020) 
0.157** 
(0.003) 
0.517** 
(0.029) 
D(REM(-2)) -0.029* 
(0.017) 
-0.442** 
(0.019) 
-0.185*** 
(0.013) 
-0.493** 
0.011 
0.0631** 
(0.002) 
0.159* 
(0.016) 
D(ODA) 0.034 
(0.024) 
-0.713** 
(0.033) 
0.131*** 
(0.014) 
0.524** 
(0.014) 
0.039** 
(0.002) 
-0.437** 
(0.024) 
D(MS) 0.015 
(0.056) 
-0.843** 
(0.039) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
0.696** 
(0.023) 
-0.110** 
(0.004) 
-1.515** 
(0.082) 
D(GE) 0.080* 
(0.042) 
1.202** 
(0.048) 
0.836*** 
(0.050) 
0.602** 
(0.013) 
0.155** 
(0.003) 
0.886** 
(0.045) 
CointEq(-1) -0.316*** 
(0.108) 
-1.493** 
(0.626) 
-0.480*** 
(0.325) 
-0.138** 
(0.337) 
-0.305*** 
(0.035) 
-0.789** 
(0.415) 
D(Y(-1))  24.098*
* 
(1.002) 
2.628*** 
(0.199) 
7.856** 
(0.199) 
1.030** 
(0.021) 
-7.504** 
(0.411) 
D(Y(-2))  18.436*
* 
(0.766) 
1.604*** 
(0.113) 
4.445** 
(0.111) 
0.273** 
(0.017) 
-2.927** 
(0.174) 
D(DK(-1))  -2.038** 
(0.087) 
-0.436*** 
(0.032) 
-2.109** 
(0.051) 
-0.174** 
(0.004) 
1.041** 
(0.058) 
D(DK(-2))  -1.998** 
(0.081) 
 -1.349** 
(0.036) 
-0.089** 
(0.003) 
0.416** 
(0.031) 
D(FDI(-1))  1.683** 
(0.071) 
0.071*** 
(0.012) 
0.099** 
(0.009) 
0.054** 
(0.003) 
-0.597** 
(0.032) 
D(FDI(-2))  0.561** 
(0.024) 
0.216*** 
(0.016) 
-0.250** 
(0.008) 
0.019* 
(0.002) 
-0.205** 
(0.014) 
D(ODA(-1))  -0.611** 
(0.025) 
 -0.142** 
(0.005) 
-0.218*** 
(0.004) 
0.031 
(0.008) 
D(ODA(-2))  -0.232** 
(0.013) 
 0.150** 
(0.004) 
-0.189** 
(0.003) 
-0.167** 
(0.013) 
D(MS(-1))  0.328** 
(0.019) 
-0.122*** 
(0.020) 
-0.158** 
(0.009) 
-0.208** 
(0.004) 
-0.283** 
(0.022) 
D(MS(-2))  0.024 
(0.011) 
0.189*** 
(0.023) 
0.490** 
(0.013) 
-0.085** 
(0.004) 
-0.149* 
(0.020) 
D(GE(-1))  0.677** 
(0.031) 
0.364*** 
(0.032) 
0.757** 
(0.0195) 
-0.281** 
(0.005) 
0.457** 
(0.030) 
D(GE(-2))  0.769** 
(0.031) 
0.176*** 
(0.022) 
0.280** 
(0.009) 
-0.003** 
(0.003) 
0.198* 
(0.021) 
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D(F(EWA))  0.093** 
(0.003) 
    
D(F(EWA)(-1))  0.322** 
(0.013) 
    
D(F(EWA)(-2))  0.046** 
(0.002) 
    
D(F(PCA))   0.527*** 
(0.035) 
   
D(F(PCA)(-1))   -0.045*** 
(0.009) 
   
D(F(ECO))    -0.014** 
(0.000) 
  
D(F(ECO)(-1))    -0.005** 
(0.000) 
  
D(F(ECO)(-2))    -0.001 
(0.000) 
  
D(F(SOC))     0.021** 
(0.000) 
 
D(F(SOC)(-1))     0.001 
(0.000) 
 
D(F(SOC)(-2))     -0.055*** 
(0.001) 
 
D(F(M&P))      0.019 
(0.003) 
D(F(M&P)(-1))      -0.197** 
(0.010) 
D(F(M&P)(-2))      -0.085** 
(0.005) 
***, **,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and standard error in parenthesis. 
5.4.5 Model Diagnostics 
To investigate the robustness of the estimated models, some diagnostics tests were 
conducted such as a serial correlation test, heteroscedasticity test as well as a 
stability test.  The serial correlation test for all models suggested the absence of 
serial correlation in the residuals as the Fstats were not significant in all models as 
depicted in Table 5.8 below.  In other words, it can be said that the errors are 
normally distributed and can be useful for inference making (Nwachukwu and 
Egwaikhide, 2007). 
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Table 5.8: Diagnostic Tests on the Impact of State Fragility on Capital Flows 
and Economic Growth 
 BASE 
MODEL  
F(EWA) 
MODEL 
F(PCA) 
MODEL 
F(ECO) 
MODEL 
F(SOC) 
MODEL 
F(M&P) 
MODEL 
Serial Correlation 
 
F 
 
LM 
 
1.555 
(0.235) 
 
6.792 
(0.078) 
 
7.620 
(0.221) 
 
29.172 
(0.000) 
 
4.614 
(0.183) 
 
28.833 
(0.000) 
 
8.497 
(0.184) 
 
17.784 
(0.001) 
 
5.641 
(0.154) 
 
23.833 
(0.000) 
 
6.144 
(0.220) 
 
25.330 
(0.000) 
 
Normality 
 
10.794 
(0.005) 
 
2.087 
(0.035) 
 
4.950 
(0.084) 
 
17.754 
(0.000) 
 
25.933 
(0.000) 
 
5.564 
(0.062) 
Heteroscedasticity 
(ARCH) 
0.253 
(0.858) 
 
0.851 
(0.837) 
0.861 
(0.474) 
 
2.711 
(0.438) 
1.189 
(0.334) 
 
3.618 
(0.306) 
4.577 
(0.041) 
 
4.236 
(0.040) 
0.830 
(0.369) 
 
0.862 
(0.353) 
4.981 
(0.033) 
 
4.557 
(0.033) 
 
Stability tests were conducted for all the models. Results, from the Cumulative Sum 
(CUSUM) and Cumulative Sum of Squares (CUSUMSQ) help in analysing the 
stability of the long run relationships and short-run dynamics. The stability of the 
regression can be evaluated by stability tests, and they can show whether or not the 
regression equation is stable over time (Pearsan et al., 2001). The null hypothesis 
here is that the coefficient vector remains same in all periods (Bahmani-Oskooee, 
and Ng, 2002). CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are plotted against the critical 
bound of 5% significance. According to Bahmani-Oskooee, and Ng, 2002), if the plot 
of these statistics remains within the critical bound of the 5 percent significance level, 
the null hypothesis (i.e. all coefficients in the error correction model are stable) 
cannot be rejected. The plot of the cumulative sum of recursive residual is presented 
in figure 5.1 below.  
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Figure 5.1: Plots of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ TESTS 
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As shown, the plot of CUSUM residuals for the Base model was within the 
boundaries; however, it slightly exceeded its boundaries in the CUSUMSQ residuals. 
The F (ewa) model exceeded its CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots, suggesting some 
form of instability in the model.   Upon the introduction of the F(pca) the performance 
of the residuals generally improved, indicating improved stability in the model and 
therefore validates the use of the PCA in measuring state fragility.  This result can be 
explained in that the introduction of the F(pca) helped to explain the residual in the 
base model better. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots for the disaggregated fragility 
models F (eco, soc and m&p) were all within the boundaries. That is to say that the 
stability of the parameters has remained within its critical bounds of parameter 
stability. It is clear from both the plots that both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests 
confirm the stability of the F(pca) model to explain the aggregate relationship 
between the economy and state fragility in Nigeria. Furthermore the result from the 
F(pca) model also presents coefficients that were more statistically significant.  
5.5 Further Discussions 
Growth and development of fragile states as well as progress in resilience building in 
fragile states remain a crucial priority for the international development community as 
well as the fragile states themselves. Indeed fragile states do represent a quite 
diverse group of economies. This group consists of very low income to, in recent 
times, middle-income countries. Therefore, the economic implications of state 
fragility for growth remain cloudy. At the very least, the recent upgrade of some 
fragile states from low income to middle income albeit (lower) has revealed that 
perhaps state fragility does not necessarily mean low income.  
Early empirical investigations into the relationship between growth and state fragility 
have provided contrary opinions as to whether state fragility necessarily implies low 
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income or poor economic performances.  While their findings have not necessarily 
suggested positive relationships, the robustness of negative relationships has 
equally not been strong enough to conclude for a negative relationship. For example, 
Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010), in a model trying to explain state fragility 
determinants in sub-Saharan Africa, argued that economic determinants such as per 
capita GDP growth and investment did not have any significant relationship with 
state fragility in their panel data set. Kaplan (2015) argued further that perhaps 
growth has a way in which it clouds up fragility, giving an erroneous external 
perception of such economies. Although in this study, a negative relationship has 
been found between growth and our measures of state fragility, the level of 
significance has not been very robust. This is however consistent with the seminal 
findings of Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) who posit that the income level of fragile 
state economies or its growth rate, as well as investment (domestic) levels, do not 
necessarily have a robust relationship with state fragility. They argued that, in some 
cases, this relationship can even run in a positive direction as seen in the short run 
findings of this study.  
In the case of capital flows, it is worth mentioning that this study found no significant 
long-run positive impact of FDI on growth. The presence of state fragility makes it 
more significantly negative. Recent periods have seen an emerging plethora of 
similar findings in African economies as well as some other developing economies. 
For example, Herzer and Klasen (2008) argued that the acclaimed FDI-led growth 
hypothesis is non-existent in the long run. Klobodu and Adams (2016), using the 
case of Ghana, found a negative relationship between FDI and growth. Jawaid and 
Saleem (2017) found a similar result for Pakistan as well as Akinlo (2004) for 
Nigeria. Adams (2009) argued that domestic capital remains more relevant for 
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growth promotion in sub-Saharan African than FDI. He argued the possibility that 
FDI may crowd out domestic capital, concluding that the augmentation of domestic 
capital with FDI has at least not been effective. 
As noted by Hansen and Giorgioni (2007), in the Solow (1956) type neoclassical 
models, the impact of FDI on the growth rate of output is constrained by the 
diminishing returns of physical capital. Therefore, FDI could only be expected to 
exert a level effect on the output per capita, but not a rate effect. In other words, FDI 
could not alter the growth rate of output in the long run (Bengoa and Sanchez-
Robles 2003). This thesis utilised output per capita. Hansen and Giorgioni (2007) 
highlighted the seminal contributions by Baran, (1957), Dos Santos (1970) and 
Chase-Dunn, (1975) that FDI inflows may have had negative effects on growth of the 
recipient economy if these inflows resulted in substantial outflows of profits and 
dividends and/or if the vehicles of FDI, the multinational corporations (MNCs), 
obtained substantial concessions from the host country. 
 Hansen and Giorgioni (2007) however noted that recent new economic growth 
theory suggest that FDI can affect not only the level of output per capita (as in the 
neo-classical models) but also its rate of (long-run) growth. It becomes apparent that 
the impact of FDI on the economy is expected to be dependent upon some 
characteristics of host countries, rather than being absolutely positive or negative. 
Adelman and Morris (1967) argued that (to benefit from FDI) governments had to 
maintain a certain degree of macroeconomic stability, to promote domestic and 
foreign competition for socioeconomic development. In particular, some studies 
suggest that FDI contributes to growth only if host countries meet some conditions 
such as human capital development and financial market development (Hansen and 
Giorgioni, 2007). Kherfi and Soliman (2005) examined the effectiveness of foreign 
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direct investment on growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) regions finding that FDI affects growth positively only 
in the European Union accession countries of the CEE region, while the effect of FDI 
on growth in MENA is either insignificant or negative. They concluded that the 
magnitude of the FDI effect depends on host country conditions. These conditions 
include macroeconomic stability and institutional strength, the absence of which 
characterises fragile states.  Oliva and Rivera-Batiz (2002) suggest that the concepts 
of growth policies and foreign investment promotion should be expanded to include 
the quality of government. They find evidence that, institutions, as expressed by the 
quality of the democratic regime and the rule of law, matter in making FDI favourable 
for growth. They conclude that institution quality is of substantial importance in 
attracting FDI and in creating a favourable environment for FDI to contribute to 
growth. 
In the context of fragile states, the argument has been that, theoretically, these 
economies do not present attractive inward FDI scenarios, and FDI to these 
economies has been mainly resource-driven, particularly in Nigeria (Hangel and 
Pagel, 2012). They argued that countries like Djibouti, Chad, Niger and Uganda have 
witnessed an inverse relationship between their stability and FDI received. They 
explained that resource seeking FDI thrives more in the absence of resilience and 
stability. They claimed that perhaps, FDI to this sector has a way of stimulating state 
fragility. They concluded that this FDI type has other consequences which, as 
suggested by the literature, include an inverse relationship with economic 
performance and they recommended diversification of the economy which, as they 
had previously alluded to, has difficulty in such fragile states. 
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In the case of other capital flows (remittances and ODA) the study found a positive 
relationship with growth in the long run for all models, but mixed findings in the short 
run. In the case of remittances, the presence of state fragility makes it more 
significant for economic growth. In the case of ODA state fragility renders it less 
significant for economic growth. Previous studies such as Choong et al. (2010), 
Wamboye, et al. (2014), and Odusanya, et al. (2011) have found positive association 
between aid and economic growth, while findings such as Klobodu and Adams 
(2016) and Kodama (2012) have found a negative relationship. However, Moyo 
(2009) has provided a detailed explanation as to why aid may not always be 
significant for economic growth in Africa, linking it to a cycle of corruption trap, which 
in itself is a strong characteristic of state fragility. 
In a recent report, the Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development 
(2018), argued for the use of ODA to support domestic investment for job creation as 
the most productive and effective way donors can help to drive growth in fragile 
states. They argued first of all that the issue of conditionality has to be relaxed for 
fragile states and then ODA should be channelled to the private sector, alluding to 
the capacity of domestic investors to be most effective in understanding domestic 
challenges and how to optimise the situation. The report stressed that rapid 
expansion of productive jobs gradually stabilises such a society. Such jobs are 
created primarily by the private sector: modern firms harness economies of scale 
and specialisation by organising workers into teams. In fragile states, there are very 
few such firms, and so the typical person currently works independently. 
Consequently, people are stuck in low productivity jobs, and hence poverty. Fragile 
states have few modern firms because they exist only where they can thrive: the 
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risks currently outweigh the likely rewards. But without firms, societies will remain 
fragile.  
Fortunately, ODA can be used to break this trap, by changing the balance between 
risk and reward. The report highlights that typically, firms in fragile environments face 
four major negatives. First, the economic infrastructure is inadequate, providing 
neither the electricity nor connectivity to markets that firms need in order to function. 
Aid can directly finance the necessary infrastructure projects. Secondly, the 
regulatory environment is hostile. Aid can finance the technical advice that assists 
governments in regulatory reform. Thirdly, while in fragile states the economy 
is typically rudimentary, with many possible activities lacking proper firms, there is a 
first-mover disadvantage in pioneering activities, so they remain neglected. Aid can 
be channelled through DFIs to offset this disadvantage. Finally, fragility poses an 
existential risk that is beyond the power of the government to remove or offset. ODA 
can finance the political risk cover that addresses these fears. Perhaps, it suffices to 
argue that flows that have much to do with states or governments in fragile states 
are often not as productive for economic growth. 
 In the case of remittances, the significance in the face of state fragility can be linked 
to what Lum et al. (2013) called the result of "fungibility". They argued that 
governments may become relaxed in ensuring the mobilisation of public resources 
because private finances are filling in gaps where public services would otherwise be 
offered. However, they argued alternatively, that remittances might undermine a 
government’s capacity if the money is used to fund violent activities or support 
opposition groups and thereby make the country more fragile.  Nielsen, and Riddle, 
(2009) noted that another significant (and resilient) form of finance in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries comes from the diaspora, which represents key actors in 
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all phases of state fragility. Although much of the remittance flows go to support 
current consumption, many of these countries turn to their diaspora for much-needed 
investment capital. The funds of the diaspora are often significant. Fragile states 
often have large Diasporas that remit funds to family members, suggesting that 
remittances may tend to be large relative to GDP in such states. In addition, the poor 
quality of social and political institutions in these countries may affect how 
remittances affect the economies of these nations (Chami et.al, 2018). 
5.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter investigates the role of state fragility on the relationship 
between capital flows and economic growth in Nigeria. The study utilised a stepwise 
approach to examine this relationship using the ARDL estimation technique. From 
the estimates generated, the study found that there is a significant long-run 
relationship between capital flows and economic growth. The study found that 
remittances remain a crucial form of capital inflow to Nigeria and that the presence of 
state fragility makes it even more significant. The study also found that development 
aid contributes positively to economic growth. However, the presence of state 
fragility renders it insignificant. In the case of FDI, the study found a negative 
relationship between it and the economy albeit insignificant. However, the presence 
of state fragility makes it significant but still negative. The study found a direct 
negative relationship between state fragility and output per capita, however it was 
not very significant. It also found a more significant negative indirect relationship 
between state fragility and output per capita particularly through the way it alters the 
contribution of potential growth drivers such as capital flows.  The study, therefore, 
concludes that, while the issue of state fragility needs to be addressed and 
concerted efforts put into building state resilience, not necessarily just for the direct 
171 
 
adverse impact of state fragility for economic growth, but, also, its impact through 
other channels such as capital flows. 
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CHAPTER 6: IMPACT OF STATE FRAGILITY ON CAPITAL INFLOWS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA: CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the main findings of the study and their implications as it 
addresses the questions raised to achieve the core objective of the study. It also 
presents the summary and conclusions of the study and highlights the limitations. 
6.1 Introduction 
Fragile states pose a dilemma for the development community at research, policy 
and practice levels. These countries present not only some of the most severe and 
urgent development needs in the world, but also the most difficult environments for 
conventional economic theories and assumptions. However recent periods have 
witnessed growth in a significant number of these countries. This raises the issue of 
what drives the witnessed growth, and whether the manifestations of state fragility 
have implications for growth in a fragile state. Interestingly, quite a lot of the existing 
empirical studies on economic growth tend to ignore state fragility. This study, 
therefore, seeks to understand the significance of state fragility for capital flows and 
economic growth, using Nigeria as a case. The study utilised econometric analysis 
techniques in addressing the research questions highlighted to achieve the core 
objective of the study. The key findings of the study are presented below.  
6.2 Findings and Implications of the Study  
To achieve the objective of this study, which involves investigating the implications of 
state fragility for the economy of a fragile state like Nigeria, the study had first to 
conceptualise state fragility. This was done by reviewing seminal works on the 
concept of state fragility. It is crucial to note that, while the concept of state fragility 
remains an evolving one, far less has been done on it with regard to economic 
analysis and implications.  
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This study has identified various forms of the dimensions of state fragility and 
ongoing arguments on the fragility concept. It went further to highlight the consensus 
on the multidimensional approach adopted in dealing with state fragility and found 
that state fragility is perceived as “context“. The various definitions of state fragility 
perceive it as a multidimensional phenomenon, so the use of a univariate approach 
to quantification becomes inadequate. The word "multidimensional" suggests the 
need for a multivariate approach in quantifying fragility and renders the use of a 
univariate approach less appropriate.  
The study went further in presenting a time series fragility index for Nigeria using 
methods suggested by existing literature as well as introducing a multivariate 
approach in the principal component analysis. From the trends observed, it becomes 
clear that state fragility trend in Nigeria has continued to rise, however not in a 
straight linear path. The upward trend in state fragility corroborates studies that have 
suggested the difficulty for most fragile states to build any form of resilience.  In the 
light of the results generated from both techniques used in this study to quantify state 
fragility, the relevance and implications of a multivariate approach can be discussed. 
In recent times there have been continued calls for scholastic efforts that approach 
fragility from a multidimensional perspective. The multivariate approach (principal 
componenent analysis) used in this study positions it among the emerging studies 
that attempt to provide a multidimensional analysis to fragility, albeit from a 
contextual (country specific) perspective. Therefore  this index is apposite as a 
fragility proxy for further economic analysis. 
In addressing the second question posed by this study, the study investigated 
whether the role of state fragility matters for capital flows and economic growth in 
Nigeria. From the estimates generated, the study found that domestic investment 
174 
 
remains essential for economic growth in Nigeria, irrespective of state fragility. The 
study found that there is a significant long-run relationship between capital flows and 
economic growth. The study found that remittances are a crucial form of capital flow 
to Nigeria and that the presence of state fragility even makes this more significant 
except for in the case of social dimension of state fragility where it was negative. The 
study also found that ODA contributes positively to economic growth. However, the 
presence of state fragility renders it insignificant, although, when state fragility is 
disaggregated, it becomes significant. In the case of FDI, the study found a negative 
relationship with economic growth, albeit insignificant. However, the presence of 
state fragility makes it significant but still negative. FDI was only found to be positive 
in the economic dimension of state fragility but insignificant. 
The study found a negative relationship between state fragility and the economic 
growth; although, it was not very significant. This, therefore, implies that policies that 
address the issue of state fragility need to be pursued and concerted efforts put into 
building state resilience, not necessarily only for the direct adverse impact of state 
fragility on the economic growth, but rather its impact through other channels such 
as capital flows. Also, policies that promote an enabling environment for domestic 
investment to thrive will have positive growth implications for the economy of a 
fragile state like Nigeria.  
6.3 Summary and Conclusion of the Study 
In conclusion, this study investigated the implications of state fragility for the 
economy of a fragile state using the case of Nigeria. The study finds that state 
fragility trends in Nigeria have continued to rise, however not in a straight linear path. 
In investigating the economic implications of state fragility, the study finds that, while 
state fragility remains a major developmental challenge, which has adverse direct 
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implications for economic growth, but more importantly, it has more significant 
indirect implications. These indirect implications include altering the behaviour of 
crucial growth drivers such as capital inflows, as seen in the case of this study.  
6.4 Limitations of the Study and Direction for Future Research 
Research works often have some factors militating against them. It is essential to 
indicate that this research also suffers from some possible limitations and challenges 
faced in conducting the study. This section highlights the major challenges faced in 
the process of conducting this study. 
The original growth model used in the study included a measure of human capital 
in line with Jalilian et al. (2007) following Mankiw et al. (1992). However, due to 
issues of multicollinearity, it was dropped out of the model. Theoretically, the 
inclusion of a variable which is computed from a combination of various other 
variables in the data set as done in the case of the state fragility measure can 
lead to multicollinearity. In the computation of our measure of state fragility, 
human capital elements had been captured. Also, the VIF statistical tests 
suggested high VIF for our measure of human capital and state fragility. Since 
the primary focus of this study is to investigate the impact of state fragility on 
capital inflows and economic growth in Nigeria, the study dropped human capital.  
Conceptually state fragility remains an evolving area of study and so is 
knowledge about it. Perhaps less knowledge is available for accurate 
quantification of it. Indeed it is a phenomenon with very qualitative dimensions; 
hence the plethora of definitions. 
Based on commonalities of the various definitions and symptoms of fragility and 
dimensional categorisation of the manifestations of state fragility as proposed by 
the Fund for Peace (2015), this study identifies relevant variables to explain state 
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fragility. These variables were identified in line with Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 
(2012) and Fund for Peace (2015), but adapted to suit the context of Nigeria. 
However, the selected variables focused on quantifiable symptoms and 
manifestations with the most economic relevance, not necessarily causes, 
symptoms and consequences as proposed by Besley and Pearson (2011).    
For this study, based on its economic nature, the variables considered to have 
more economic relevance, and importance were selected, bringing into context 
the larger theme upon which the study is based and in synchronisation with 
fragility determinant variables as expressed by (Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2012). 
This study acknowledges that many indices that have been constructed to 
capture multidimensional issues for econometric analysis are often vulnerable to 
other flaws such as uncaptured variables and dimensions of the issue, as noted 
by Kwabena and Traynor (1999) among others.  Similarly, this study does not 
claim to have fully captured all contributory elements of state fragility in 
computing our measures of state fragility. However, we have selected the most 
quantifiable elements of the various state fragility dimensions with the most 
accurate and uniformly complete available data for the period of the study. 
However accuracy and precision remain areas that can be investigated further.  
From the foregoing, the empirical results should be interpreted cautiously, as they 
only present an exploratory investigation into the implications of state fragility for 
the economy. Also, the drivers of state fragility may differ across countries as 
noted in chapter 3, hence the need for caution in generalisation. However, 
despite these caveats, the study provides apriori grounds for understanding the 
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economic implications of the presence of state fragility in a fragile state like 
Nigeria.  
Cognisant of these limitations, further research could be conducted to strengthen 
the findings and conclusions reached on the implications of state fragility for 
economic performance in Nigeria as examined by this research. In particular, 
attempts to capture other forms of capital inflow, such as portfolio equity and debt 
among others which were left out in the study due to non-availability of accurate 
data at the time of the study, could provide a better understanding of the 
implications of state fragility for the economy. Similarly, access to a 
disaggregated form of FDI inflow into oil and non-oil FDI data will improve and 
perhaps provide better understanding of the negative FDI sign. Furthermore, as 
the scope of this research did not attempt to capture growth and income 
redistribution, future research could look at opportunities for further extending the 
analysis to capture the economic growth and income redistribution discussion. 
Once sufficient data are available for relevant indicators this could be another 
emerging debate for the fragile state and economy literature. This could provide 
more robust findings and hence stronger conclusions on the implications of state 
fragility for the economy of Nigeria. Also, future research may look at extending 
the analysis to other country studies of similar economic structure particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa based on their own fragility context in order to generalise the 
findings and policy application across the sub-region. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
Appendix 1.1: Remittance Flows to Fragile Economies 
Country Remittances 
Rank 2010 
Percent of Total 
Remittances to FS 
2010(%) 
Remittances 
Rank 2005 
Percent of Total 
Remittances to FS 
2005 (%) 
Bangladesh                     
(O) 
1 22.9 1 20.4 
Nigeria                            
(O)  
2 21.1 3 15.4 
Pakistan                           
(O) 
3 20.4 2 20.2 
Sri Lanka                        
(O) 
4 7.6 4 8.2 
Nepal                              
(O) 
5 7.3 6 5.4 
Kenya                             
(O) 
6 3.6 9 3.5 
Sudan                              
(O) 
7 3.0 7 4.8 
Haiti                                
(O) 
8 2.8 8 4.4 
Yemen                            
(O)  
9 2.5 5 5.6 
West Bank and Gaza      
(O) 
10 2.3 10 3.3 
Total Percent received by top 10 
remittance receipts 
93.4  91.3 
(O) In top 10 both Years (>) in top 10 2005-10 (<) Out of top 10 2005-10 (N) Unknown 
Source: OECD, 2013 Pp.73 
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Appendix 1.2: FDI Flow to Fragile Economies 
Country FDI Rank 
2010 
Percent of Total 
FDI to FS 2010(%) 
FDI Rank 
2005 
Percent of Total 
FDI to FS 2005(%) 
Nigeria                                (O) 1 21.9 1 29.8 
Iran                                      (O)  2 13.1 2 18.8 
Congo DR                            (N) 3 10.7 NA NA 
Congo Rep                          (O) 4 10.2 8 3.1 
Sudan                                  (O) 5 7.5 3 13.8 
Pakistan                              (O) 6 7.3 4 13.2 
Iraq                                      (O) 7 5.2 7 3.1 
Niger                                    (>) 8 3.4 25 0.3 
Bangladesh                         (O)  9 3.3 5 4.9 
Myanmar                            (>) 10 3.3 15 1.4 
Uganda                                (<) 11 3.0 10 2.3 
Bosnia-Herzegovina          (<) 22 0.8 6 3.6 
Georgia                               (<) 12 3.0 9 2.7 
Total Percent received by top 10 FDI recipients 85.9  95.2 
(O) In top 10 both Years (>) in top 10 2005-10 (<) Out of top 10 2005-10 (N) Unknown 
Source: OECD, 2013 Pp.70 
Appendix 1.3: ODA Flow to Fragile Economies 
Country ODA Rank 
(2010) 
Percent of Total 
ODA to FS 2010 (%) 
ODA 
Rank 
(2005) 
Percent of Total 
ODA to FS 2005 
(%) 
Afghanistan              (O) 1 12.8 3 5.3 
Ethiopia    (O) 2 7.1 4 3.6 
Congo DR (O) 3 6.8 5 3.5 
Haiti  (>) 4 6.2 18 0.8 
Pakistan  (O) 5 6.1 7 3.0 
West Bank and Gaza (>) 6 5.1 12 1.9 
Iraq  (O) 7 4.4 1 40.9 
Nigeria (O) 8 4.1 2 11.9 
Sudan (O) 9 4.1 6 3.4 
Uganda (O) 10 3.5 10 3.2 
Total percent received by top 10 ODA 
recipients 
60.1  76.6 
(O) In top 10 both Years (>) in top 10 2005-10 (<) Out of top 10 2005-10 (N) Unknown 
Source: OECD, 2013 Pp.54 
From Appendix1.1 to 1.3 it can be observed that Nigeria remained a constant feature in the 
capital flows to fragile states. In terms of remittances receives above 22 percent of total 
remittances to fragile states. Nigeria has over the years continued to be leading FDI recipient 
in fragile state economies accounting for over 20 percent of FDI going to fragile economies. 
In terms of ODA accounts for only slightly above 4 percent of total ODA going to fragile 
states.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Let c = [
𝑐1
𝑐2
⋮
⋮
𝑐𝑛
], and it is the vector of the n principal components, 
and A =    
[
 
 
 
 ∝1
(1)
∝1
(2)
⋯ ∝1
(𝑛)
∝2
(1)
∝2
(2)
⋯ ∝2
(𝑛)
⋯ ⋯ ⋯
∝𝑛
(1)
∝𝑛
(2)
∝𝑛
(𝑛)
]
 
 
 
 
 an nxn matrix, made up of vector columns   
and x =    [
𝑥1
𝑥2
⋮
⋮
𝑥𝑛
]the vector of initial n variables.   
In an algebraic matrix equation, this can, therefore, be written as  
𝑐 =  𝐴𝑡 ∗ 𝑥           (3.4) 
Where c and ∝ are both generic notations of principal components and a vector with 
elements that define a standardised linear combination, respectively. 
To, therefore, determine the principal components require the maximisation of VAR(c).  
This is therefore done through solving for 
{
𝑐 =∝𝑡 ∗ 𝑥
max𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑐)
           (3.5) 
Where α is a standardised linear combination 
This then equals {
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∝𝑡 ∑ ∝
∝𝑡∗ ∝= 1
        (3.6) 
Where ∑ is covariance matrix of initial variables. 
Each principal components is equal to its corresponding matrix∑ eigenvalue (λ).  
Given that ∑ has n eigenvalues, this can, therefore, be represented as λ1  ≥ λ2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ λ𝑛. 
This inequality can, therefore, be rewritten as 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝐶1) ≥ 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝐶2) ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝐶𝑛) 
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The larger the amount of principal components retained will lead to a greater part of the 
variance captured from the initial variable space. 
𝑥𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑓𝑗  + 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑢𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖
𝑘
𝑗=1
        (3.7) 
Where: influence of common factor  is explained by ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑓𝑗 
𝑘
𝑗=1
e 
            influence of  Individual factor is explained by 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑢𝑖 
           and influence of residual factor is explained by 𝜀𝑖 
Therefore, the initial variable variance is:  
𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑥1) = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥1  + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥1     (3.8) 
Going further, according to Armeanu and Lache (2008), individuality and residuality are often 
difficult to separate, as they both  form the specific uniqueness of each initial variable 
variance and this can, therefore, be expressed as: 
 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥1  =  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥1  + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥1       (3.9) 
Therefore 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥1) = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥1        (3.10) 
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Appendix 3.1: A comprehensive overview of selected definitions of state fragility as 
used by major institutions within the donor community 
Institution Concept Definition 
World Bank 
(WB) 
Fragile states 
Fragile and 
conflict 
affected 
situations 
(FCS) 
The World Bank adopted the term fragile states “in the 
interests of harmonization” (WB, 2005: 1) as corresponding to 
their definitions of Low Income Countries Under Stress 
(LICUS). “The Bank identifies fragile states by weak 
performance on the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA). They share a common fragility, in two 
particular aspects: 
 State policies and institutions are weak in these 
countries: making them vulnerable in their capacity to 
deliver services to their citizens, to control corruption, 
or to provide for sufficient voice and accountability. 
 They face risks of conflict and political instability. (…)” 
(WB, 2005: 1). 
The CPIA considers 16 criteria, group in 4 clusters (economic 
management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion 
and equity, and public sector management and institutions) for 
rating countries on a scale from 1 to 6. A country is considered 
fragile if its score is equal to or below 3.2. 
Fragile situations are “[p]eriods when states or institutions lack 
the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations 
between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, 
making them vulnerable to violence.” (WB, 2011: xvi) "Fragile 
Situations" have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA country 
rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN and/or regional 
peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three 
years. (WB, 2013) 
Asian 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Weakly 
performing 
countries 
(WPCs) 
“Many of the region’s poor people live in DMCs [developing 
member countries] that have weak governance, ineffective 
public administration and rule of law, and civil unrest. These 
countries have been referred to variously as WPCs, fragile 
states, low-income countries under stress (LICUS), and difficult 
partnership countries. Service delivery systems in such 
countries seldom function well, and the government’s ability to 
guarantee the basic security of its people is often limited. 
WPCs are more likely to experience large- scale and civil 
conflict than other low-income countries.” (ADB, 2007: 1) 
“While WPCs may exhibit aspects of fragility, the primary focus 
on weak performance is consistent with the performance-
based allocation systems of ADB, African Development Bank, 
and the LICUS approach of the World Bank.” (ADB, 2007: 1) 
African 
Development 
Bank (AfDB) 
Fragile states “Fragility is an imbalance between the strains and challenges 
(internal and external) faced by a state and society and their 
ability to manage them. At the extreme, fragility is expressed 
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as conflict or collapse of state functions. (…) Fragility is thus 
the opposite side of the coin to state resilience, which is the 
ability of the state to manage such strains through effective 
institutions, processes and capacities that build legitimacy and 
societal cohesion.” (AfDB, 2014: 2) 
European 
Commission 
Situations of 
fragility 
“Fragility refers to weak or failing structures and to situations 
where the social contract is broken due to the State’s 
incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, 
meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding service 
delivery, management of resources, rule of law, equitable 
access to power, security and safety of the populace and 
protection and promotion of citizens’ rights and freedoms.” 
(European Commission, 2007: 5) 
OECD Fragile states “A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic 
governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually 
constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more 
vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic 
crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the 
capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its 
territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs 
and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, 
and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience 
should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum.” ( OECD, 
2012) 
g7+ Fragile states “A state of fragility can be understood as a period of time 
during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic 
development requires greater emphasis on complementary 
peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building 
inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good 
management of resources, and accountable and fair service 
delivery.” (g7+, 2013: 1) 
DFID Fragile states “Although most developing countries are fragile in some ways, 
DFID’s working definition of fragile states covers those where 
the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the poor. The most important 
functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial 
control, safety and security, capacity to manage public 
resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect 
and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain 
themselves. DFID does not limit its definition of fragile states to 
those affected by conflict.” (DFID, 2005: 7) More recently, the 
expression Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS) has 
also been used. 
USAID Fragile states “USAID uses the term fragile states to refer generally to a 
broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states. However, 
the distinction among them is not always clear in practice, as 
fragile states rarely travel a predictable path of failure and 
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recovery, and the labels may mask substate and regional 
conditions (insurgencies, factions, etc.) that may be important 
factors in conflict and fragility. It is more important to 
understand how far and quickly a country is moving from or 
toward stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not. 
Therefore, the strategy distinguishes between fragile states 
that are vulnerable from those that are already in crisis. 
USAID is using vulnerable to refer to those states unable or 
unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and 
basic services to significant portions of their populations and 
where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This 
includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. 
USAID is using crisis to refer to those states where the central 
government does not exert effective control over its own 
territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital 
services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of 
the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent 
conflict is a reality or a great risk.” (USAID, 2005: 1). 
Canadian 
International 
Development 
Agency 
(CIDA) 
Fragile states “According to CIFP’s [Country Indicators for Foreign Policy] 
conceptualization, the state is the primary unit of analysis and 
needs to exhibit the three fundamental properties of authority, 
legitimacy and capacity (ALC) to function properly (or to use 
the World Bank’s language – security, justice and jobs). 
Fragility measures the extent to which the actual 
characteristics of a state differ from their ideal situation; states 
are constrained by both internal and external forces that are 
constantly changing over time. Consequently, all states are, to 
some extent, fragile; weakness in one or more of the ALC 
dimensions will negatively impact the fragility of a particular 
country. In that sense, we need to consider not only the 
extreme cases of failing, failed and collapsed states but also 
the ones that have the potential to fail.” (Carment and Samy, 
2012: 4). 
Notes: See Box 1 in Cammack et al (2006: 17) for a more comprehensive list of working definitions of fragile states 
used by donor organisations. 
Source: Ferreira, I A R (2015). Defining &Measuring State Fragilty: A New Proposal. The 
Annual Bank Conference on Africa. Berkeley, CA 
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/109_-
_ABCA_2015_Ines_Ferreira_Defining_and_measuring_state_fragility__A_new_proposal_M
ay15.pdf  
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Appendix 3.2: Income Level Classification of Fragile State Economies 
Low-income Fragile 
States  
                           Middle-income fragile States 
Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income 
Afghanistan Cameroon Angola 
Bangladesh Congo. Rep Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Burundi Cote d’Ivoire Iran. Islamic Rep. 
Central African Republic Georgia  
Chad Iraq  
Comoros Kiribati  
Congo. Dem. Rep Kosovo  
Eritrea Marshall Islands  
Ethiopia Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  
Guinea Nigeria  
Guinea-Bissau Pakistan  
Haiti Solomon Islands  
Kenya South Sudan  
Korea, Dem. Rep Sri Lanka  
Kyrgyz Republic Sudan  
Liberia Timor-Leste  
Malawi West Bank and Gaza  
Myanmar Yemen Rep  
Nepal   
Niger   
Rwanda   
Sierra Leone   
Somalia   
Togo   
Uganda   
Zimbabwe   
Source: OECD, 2013, p.19 
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Appendix 3.3: A Comprehensive Overview of Measures and Method Used in the Construction of Existing Fragility Indices 
Index Institution 
(Reference) 
Purpose Scale Indicators Methodology Application 
CIFP 
Fragility 
Index 
Carleton 
University 
(Carment and 
Samy, 2012; 
CIFP website, 
2015) 
The CIFP is a robust 
assessment tool which 
assesses state performance 
along each of the three 
dimensions of statehood 
(authority, legitimacy, and 
capacity). 
1-9 (low 
fragility 
to high 
fragility) 
More than 70 
indicators, 
representing 
performance 
measures along 
several dimensions: 
governance, 
economics, security 
and crime, human 
development, 
demography, and 
environment. 
During the first level of 
analysis, structural 
indicators are grouped 
into six clusters 
corresponding to each 
dimension, and a 
composite index for 
country performance 
along those dimensions 
is constructed. The 
results for each country 
are then averaged in 
each subject cluster 
(ALC). 
Countries have scores 
for the different 
components of the ALC 
approach and an overall 
score. Overall fragility 
scores above 6.5 are 
considered serious. 
Country 
Policy and 
Institution
al 
Assessme
nt (CPIA) 
World Bank 
(WB, 2011) 
The goal is to assess the 
quality of a country’s 
present policy and 
institutional framework, in 
terms of how conducive it is 
to fostering poverty 
reduction, sustainable 
growth, and the effective 
use of development 
assistance. 
1-6 (low 
to high) 
16 criteria related to 
economic 
management, 
structural policies, 
policies for social 
inclusion/equity, 
and public sector 
management and 
institutions. 
The CPIA criteria include 
the indicators for the four 
clusters. For each 
criterion, countries are 
rated on a scale of 1 
(low) to 6 (high). The 
rating process includes: 
i) a benchmarking phase, 
during which there is the 
rating of a small but 
representative sample of 
countries selected from 
all regions; and ii) a 
second phase, during 
which the remaining 
countries are rated using 
the scores from the 
Fragile states are 
countries with a CPIA 
score of 3.2 or less. 
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benchmark countries as 
guideposts. Each of the 
four clusters weighs 25% 
of the overall score. 
Fragile 
states 
index 
(FSI) 
Fund for 
Peace; 
Foreign Policy 
journal (Fund 
for Peace and 
It allows the identification of, 
not only the normal 
pressures that all states 
experience, but also when 
those pressures are 
pushing the state towards 
the edge of failure. It 
enables political risk 
assessment and early 
warning of conflict. 
1-120 12 key political, 
military, social and 
economic indicators 
(and more than 100 
sub-indicators). 
The Conflict Assessment 
Software Tool (CAST) is 
used to attribute a score 
to each indicator 
representing the 
significance of the 
various pressures to 
each country with. The 
overall assessment is a 
result of a triangulation of 
these results, 
quantitative analysis and 
a qualitative examination 
of the major events in the 
countries. 
In the report countries 
are categorized by score 
quartiles: alert (90-120), 
warning (60-90), stable 
(30-60), and 
Index of 
state 
weakness 
in the 
developin
g world 
(ISW) 
Brookings 
Institution 
(Rice and 
Patrick, 2008) 
It allows the identification of 
potential patterns of state 
weakness, either within 
geographical regions or 
across functional areas by 
capturing state performance 
across its four areas of 
responsibility: economic, 
political, security and 
welfare. 
0-10 Index of state 
weakness in the 
developing world 
(ISW) 
Brookings Institution 
(Rice and Patrick, 2008) 
It allows the identification 
of potential patterns of 
state weakness, either 
within geographical 
regions or across 
functional areas by 
capturing state 
performance across its 
four areas of 
responsibility: economic, 
political, security and 
welfare. 
State 
fragility 
index 
(SFI) 
George 
Mason 
University 
(Marshall and 
It is a measure of fragility in 
a country, which is closely 
associated with the state 
capacity to manage conflict, 
0-25 
(no 
fragility 
to 
State fragility index 
(SFI) 
George Mason 
University (Marshall and 
Goldstone, 2007; 
Marshall and Cole, 2014) 
It is a measure of fragility 
in a country, which is 
closely associated with 
the state capacity to 
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Goldstone, 
2007; Marshall 
and Cole, 
2014) 
make and implement public 
policy, and deliver essential 
services, and its systemic 
resilience in maintaining 
system coherence, 
cohesion, and quality of life, 
providing and effective 
response to challenges and 
crisis, and sustaining 
progressive development. 
extreme 
fragility) 
manage conflict, make 
and implement public 
policy, and deliver 
essential services, and 
its systemic resilience in 
maintaining system 
coherence, cohesion, 
and quality of life, 
providing and effective 
response to challenges 
and crisis, and sustaining 
progressive 
development. 
Notes: Gutierrez et al. (2011), Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009) and Ziaja (2012) provide more extensive and complete accounts of the existing indices. 
Source: Ferreira, I A R (2015). Defining & Measuring State Fragilty: A New Proposal. The Annual Bank Conference on Africa. Berkeley, CA 
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/109_-
_ABCA_2015_Ines_Ferreira_Defining_and_measuring_state_fragility__A_new_proposal_May15.pd 
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Appendix 3.4: A Comprehensive Overview of Attributes, Aggregation Methods Indicator 
Weights Used to Construct Existing Fragility Indices 
Index Attributes and aggregation method Number of 
Indicators 
Weight per 
indicator 
BTI Weak 
Stateness Index 
(Monopoly of Violence + Basic Administration) / 2 2 0.500 
CIFP 
Fragility Index 
(Governance [12] + Economics [24] + Security & Crime [10] 
+ Human Development [17] + Demography [10] + 
Environment [10]) / 6 
83 0.007-
0.019 
Failed State 
Index 
(Mounting Demographic Pressures +Massive Movement of    
Refugees or   Internally   Displaced   Persons   creating   
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies  +  Legacy  of  
Vengeance-Seeking  Group  Grievance   or Group Paranoia 
+  Chronic and  Sustained  Human  Flight  +   Uneven 
Economic  Development  along  Group  Lines  +  Sharp  
and/or  Severe Economic  Decline  +  Criminalization  and/or  
Delegitimization  of the State + Progressive Deterioration of 
Public Services + Suspension    or Arbitrary Application of 
the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation    of Human 
Rights + Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a 
State" + Rise of Factionalized Elites + Intervention of Other 
States    or External Political Actors) / 12 
12 0.083 
IDA 
Resource 
Allocation 
Index 
(Economic Management [3]  + Structural Policies [3]  + 
Policies     for Social   Inclusion/Equity   [5]   +   Public   
Sector   Management     and Institutions [5]) / 4 
16 0.050-
0.083 
Index of 
State 
Weakness 
(Economic Basket [5] + Political Basket [5] + Security Basket 
[5]   + Social Basket [5]) / 4 
20 0.050 
PCIL Risk Ratio No attributes specified. The index uses a logistic regression 
model to produce country scores.  As variables,  it  uses  
Regime   Consistency, Infant  Mortality,  Economic  
Openness,  Militarization,  Neighborhood War and dummy 
variables for Autocracy and Partial Democracy. 
7 Not 
determined 
Political 
Instability 
Index 
(Underlying Vulnerability [12] + Economic Distress [3]) / 2 
Three indicators have a weight of two. 
15 0.038-
0.200 
State 
Fragility 
Index 
Effectiveness score + Legitimacy score =(Security   
Effectiveness   [1]   +   Political   Effectiveness   [3] + 
Economic Effectiveness [2]  +  Social  Effectiveness [1]) +  
(Security Legitimacy [1]  + Political Legitimacy [4]  + 
Economic   Legitimacy [1] + Social Legitimacy [1]) 
14 0.031-
0.125 
WGI 
Political Stability 
Indicator 
No attributes specified. The index uses an unobserved 
components model which weights each indicator according 
to its correlation with the other indicators.
33
 
35 0.010-
0.094 
                                                          
33
 Table refers to the 2008 editions of indices; exceptions: CIFP Fragility Index (2007) and Political Instability Index (2009/10). 
The figures in brackets show the number of indicators used to measure each attribute.  If the number of indicators used is one 
for all attributes, the bracket is omitted The weight per indicator can vary, even if no explicit weighting scheme is applied, when 
differently sized categories lead to different impacts of individual indicators on the overall index score. 
The Failed States Index also draws on at least four structural indicators and calibrates scores by expert judgement. The exact 
design and impact of these components is not published. 
PCIL risk ratio: Since the index does not standardize the indicators, the modelled weights cannot be calculated. According to 
the author, regime consistency has the strongest and militarization the lowest impact (personal communication). 
The WGI Political Stability index uses 35 indicators from 13 sources in the year 2008. The six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators jointly use many more indicators from 35 sources.These are weights provided by the index authors (World Bank 
2009b). 
Source: Ziaja, S., (2012). What do fragility indices measure? Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, pp.1-26. 
235 
 
Appendix 3.5: Preliminary statistics 
 OR R YB INF TR G E SE S 
 Mean  4.312  1.087  3.972  2.683  2.597  0.597  5.545  3.370  2.603 
 Median  4.305  1.099  3.978  2.503  2.303  1.000  5.544  3.286  2.564 
 Maximum  4.485  1.099  3.993  4.288  6.620  1.000  5.545  3.896  3.232 
 Minimum  4.016  0.693  3.947  1.683  0.000  0.000  5.541  2.819  2.229 
 Std. Dev.  0.101  0.068  0.016  0.731  1.929  0.495  0.000  0.275  0.265 
 Obs  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 
 
Appendix 3.6: Kaiser's Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
   
    MSA    
OR 0.872  
R 0.742  
YB 0.979  
INF 0.766  
TR 0.954  
G 0.760  
E 0.842  
SE 0.838  
S 0.954  
Kaiser's MSA 0.856  
 
Appendix 3.7: Maximum Absolute Correlations 
   
    MAC    
OR 0.552  
R 1.000  
YB 0.766  
INF 0.501  
TR 0.855  
G 0.702  
E 1.000  
SE 0.855  
S 0.733  
Overall 1.000  
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Appendix 3.8: Principal Component (Eigen Vectors) 
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   PC 6   PC 7   PC 8   PC 9   
          
          
OR -0.039 0.300 0.790 -0.367 0.005 -0.307 0.217 -0.095 0.001 
R 0.127 0.636 -0.158 -0.027 0.063 0.209 0.003 0.075 0.707 
YB 0.431 -0.067 0.301 0.038 0.365 0.110 -0.751 -0.093 -0.000 
INF -0.286 0.084 0.376 0.804 0.218 0.225 0.154 0.039 0.000 
TR 0.459 -0.014 0.058 0.236 -0.157 -0.382 0.076 0.744 -0.000 
G 0.371 -0.239 0.259 -0.148 -0.297 0.736 0.284 0.079 0.000 
E 0.127 0.636 -0.158 -0.027 0.063 0.209 0.003 0.075 -0.706 
SE 0.420 0.124 -0.026 0.372 -0.496 -0.238 0.038 -0.604 -0.000 
S 0.417 -0.128 -0.152 -0.010 0.673 -0.109 0.527 -0.213 0.000 
          
 
Appendix 3.9: Rotated Principal Component (Eigen Vectors) 
    
     PC1 PC2 PC3 
OR  0.012  0.090  0.813 
R  0.258 -0.115  0.155 
YB  0.067  0.590  0.256 
INF -0.101 -0.194  0.326 
TR  0.501  0.196 -0.036 
G -0.149  0.635  0.009 
E  0.258 -0.115  0.155 
SE  0.744 -0.083  0.000 
S  0.159  0.361 -0.344 
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Appendix 3.10: Result of Equal weight fragility and PCA Fragility.  
YEAR F(EWA) F(PCA) F(ECO) F(SOC) F(M&P) 
1980 3.853904 4.135067 4.157138 3.24059 3.25545 
1981 3.874452 4.231726 4.157174 3.24056 3.25545 
1982 3.935038 4.576412 3.973152 3.240502 3.131418 
1983 3.980352 5.191967 4.078736 2.786988 3.229284 
1984 3.963303 4.963424 4.003008 2.128287 3.120598 
1985 3.721628 5.187834 3.822535 1.124387 1.514765 
1986 3.688275 4.945683 3.658703 -0.88853 1.490266 
1987 3.731951 4.873219 3.987448 -8.62383 1.445511 
1988 3.830834 4.68496 4.416823 0.461916 1.370866 
1989 3.818322 4.633995 4.425247 1.561794 1.349503 
1990 3.71024 4.842125 3.967443 2.218997 1.290197 
1991 3.748312 4.994815 4.187486 2.692817 1.124137 
1992 3.840832 5.711121 4.533216 3.06251 0.909743 
1993 3.864053 5.46813 4.604104 3.356054 0.569165 
1994 3.849831 4.609795 4.55364 3.590892 -0.15266 
1995 3.864717 4.204183 4.579994 3.780405 -11.9246 
1996 3.799711 4.772203 4.304705 3.937099 3.150023 
1997 3.728739 6.067035 3.989141 4.068367 2.972761 
1998 3.718707 5.27741 4.001547 4.176159 2.783411 
1999 3.982388 5.998588 4.042702 4.261483 3.905946 
2000 3.986528 5.703868 4.147075 4.326244 3.520557 
2001 4.001128 5.576017 4.11187 4.373524 3.515675 
2002 3.991526 5.721887 3.86121 4.406578 3.81072 
2003 4.003926 5.895165 4.025115 4.427639 3.274075 
2004 4.029094 5.797622 4.037691 4.438857 3.583448 
2005 4.029928 6.099711 4.078024 4.442154 3.230967 
2006 4.0266 6.571424 4.020148 4.438328 3.540122 
2007 4.010573 7.004049 3.828524 4.428885 3.715644 
2008 4.038491 7.038586 3.925329 4.417148 3.57726 
2009 3.996928 6.742681 3.301173 4.407093 3.424768 
2010 4.039223 7.133401 3.396796 4.40179 3.543604 
2011 4.078895 7.602096 3.492794 4.402519 3.901093 
2012 4.184288 8.27605 3.263135 4.40206 4.392044 
2013 4.103782 8.013458 2.870664 4.455406 4.01081 
2014 4.202718 8.469629 2.592633 4.497911 4.605167 
2015 4.158741 8.384427 -2.23853 4.605174 4.564771 
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Appendix 4  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡           (4.1) 
Where Y= income, C= consumption, S=savings and t = time-specific effects. 
Based on classical economic notions of full employment, that assumes savings (S) and 
investment (I) to be equal, it can, therefore, be assumed that: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡            (4.2) 
Therefore: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡          (4.3) 
Given that all income is consumed or saved:   𝑆 = 𝑠𝑌      (4.4) 
Where s= marginal propensity to save 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡             (4.5) 
Since 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑌, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐶 = (1 − 𝑠)𝑌          (4.6) 
The capital accumulation equation can, therefore, be expressed as  
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿)              (4.7) 
Where K = capital   𝛿 = depreciation 
Therefore: 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿)           (4.8) 
The capital output ratio is symbolised as θ where 𝜃 =
𝐾𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 
This equation can then be used in growth expression.  
Changing the subject of formula of the capital-output ratio equation: 𝜃𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 
Substituting this into the capital accumulation equation then gives: 
𝜃𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝑡(1 − 𝛿)         (4.9) 
By expansion:  𝜃𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝜃𝑌𝑡       (4.10) 
Therefore by solving:  𝜃𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝜃𝑌𝑡 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝜃𝑌𝑡      (4.11) 
Dividing through by 𝜃 =  𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡 =
𝑠𝑌𝑡
𝜃
− 𝛿𝑌𝑡       (4.12) 
Dividing through by 𝑌𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑡+1− 𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
𝑠
𝜃
− 𝛿       (4.13) 
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Therefore 
𝑌𝑡+1− 𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡
  which can be re-written as ∆Y where ∆ = change and it basically represent 
a proportionate change in output with respect to output this year, and can be termed the 
growth rate of output.  
This, therefore, goes to provide the simple Harrod-Domar growth equation 𝑔 =
𝑠
𝜃
− 𝛿 (4.14) 
Where g = growth. 
Kaldor (1961) however stressed that steady income per capita growth remains a 
fundamental 
Drawing inspiration from the Harrod-Domar growth equation, the Solow model posits that 
output (Y) is a function of two inputs: capital (K) and labour (L). 
Mathematically it is represented as 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿)      (4.15) 
Where K>0, L>0 
The features assumed for this function includes a constant returns to scale, positive marginal 
productivity and diminishing marginal rate of substitution. A natural growth rate is assumed 
for labour, i.e., 𝑛 =  ∆𝐿/𝐿, as a result of exogenous growth in the population.  Capital (K) is in 
line with the Harrod-Domar capital accumulation assumption of  
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿) where new capital stock (𝐾𝑡+1) is a function of existing capital less 
depreciation (𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿)) in addition to investment (It).  
This is so due to the classical argument that income is either consumed or saved and that 
savings are invested (𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡). This is so by the classical argument of income is either 
consumed or saved, and that savings are invested (𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡). Therefore representing the 
fraction of income saved with constant s change in capital stock over a period of time can 
therefore be represented as  
∆𝐾 = 𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾 = 𝑠𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) −  𝛿𝐾         (4.16) 
This equation, therefore, provides an explanation of capital accumulation process over time 
on the assumption of labour employment. Indeed the existence of labour is pivotal to the 
Solow model which provides a somewhat explanation for the diminishing marginal returns to 
capital, hence the need for a per capita approach to the Solow model. 
Based on the capital accumulation equation earlier stated as: 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿)  (4.17) 
This is be transposed to give  𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿) + 𝐼𝑡       (4.18) 
240 
 
Since, investment is a product of savings rate and income, 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿) + 𝑠𝑌𝑡 (4.19) 
Introducing labour as done by Solow 1956 then brings the argument as to output per capita 
and capital per capita which then gives the equation as: 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡
=
𝐾𝑡(1−𝛿)
𝑙𝑡
+
𝑠𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑡
  (4.20) 
This gives 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡
= (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑠𝑦𝑡        (4.21) 
Where k represents capital per capita, and y represents output per capita. 
Due to the difference in t+1 and t, the left-hand remains unsolved. In solving this, multiply it 
by lt+1/lt+1 
This gives 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡
= (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑠𝑦𝑡        (4.22) 
We therefore now have equation in per capita as 𝑘𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡
= (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑠𝑦𝑡  (4.23) 
Labour growth therefore is 
𝑙𝑡+1
𝑙𝑡
= (1 + 𝑛)         (4.24) 
Therefore: 𝑘𝑡+1(1 + 𝑛) =  (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑠𝑦𝑡         (4.25) 
This equation can, therefore, be explained that capital stock per capita of the next period 
(𝑘𝑡+1) is a result of the current capital stock left after depreciation ((1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡) in addition with 
the unconsumed portion of output (𝑠𝑦𝑡)  which becomes investment on the notion that 
investment is a product of savings rate and income. The model however assumes constant 
labour growth, hence the need for a proportionate capital stock as labour increases to 
ensure constant capital per capita stock. This continues to a stage where newly accumulated 
capital per period is just adequate in maintaining capital stock per capita constant (k*), and 
an output per capita constant (y*). This steady state can be explained to be a situation where 
individual variables of the model are all growing with a constant rate over time. 
This can be represented as 𝑘𝑡=1 = 𝑘𝑡 = 𝑘
∗ and  𝑦𝑡=1 = 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦
∗     (4.26) 
Therefore at steady state, 𝑘∗(1 + 𝑛) =  (1 − 𝛿)𝑘∗ + 𝑠𝑦∗      (4.27) 
By solving,  𝑘∗(1 + 𝑛) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘∗ = 𝑠𝑦∗       (4.28) 
(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘∗ = 𝑠𝑦∗ 
𝑘∗ = 
𝑠
(𝑛 + 𝛿)
𝑦∗ 
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This can be alternatively written as 𝑦∗ =
(𝑛+𝛿)
𝑠
𝑘∗       (4.29) 
This steady state, therefore, connotes that constant output growth leads proportionate 
growth in capital stock and investment, implying a constant capital-output ratio, on the 
assumption of  
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 and  𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡(1 − 𝛿) explaining growth in capital stock.  
𝑌 = 𝑇(𝑡)𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿)               (4.30) 
Where T(t) is the accumulation of shifts in the production function over time, Y is output and 
K and L inputs capital and labour respectively. 
The MRW 1992 
Assuming a given country at time t, with an output Yt and inputs labour Lt and accumulated 
factors of types: Kt, Ht. The inputs: Ht and Kt accumulated by the sacrifice of current output, 
and are human and physical capital. It assumes advancement in technology through human 
capital through learning by doing process under the assumption that it is accumulated as an 
economic activity by product which does not require current output sacrifice.  The 
combination of these inputs, therefore, gives output, in line with the constant returns to scale 
cobb-Douglas form. The model kicked off with the textbook statement of Solow. 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
1𝑖    (4.31) 
Where Y = total income, K = capital stock, L = Labour and A = technology parameter. 
MRW augmented this textbook by introducing a symmetrical introduction of human capital as 
physical capital H which then gives 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
∝𝐻𝑡
𝛽(𝐴𝑡(𝐿𝑡))
1−𝛼−𝛽   (4.32) 
By expansion: 
𝑘𝑡
0 = 𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡     (4.33) 
ℎ𝑡
0 = 𝑠ℎ𝑦𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)ℎ𝑡     (4.34) 
Where 0 = change rate and 𝛿= proportionate depreciation rate to capital. Capital savings 
rate but physical and human are 𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ respectively, h= H/AL, k = K/AL and y=Y/AL. 
Steady state equations therefore are: 
𝑘∗ = (𝑠𝑘
1−𝛽
𝑠ℎ
𝛽
|𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)
1/(1−𝛼−𝛽)
           (4.35) 
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ℎ∗ = (𝑠𝑘
𝛼𝑠ℎ
1−𝛼|𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)
1/(1−𝛼−𝛽)
           (4.36) 
By substitution and log taking, production function for income per capita becomes 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑌𝑡
𝐿𝑡
) = ln𝐴 (0) + 𝑔𝑡 −
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) +
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(𝑠𝑘) +
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(𝑠ℎ).        (4.37) 
In the work of Mankiw Romer and Weil, (1992) the saving rate of capital 𝑠𝑘 was proxy by 
share of investment in GDP, the savings rate of human capital was proxy by the fraction of 
the labour force that are enrolled in secondary school. A straight forward development 
economist perspective is such as sees capital as an essential criterion for growth to occur 
irrespective of the source of such capital (Waheed, 2004). Other studies in modelling growth 
and indeed capital in developing economies have broken down capital to reflect these two 
forms of capital both foreign and domestic (Akinlo, 2004; Ayanwale, 2007; Driffield and 
Jones 2013; Adeniyi, 2015) .  
Endogenous Growth  
The perfect competition models assume a return to scale that is constant as well as 
production factors are covered for by marginal products, i.e., all output is exhausted by factor 
payments: 𝑌 =  𝐹𝑘𝐾 + 𝐹𝑙𝐿     (4.38) 
where: Y=Output, 𝐹𝑘𝐾 and 𝐹𝑙𝐿 are for capital and labour factor inputs receipts respectively.  
Cobb-Douglas aggregate production functions as: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼  𝐿𝑡
𝛽
     (4.39) 
Where Y = total income, K = capital stock, L = Labour and A = technology parameter. No 
restrictions are placed on coefficients α and β as against the exogenous assumption α+β=1. 
These models, however, assume saving to be a constant fraction of gross income in an 
economy. The growth in stock of capital can, therefore, be represented as  
𝐾𝑡 = 𝑠𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
𝛽
− 𝛿𝐾𝑡.   (4.40) 
Assuming that labour force maintains a constant growth, 
𝑛 =  ∆𝐿/𝐿        (4.41) 
Therefore, growth in stock of capital per capita can be represented as 
∆𝑘𝑡 = 𝑠𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
𝛽+𝛼−1
− (𝛿 + 𝑛)𝑘𝑡    (4.42) 
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∆𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 𝑠𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼−1𝐿𝑡
𝛽+𝛼−1
− (𝛿 + 𝑛).    (4.43) 
The Rebelo Growth Model  
Two major assumptions of the Lucas-Uzawa Model are: 
Assumption1: That agent expends their time resource between educational ventures and 
production process. 
Assumption 2: that production is a function of both individual (internal) and aggregate 
(external) input. Where, individual inputs incorporated physical and human capital and 
aggregate incorporated aggregate human capital. 
𝐾𝑡 = 𝐾𝑑𝑡 + 𝐾𝑓𝑡         (4.44) 
Waheed (2004) however, argued further that capital deficient country majorly developing 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia have largely relied on foreign capital to 
supplement domestic capital to fast-track their growth. 
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Appendix 5 
Appendix 5.1: Lag Length Selection for Co-integration 
Endogenous Variables: Y DK FDI REM ODA MS LGE 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -124.8857 NA   6.98e-06  7.993073  8.310514  8.099882 
1  27.95910  231.5830  1.38e-08  1.699449   4.238976*  2.553922 
2  89.17028   66.77584*  1.02e-08  0.959377  5.720992  2.561515 
3  175.4614  57.52743   4.44e-09*  -1.300693*  5.683009   1.049111* 
       
       Endogenous Variables: Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(EWA) 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -201.9811 NA   4.65e-05  12.72613  13.08892  12.84820 
1 -31.86029  247.4485  8.38e-08  6.294563  9.559671  7.393173 
2  69.64228  98.42673  1.84e-08  4.021680  10.18911  6.096831 
3  327.5234   125.0333*   2.52e-12*  -7.728690*   1.341053*  -4.676997* 
       
       Endogenous Variables: Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(PCA) 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -146.4625 NA   1.61e-06  9.361363  9.724152  9.483430 
1  24.46604  248.6233  2.76e-09  2.880846  6.145953  3.979455 
2  118.2610  90.95264  9.69e-10  1.075094  7.242519  3.150244 
3  320.1251   97.87351*   3.95e-12*  -7.280307*   1.789436*  -4.228615* 
       
       Endogenous Variables: Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(ECO) 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -252.5934 NA   0.000998  15.79354  16.15633  15.91560 
1 -72.93911  261.3153  1.01e-06  8.784188  12.04930  9.882798 
2  16.75137  86.97259  4.55e-07  7.227190  13.39461  9.302341 
3  283.8596   129.5070*   3.56e-11*  -5.082400*   3.987343*  -2.030708* 
       
       Endogenous Variables: Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(SOC) 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -242.8884 NA   0.000554  15.20536  15.56815  15.32743 
1 -32.04690  306.6786  8.47e-08  6.305873  9.570980  7.404482 
2  56.88715  86.23907  4.00e-08  4.794718  10.96214  6.869869 
3  313.8581   124.5920*   5.78e-12*  -6.900492*   2.169251*  -3.848800* 
       
Endogenous Variables: Y DK FDI REM ODA MS GE F(M&P) 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -200.0442 NA   4.13e-05  12.60874  12.97153  12.73081 
1 -31.07697  245.7705  7.99e-08  6.247089  9.512196  7.345698 
2  69.17558  97.21459  1.90e-08  4.049965  10.21739  6.125116 
3  306.5432   115.0873*   9.00e-12*  -6.457165*   2.612578*  -3.405472* 
       
       * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error  
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion  
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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